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ABSTRACT 
As borne out by everyday social experience, social cognition is highly dependent on 
context, modulated by a host of factors that arise from the social environment in which we 
live. While streamlined laboratory research provides excellent experimental control, it can 
be limited to telling us about the capabilities of the brain under artificial conditions, rather 
than elucidating the processes that come into play in the real world.  Consideration of the 
impact of ecologically valid contextual cues on social cognition will improve the 
generalizability of social neuroscience findings also to pathology, e.g., to psychiatric 
illnesses. To help bridge between laboratory research and social cognition as we experience 
it in the real world, this thesis investigates three themes: (1) increasing the naturalness of 
stimuli with richer contextual cues, (2) the potentially special contextual case of social 
cognition when two people interact directly, and (3) a third theme of experimental 
believability, which runs in parallel to the first two themes. Focusing on the first two 
themes, in work with two patient populations, we explore neural contributions to two topics 
in social cognition. First, we document a basic approach bias in rare patients with bilateral 
lesions of the amygdala.  This finding is then related to the contextual factor of ambiguity, 
and further investigated together with other contextual cues in a sample of healthy 
individuals tested over the internet, finally yielding a hierarchical decision tree for social 
threat evaluation. Second, we demonstrate that neural processing of eye gaze in brain 
structures related to face, gaze, and social processing is differently modulated by the direct 
presence of another live person.  This question is investigated using fMRI in people with 
autism and controls. Across a range of topics, we demonstrate that two themes of 
ecological validity — integration of naturalistic contextual cues, and social interaction — 
influence social cognition, that particular brain structures mediate this processing, and that 
it will be crucial to study interaction in order to understand disorders of social interaction 
such as autism.   
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C h a p t e r  1  
INTRODUCTION 
“I had,” said he, “come to an entirely erroneous conclusion, which shows my dear Watson, how dangerous 
it always is to reason from insufficient data.” 
  Sherlock Holmes character (Doyle, 1892/2002) 
Sherlock Holmes’ observation that it is dangerous to draw conclusions from 
insufficient data is an extreme statement of an important reminder for cognitive and social 
neuroscientists. It is unclear when data is sufficient, but it is equally clear that removal of 
crucial variables from a model will still elicit a model, albeit one that is profoundly 
different from one that would have included the ignored variables. Currently, the 
predominant scientific approach is that of systematic, as opposed to representative, design;  
variables are carefully isolated, and their effect on behavior, cognition, and neural activity 
tested. While this approach undeniably generates valuable findings, a lingering concern is 
that it reveals the brain’s capacity for processing those stimuli when tested in isolation in 
the laboratory, rather than its real-world processing tendencies when those same variables 
are contextualized alongside a myriad array of co-occurring variables.  
In an attempt to ameliorate these concerns, “ecologically valid” or naturalistic 
methods are currently en vogue. A movement towards interactive social neuroscience is 
especially popular. This first chapter provides a framework for evaluating these methods, 
and concludes with an overview of the second and third chapters of this thesis. The second 
chapter examines the role of the amygdala in threat processing, beginning by proposing a 
general function of the amygdala in assessing saliency and self relevance, showing that 
amygdala damage promotes a general rather than stimulus-specific default approach bias, 
and finally explores how situational cues are hierarchically assessed to elicit specific 
defensive behaviors to both physical and psychological social threats. This hierarchical 
model is proposed as a tool that could probe the specific contribution of the amygdala and 
other structures to guiding defensive behavior. Finally, assessing a profound experimental 
manipulation, the third chapter tests the fundamental question of whether non-interactive 
methods adequately elicit the social processing we seek to study.  
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C h a p t e r  1 . 1  
REAL LIFE OR FANTASY? A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING 
NATURALISTIC METHODS IN SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE 
Imagine you’re an undergraduate student at your university. Walking through campus, 
you see a sign:  
Participate in a psychology experiment!  
Earn $20/hr!  
 $20 can buy you 200 packets of ramen noodles. You approach the sign and tear off 
a tab with the experimenter’s contact information.  
 You decide to participate in the experiment. Later that night, you sign a few forms 
and sit down in front of a computer in a university laboratory. A psychology grad student 
turns to you: 
“In this experiment, you’ll look at pictures of people and judge them. We’re 
interested in which faces you find threatening. After seeing a face, please rate it 
on a scale of 1 to 7: use 1 if the face isn’t at all threatening and 7 if it’s very 
threatening. 4 is neutral. Enter your response as quickly as possible. Do you have 
any questions?”  
You shake your head ‘no’.  
“Okay, press the space-bar to begin.” 
 A hairless, computer-generated face appears. It stares blankly at you. Is it 
threatening? Yeah, he’s a bit dodgy. You don’t feel too strongly about it though. Maybe 
he’s a 6? Then, again, he’s not too bad — maybe a 4? You decide to compromise. 
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Tentatively, you press 5 on the keyboard.  
 An hour and countless faces later, with $20 in your pocket, you leave the laboratory 
and head for the parking lot.  
 On the way home, you stop at Walmart to exchange the cash for ramen. While 
you’re getting back in your car, a man approaches you. Unlike in the lab, you don’t 
hesitate. He’s definitely dodgy. Decisively, you jump in your car, jab the lock button, and 
drive off. 
❧❧❧ 
 As neuroscientists, we have our experimental participants complete experiments 
like this one every day. What is the difference between the two described experiences of 
fear? There’s the obvious difference: one was real and the other was a laboratory 
experiment. Other differences are subtler. The real man had hair. He moved. He was in a 
parking lot. Which of these differences matter more to our brains?   
 As scientists, we propose that the cognitive principles and models we uncover 
relate to in situ cognition. However, it is becoming clear that this belief is often 
unrealistic. A renewed focus on ecological validity aims to remedy this disconnect 
between the laboratory and real life, between the capacity of the brain to behave in a 
certain way under specific laboratory conditions and a tendency to react to those same 
factor manipulations in a completely different way in the unconstrained outside world.  
 Currently, the field is rife with discussion paragraphs and reviews dedicated to the  
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topic of ecological validity, broadly and widely construed1. Despite heavy theoretical 
interest, empirical attempts remain relatively scattershot. To be sure, more than lip 
service is paid to the concept, but the overall attempt is minimally organized. In this 
chapter, a framework for studying ecological validity is proposed and used as motivation 
for the set of studies that follow in this thesis.  
Ecological Validity Defined 
The first step in providing a framework for this area of research is to define 
ecological validity and highlight motivations for its pursuit. While currently fashionable, 
the idea of ecological validity is not new:  
Increasing numbers of cognitive psychologist and neuropsychologists are moving 
beyond the laboratory and attempting to understand human cognitive abilities as 
they are manifest in natural contexts (p. xi) (Poon, 1989). 
That statement was made in the 1980s when psychologists researching memory 
debated the merits of studying “everyday” cognition – analogous to the “real world” 
social cognition investigated here. That debate generated two important observations to 
keep in mind throughout this thesis. The first is that there are “theoretical and 
methodological trade-offs and dilemmas” (Poon, 1989) involved in this kind of research; 
as such, we should consider the “how, when, and why” for studying real-world as 
opposed to traditional laboratory cognition (Rubin, 1989). The second observation is that 
laboratory and real-world research lie on a continuum (Poon, 1989). At one far end of the 
spectrum lies experimental manipulation of isolated, low-level variables (e.g., edge 
                                                
1 Including but not limited to the following concepts: cognitive ethology, real-world, real-life or everyday life, 
naturalistic, interactive, first and second-person neuroscience, embodied cognition, representative design, and 
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detection); ethology and pure observation lie at the other. Excitingly, mixing this 
continuum, computational ethology (Anderson & Perona, 2014) is an emerging field, 
employing automated behavioral classification and detailed environmental manipulation, 
that makes ethology more experimental. Combined with tools to manipulate neural 
systems in organisms, this field has significant potential for detailing neural circuits 
underlying ecologically valid behavior.  
 Within this thesis, ecological validity is conceived as capturing the tendency rather 
than capability of the brain, and of utilizing stimuli2 that elicit patterns of response that 
capture the most variance in actual everyday behavior. Note that this definition does not 
automatically make unnatural stimuli ecologically invalid and naturalistic stimuli 
ecologically valid. This distinction draws on the Bruswikian concept of representative 
design, developed in the 1950s, which is utilized within the strategy of probabilistic 
functionalism. Probabilistic functionalism assumes that “behavior takes place in a 
semichaotic medium that contains cues of limited trustworthiness, expressed 
vicariously,” (Petrinovich, 1989) requiring a research strategy that samples a broad array 
of cues. Petrinovich posits that Brunswik’s approach of representative design can be 
“conceived as an exercise is sampling theory” (1989), which pits representative design 
against systematic design; both make different assumptions about experimental sampling 
but share a common goal of making generalizable theoretical conclusions about the mind 
(and, in our case, the brain). Under systematic design, experimenters “systematically 
include and exclude factors and manipulate variables systematically as the investigator 
                                                
2 While this definition focuses on ecological validity of the experimental manipulation, it is of course also important to 
consider the validity of our behavioral measures and generalizability of our sample population.  
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deems useful and appropriate.” Alternatively, representative design assumes it is 
necessary to “understand the situation in which stimuli are encountered, and then 
representatively sample stimuli from that population of situations.” To do this, 
representative design requires sampling “distal” stimuli, i.e., situational or contextual 
cues that influence the more proximal cause of behavior. Petrinovich makes a strong 
claim that the former is nomothetic, seeking general laws, while the latter is idiographic, 
observing behavior of isolated cases, but that divide is too severe, especially in modern 
treatment: for example, even strict proponents of systematic design consider, and model, 
individual differences, something Petrinovich (1989) did not consider compatible with 
the traditional systematic approach; similarly, proponents of representative design today 
still seek relatively general laws.  
 To reiterate: the concept of ecological validity used in this thesis is similar to 
Bruswikian representative design, which refers to an experiment’s “quality of 
naturalness, or lifelikeness” – some of these cues may be strictly “ecologically valid” in 
Brunswik’s conceptualization, in which ecological validity relates to the “potential utility 
of various cues for organisms in their ecology” (Petrinovich, 1989).  Simply put, we are 
interested in contextual cues, often naturalistic or lifelike, that have the most influence on 
patterns of behavior and cognition as they occur in the real world. While the terms we use 
are admittedly “fuzzy”, that imprecision is intentional in order to preserve a broad 
concept that encompasses three main classes of ecological validity, discussed below.  
Framework for Ecologically Valid Social Neuroscience 
 Subsequent to defining the concept of ecological validity, a second goal is to 
introduce a framework for ecological validity in social neuroscience. There are two main 
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lines of work conducted in ecological validity in social neuroscience, and a third 
important area to consider. The first centers around the theme of context, the second 
around interaction, and the third around believability.  
Adding Contextual Cues. The first and most prominent theme of ecological 
validity is to add cues to make a laboratory stimulus perceptually realistic. Often, this 
involves making the stimulus as naturalistic as possible (e.g., returning to our original 
example, using photographs, or, even better, dynamic videos, instead of computer-
generated facial images). While stimulus manipulation can make stimuli as close to a 
real-world representation as possible, another way to manipulate context to make a cue 
“realistic” is to instead simply influence high-level representations and beliefs to create 
an artificial percept of “realness.” For example, the neural response to manipulation of 
interpersonal space (know as “proxemics”) was successfully investigated by convincing 
participants that someone was approaching them in the scanning room, not with any 
change in perceptual cues, but through verbal instruction, telling participants that 
someone was approaching them (Kennedy, Glaescher, Tyszka, & Adolphs, 2009). 
Notably, this second type of contextual manipulation (i.e., non-perceptual) can only be 
manipulated in humans, whose beliefs can be verbally informed.  
Contextual cues influence all levels of cognition. For example, starting with 
perception, the fusiform face area, a region that exhibits specialization for faces relative 
to other objects, is actually most responsive to the context of a face, rather than an actual 
face (Figure 1.1.1) (Cox, Meyers, & Sinha, 2004).  
 
  
8 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1.1. The Fusiform Face Area is Preferentially Sensitive to the Context of a Face. 
Reproduced from Cox et al., (2004). Panel a: the fusiform face area of the brain (top) is 
localized in contrasts of responses to faces and objects. Panel b: changes in activity in this 
functionally localized region is greatest for the context of a face (highlighted in red).  
 
At the level of social cognition, an example of the power of context influencing 
processing tendency rather than capacity is demonstrated by comparing judgments to the 
two panels shown in Figure 1.1.2. While individuals can quickly and reliably make 
spontaneous trait inferences from photographs of facial features (Willis & Todorov, 
2006) as well as judge emotions, (e.g., the woman in panel a is upset), with the addition 
of contextual cues from that woman’s environment (Figure 1.1.2b) that social inference 
becomes much richer.  
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Figure 1.1.2. Example of Contextualized Social Emotional Inference. Contrasts of 
emotion judgments elicited by photographs of the same woman, cropped in to only reveal 
the face (panel a) and showing the environment surrounding her face (panel b), 
demonstrate that a deeper level of social emotional inference is permitted by the 
availability of contextual cues.  
An experimental example of contextual cues influencing social cognition is the 
finding that judgments of politicians based on extra-facial visual cues correspond with 
real-world election outcomes (Spezio et al., 2012). It had previously been shown that 
subjects’ laboratory two-alternative-forced-choice judgments of who was more 
competent and trustworthy of two actual political opponents corresponded with election 
outcomes — for example, the candidate more often chosen as more competent in the 
laboratory was more often the electoral winner (Ballew & Todorov, 2007). While the 
literature surrounding spontaneous trait inferences (rapid judgments of people based on 
photographs of their face) traditionally assumes those judgments are driven by facial 
features (Todorov & Uleman, 2002), and has manipulated computer-generated faces to 
a. b.
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demonstrate visual features that contribute to certain trait judgments (Todorov, Baron, 
& Oosterhof, 2008), we showed that judgments of extra-facial cues alone most strongly 
correspond with electoral outcomes (Spezio et al., 2012) (Figure 1.1.3). 
 
Figure 1.1.3. Sample Stimuli from Study on Judgments of Politicians’ Occluded Faces. 
Reproduced from Spezio, et al., (2012). Subjects made two-alternative forced choice 
decisions between candidate pairs from real elections, indicating which face they found 
more trustworthy, more competent, and less threatening. Faces were presented in three 
conditions: (a) unaltered full facial images, (b) facial-only images that windowed facial 
features while excluding external cues, and (c) non-facial images that occluded facial 
information.  
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While it is unclear which of the available visual cues (dress, hairline, posture, 
face width, etcetera) influence these judgments, it is clear that some of these contextual, 
non-facial features meaningfully influence our appearance-based judgments of others.  
So far, we have considered examples of considering contextual cues to improve 
ecological validity. A second theme of ecological exists that requires a fundamentally 
novel approach to experimentation: interaction.  
Social Interaction. In 2007, technology blogger Kathy Sierra described a 
surprising phenomena: despite several social media tools for remote communication 
being made available at a conference she attended, participants in that conference 
preferred travelling and meeting in person over staying home and communicating 
through those tools (2007) (Figure 1.1.4). She asked why this was the case. In her 
conceptualization, moving up a curve of interactive richness, social communication tools 
of increasing representational fidelity (for example, email, to phone, to video-chat), 
enabled better communication, yet never approached the case of face-to-face interaction 
where something “ineffable happens [and] turns the brain on.”  
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Figure 1.1.4. Face-to-Face Curve. Reproduced from Sierra (2007).  
More scientifically, neuroscientists also propose that distinct neural processing 
occurs in interaction (e.g., (Redcay et al., 2010; Risko, Laidlaw, Freeth, Foulsham, & 
Kingstone, 2012; Schilbach, Eickhoff, Cieslik, Kuzmanovic, & Vogeley, 2012; L. 
Schilbach et al., 2013; Leonhard Schilbach et al., 2013; Tanabe et al., 2012)), in that 
social cognition is different when interacting with rather than observing someone. 
Interaction can be viewed as a second-person account of social cognition (Schilbach et 
al., 2013); in contrast, the two dominant networks described in social neuroscience, the 
so-called Mirror Neuron System — a macroscopic brain network that can be recorded 
with fMRI, and which is thought to perform a function analogous to that of mirror 
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neurons — which offers support for a simulationist account, and the inferential 
mentalizing/Theory of Mind (TOM) network, which supports theory-theory accounts, 
offer a first and third person account, respectively (Schilbach et al., 2013). It is possible 
that evidence in favor of either of these prominent networks is strongly influenced by the 
experimental paradigms used: “it has remained unclear whether and how activity in 
the[se] networks […] is modulated by the degree to which a person does or does not feel 
actively involved in the ongoing interaction and whether the networks might subserve 
complimentary or mutually exclusive roles in this case” (Schilbach et al., 2013). To solve 
this dilemma, to find the “dark matter” of the neural mechanisms underlying social 
interaction, we should study the context of interaction as a potentially necessary form of 
ecological validity. A proposed strong contender for explaining second person accounts 
of neuroscience is embodied cognition. In contrast to spectatorial accounts, embodied 
cognition sees social perceptions as “an active process executed by an organism situated 
in the environment, wherein subjects are not isolated from but embedded in and couple 
with the perceived world” (Schilbach et al., 2013). Both a hybrid account of the two 
spectatorial views (theory-theory TOM/mentalizing and simulation theory mirroring 
accounts), as well as accounts emphasizing embodiment are gaining credence, and 
second person paradigms (requiring interaction and emotional engagement) may shine 
light on them.  
Believability. In addition to contextual cues and interaction, a third theme of 
ecological validity (which I do not manipulate in this thesis) is believability — making a 
participant believe a stimulus or experimental manipulation is ecologically valid and that 
the experimenter is not deceiving them and that the manipulation is real. Neuroeconomics 
  
14 
 
studies often consider this element of ecological validity, convincing subjects that they 
are actually interacting with other real people and that they are making “real” decisions, 
at least one of which will actually be randomly selected and realized.  
Ecological Validity in Non-Human Species. Notably, believability is a high-
level manipulation that only works in humans. How can ecological validity be 
manipulated in other species? One approach is that ethological approaches can be scaled-
up and computationally assessed (Anderson & Perona, 2014). In our three themes of 
ecological validity — (1) contextual cues, (2) interaction, and (3) believability — the 
following are possible: 
(1) Making the stimulus as rich, dynamic, and contextualized as possible is 
feasible in all species. This theme acts on perception. 
(2) Making a stimulus interactive, or contingent, on an animal’s actions can be 
done in other species. This theme acts at many levels, not just perception. In 
addition to other species, this theme would be important to test in development. 
(3) Believability can only be manipulated in humans. 
An important gap to bridge between social neuroscience in humans and other animals is 
that other animals usually do not know that they are in an experiment, and studies with 
them are therefore ecologically valid in that sense (Stanley & Adolphs, 2013). On the 
other hand, verbal report and explicit instruction are impossible in animals, and non-
ethological testing approaches often require extensive training.  
 In animal experiments, it is beginning to be recognized that the animal’s rearing 
and comfort are crucial aspects of ecological validity in social neuroscience. Tetsuro 
Matsuzawa’s novel participant observation method (Matsuzawa, 2013) in chimpanzee 
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research begins to address this issue. In his approach, group-housed, mother-reared 
chimpanzees “volunteer” to participate in experiments, coming to testing areas of their 
living space as they wish. Further, testing and social life are not separated — 
chimpanzees are raised to interact with and trust the experimenter, with their mother 
present for interactions with the experimenter. This trusting and fairly natural laboratory 
rearing has permitted studying other themes of ecological validity, such as interaction, in 
the finding that chimpanzees are capable of altruistic behavior, helping conspecifics 
based both on a perceptual understanding of their need and being “asked” for help 
(Yamamoto, Humle, & Tanaka, 2012). Observing this altruistic behavior required an 
interactive paradigm since the behavior required being asked for help, an interactive 
process. 
Evolutionary View of Ecological Validity. The following question could be 
asked: what does ecological validity actual gain? Are differences just attentional? Aside 
from the theoretical reasons put forth thus far, our consideration of other species segues 
to answering that question with another question: what did the brain actually evolve to 
process? While we do not actually know, there are two very different views. The first is 
that it evolved to process real stimuli, in the real world, in an interactive context (a view 
espoused by ethologists). A second view, supported by strong proponents of 
computational models of the mind, is that the brain evolved to process simpler 
computations that can be brought to bear on real-world processes. At minimum, these 
real-world processes require incorporating more information or computations to 
determine behavior. Regardless of which answer one supports, ecological validity is 
useful. Aside from these theoretical rationales, there is empirical evidence that contextual 
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manipulations do influence behavior.  
Further Aspects of Ecological Validity. While three main themes of ecological 
validity have been discussed, there are of course still other aspects of ecological validity 
not covered here, including, but not limited to (1) individual variation, (2) the temporal 
dynamics of everyday versus laboratory behavior were response times are experimentally 
circumscribed, and (3) the need for more varied and comprehensive ways to measure 
behavior, including more implicit measures.  
Moving Forward 
Returning to the concept of representative design, with any factor relevant to 
ecological validity tested, it is important to be keenly aware of issues of generalizability. 
Additionally, as with all neuroscience, studies sampling many different methods and 
providing convergent evidence are preferable. Also, while ethological approaches are 
valuable and information, as neuroscientists, we need to not only observe behavior, but 
also develop and test models that explain neural processing thereof.  
Moving forward, working within the framework of two main themes of ecological 
validity, contextual cues, and interaction (with a parallel them of believability), we test 
the importance of the those themes in the next two chapters by (1) investigating the 
sensitivity of the amygdala to contextual cues, including ambiguity, in threat perception, 
and (2) investigating the influence of interaction on the neural processing of gaze in 
individuals with autism spectrum disorder.  
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C h a p t e r  2  
THE AMYGDALA AND SOCIAL THREAT 
The first chapter of this thesis claimed that ecologically valid social cognition is 
influenced by a constellation of situational contextual cues. While offering support for 
that claim, this chapter also offers evidence in support of the amygdala serving a general 
role; this in turn helps explain the amygdala’s generalized processing of diverse inputs.  
This three sections of this chapter all focus on the amygdala and threat; two of the 
three sections are published or in press and one is currently under review. The rationale for 
focusing on the amygdala is twofold: (1) arguably, it is the most investigated brain 
structure in social neuroscience, and will feature later in this thesis as a neuroimaging 
region of interest, partially because it is hypothesized to contribute to dysfunctional social 
cognition in autism spectrum disorder (cf. Chapter 3.1). Within this chapter, the first 
section provides a brief review of what we know about the function of the amygdala; the 
second and third sections are empirical papers. A further rationale (2) for studying the 
amygdala is that I had access to three extremely rare neurological patients who had focal 
bilateral lesions to the amygdala. Because I investigated approach-avoidance behavior to 
faces, an important category of social stimuli, prior work that linked face processing to the 
amygdala, including in these same patients, increased the relevance of focusing on this 
brain structure.  
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Summarizing our results, this chapter begins exploring the role that the 
amygdala plays in social perception, suggesting a general role related to evaluating the 
saliency or self-relevance of social and non-social cues for an organism.   
In the second section, disruption of this evaluation is shown to promote an 
enhanced default approach bias in bilateral amygdala lesion patients – instantiated as a 
tendency to default to rating impoverished facial images in which facial features were 
occluded as more approachable, i.e., more trustworthy and less threatening than their 
unaltered, whole-face counterparts. This second section marks an important reminder 
that information content, i.e., ambiguity, rather than specific information, can be an 
important contextual dimension along which our brains evaluate stimuli to guide our 
social behavior.  
This chapter culminates by assessing how ambiguity, alongside nine other 
contextual factors, hierarchically guides human defensive responses to both physical 
and psychological threat scenarios, mirroring patterns of threat evaluation observed in 
other species. In line with the first section of this chapter, this hierarchical guidance of 
defensive responses relies upon appraisal of the contextual relevance of potential 
threats to a person. 
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C h a p t e r  2 . 1  
THE AMYGDALA AND SOCIAL PERCEPTION3 
 The amygdala is a key structure connecting sensory representations with valuation, 
social inference, attentional modulation, and memory encoding.  As such, it plays a 
prominent role in one particular aspect of social perception: the ability to infer the 
meaning of social communicative signals.  While this role is best studied in regard to the 
recognition of emotions from facial expressions, it extends to more complex social 
judgments, other sensory modalities, as well as the incorporation of context.  Recent 
work attempts to synthesize a more unitary function from all these findings, possibly 
related to aspects of evaluating biological significance or saliency.  Considerable future 
work is required to situate the amygdala’s function within a more extended neural 
system, likely featuring close interactions between the amygdala, temporal and prefrontal 
cortex, as well as parts of the basal ganglia and brainstem. 
 
Introduction 
 Bilaterally buried in the medial temporal lobe, the human amygdala is a compact 
subcortical structure, unilaterally occupying just under 1400 mm3 in postmortem 
histology (Schumann & Amaral, 2006) and around 2000 mm3 in live MRI scans 
(Schumann et al., 2004). Our understanding of the amygdala’s functional role has 
evolved considerably over the past 50 years, most strikingly shifting from a role in social 
behavior (in the mid-1900s) to one related to fear (in the late 1900s) to one more 
                                                
3 A version of this chapter has been published (Harrison & Adolphs, 2015).  
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abstractly related to value, saliency, and relevance at the current time.  
 Historically, and at first glance, the role of the amygdala may appear deceptively 
simple — it detects threat through a specific role in associative memory (LeDoux, 1996). 
While this function’s simplicity and biological significance constitute an attractive 
explanation, decades of investigation support a considerably more complex and diverse 
view (Aggleton, 2000; Whalen & Phelps, 2009), to some extent leaving in question what 
might be its “basic” function — topics we take up below.  
 Lesion studies, including the early classic work by Kluver and Bucy (1939), 
implicated the amygdala in social processing. Subsequent research focused on detection 
of social and non-social threat. In tandem with increased interest in social neuroscience, 
social stimuli, especially faces and facial emotions, were studied in detail. Outside of 
social neuroscience, threat processing studies evolved into a healthy branch of reward 
learning research, supplemented by neuroeconomics. This accumulation of evidence 
made it clear that the amygdala does much more than detect threat; in an early synthesis 
of these diverse areas of research, we (Adolphs, 2010) summarized the emerging view 
that the amygdala processes  “a psychological stimulus dimension related to saliency or 
relevance.” Clearly, this role would be important to social perception, both at the direct 
perception end, and in a modulatory attentional role (see Box 2.2.1).  
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How tenable is the hypothesis that the amygdala processes salience or relevance? 
Attractively, it predicts a rather broad processing role, which is borne out by the 
amygdala’s anatomy. The amygdala features dense afferent and efferent connections to 
other cortical and subcortical regions, and features interconnections between its 
constituent subnuclei (Amaral, Price, Pitkänen, & Carmichael, 1992; Pitkänen, Savander, 
& LeDoux, 1997). Interconnections within the amygdala highlight the complexity packed 
into this small structure. The human amygdala is a collection of over a dozen nuclei and 
sub-nuclei (Figure 2.1.1). Broadly speaking, it consists of two main regions: the 
basolateral amygdala and centromedial amygdala. Ultimately, an understanding of the 
role of the amygdala in social perception cannot ignore distinctions between its 
subnuclei.   
Box 2.2.1. Social Perception 
 Perception is the transduction of sensory stimuli to action potentials, which elicit early neural 
processing, resulting in an organism detecting, discriminating, and categorizing an attended environmental 
stimulus. A perceived object is processed to the extent that it can be discriminated from other stimuli, and 
categorized (further recognition and judgments that rely on memory, and, in the case of humans, naming, 
typically follow but need not be included under the rubric “perception”).   
 Social perception is the perception of “social” objects. Notably, “social perception refers to initial 
stages in the processing of information that culminates in the accurate analysis of the dispositions and 
intentions of other individuals” (Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000). Thus, while emotion recognition and 
face processing are typically considered perceptual, inferring the beliefs of other people (“mentalizing”) is 
not. The boundary between “initial” and “later” processing is fuzzy and can be debated.  
Similarly, the bounds of the amygdala’s role in social perception are not clear. Antecedent to 
perception, it guides attention. Subsequent to perception, the amygdala helps evaluate social stimuli to 
guide our behavior. While working within a classic three-stage cognitivist model that separates perception, 
attention, and behavior can be useful methodologically, attempting to isolate the amygdala’s role in 
perception ultimately fails to provide a unitary understanding of the amygdala’s function. The amygdala 
likely contributes to rapid detection, more extended processing, and behavior - all at different points in 
time. In fact, it participates all the time, likely through interactions of its various sub-nuclei with different 
networks, and we should view its perceptual role as restricted to a particular slice in processing time 
within a specific network. Its broader role is much more pervasive. 
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Figure 2.1.1. Amygdala nuclei. A coronal section of a postmortum human brain (left) 
shows the centromedial nucleus outlined in orange and basolateral complex outlined in 
red. An MRI scan (right) shows coronal and parasaggital probabilistic locations of 
amygdala nuclei in humans. Lefthand panel: BL = basolateral nucleus; BM = basomedial 
nucleus; BV = basoventral nucleus; CE = central nucleus; La = lateral nucleus; Me = 
medial nucleus; VCo = ventral cortical nucleus; CL = Claustrum; Ent = entorhinal cortex; 
F = endorhinal sulcus; Hi = hippocampus; NbM = Nucleus basalis of Meynert; TrO = 
Tractus opticus; V = lateral ventricle. Righthand panels: Orange = centromedial 
amygdala; red = basolateral amygdala; magenta = superficial amygdala; yellow = 
hippocampal-amygdaloid transition area; light blue = subiculum; green = CA regions of 
the hippocampus; dark blue = dentate gyrus; purple = entorhinal cortex. Reproduced from 
Amunts, et al. (2005). Cytoarchitectonic mapping of the human amygdala, hippocampal 
region, and entorhinal cortex: intersubject variability and probability maps. Anatomy and 
Embryology, 210(5-6), 343-352, with permission from Spring Science + Business Media.  
 
 Here we readdress the question of what the amygdala contributes to social 
perception. We do so by (1) reviewing the three main areas of amygdala research - fear, 
social judgment, and reward processing; (2) conducting a meta-analysis of human fMRI 
studies; and (3) considering anatomy and connectivity.   
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The Amygdala and Fear 
 Behaviorally, some of the most striking consequences of focal amygdala lesions in 
nonhuman animals are a lack of fear-like behavior in response to normally threatening 
stimuli.  This has been shown particularly clearly in the case of rats (Choi & Kim, 2010), 
where reversible pharmacological lesions revealed a parametric relationship between 
amygdala activity and fearful behavior: muscimol-induced lesions were associated with a 
lack of fearful behavior, whereas bicuculline-induced excitation was associated with 
exaggerated fearful behavior.  
 Recently, optogenetics has been used to study fear behavior and conditioning in 
rats. Optogenetics uses molecular biology tools to express synthetic ion channels in 
particular neurons of an animal’s brain.  These ion channels are opened or closed by 
light, allowing light pulses to modulate neural activity in real-time in freely moving 
animals. Optical stimulation of amygdala neurons can directly serve as a conditioned 
stimulus in fear conditioning (Johansen et al., 2010). Meanwhile, optical silencing of 
basolateral neurons that project to the centromedial nucleus affects anxiety behavior (Tye 
et al., 2011). Optogenetics is a powerful technique, with exciting potential to elucidate 
functional interactions of neural populations. 
 A complementary approach to neuromodulation consists of irreversible chemical 
lesions via ibotenic acid, an approach taken in several monkey studies (Emery et al., 
2001; Mason, Capitanio, Machado, Mendoza, & Amaral, 2006; Prather et al., 2001).  
Here, too, there is a consensus that amygdala lesions reduce the normally cautionary 
break on behavior that is elicited by stimuli that signal potential threat.  Interestingly, the 
behavioral effect (which consists essentially of an unmasking of exploratory or approach 
  
24 
 
behaviors that are normally inhibited) is seen both for overtly threatening stimuli (e.g., 
snakes) as well as for stimuli that merely signal uncertainty (e.g., novel objects next to 
food).  The consequences on behavior for complex social stimuli are rather varied, and 
depend to some extent on context and individual differences (Mason et al., 2006). 
 In humans, only a single complete lesion case has been well studied (although there 
are a handful of studies on other patients with similar lesions): SM, a patient with 
developmental bilateral amygdala lesions, also showed a dramatic lack of fear behaviors 
(Feinstein, Adolphs, Damasio, & Tranel, 2011), as well as impairment in directing gaze 
and attention to relevant facial features (Figure 2.1.2).  Especially valuable in this human 
case was the opportunity to (a) test fear elicitation across a wide range of stimuli 
(autobiographical recall, actual snakes and spiders, a haunted house, fear experience in 
everyday life, horror movies) and (b) investigate other basic emotions as well.  A highly 
selective absence of fear was found across all the stimuli. Interestingly, while the 
amygdala seems necessary to elicit fear from external stimuli, following lesioning of the 
amygdala, interoceptive fear can be induced by carbon dioxide inhalation (Feinstein et 
al., 2013).  
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Figure 2.1.2. The brain and face processing of patient SM. Bilateral amygdala lesions 
impair the use of the eyes and gaze to the eyes during emotion judgment. (A) A patient 
with bilateral damage to the amygdala made significantly less use of information from 
the eye region of faces when judging emotion. (B) While looking at whole faces, the 
patient (right column of images) exhibited abnormal face gaze, making far fewer 
fixations to the eyes than did controls (left column of images). This was observed across 
emotions (free viewing, emotion judgment, gender discrimination). (C) MRI scan of the 
patient’s brain, whose lesion was relatively restricted to the entire amygdala, a very rare 
lesion in humans. The two round black regions near the top middle of the image are the 
lesioned amygdalae. (D) When the subject was instructed to look at the eyes (“SM eyes”) 
in a whole face, she could do this, resulting in a remarkable recovery in ability to 
recognize the facial expression of fear. The findings show that an apparent role for the 
amygdala in processing fearful facial expressions is in fact more abstract, and involves 
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the detection and attentional direction onto features that are socially informative. 
Reproduced from Adolphs, (2010). What does the amygdala contribute to social 
cognition? In: A. Kingstone & Miler (Eds.), Year in Cognitive Neuroscience 2010 (pp. 
42-61). Malden: Wiley, with permission from Wiley.  
 A few other such amygdala lesion patients have also been studied, and bear out 
these main findings (J. Feinstein, personal communication). A point to note is that they 
all suffer from a developmental and progressive disease, leaving open questions about 
when in development lesions first manifest as well as whether any tissue or passing fibers 
might be spared. Some of these patients appear to have damage mostly restricted to the 
basolateral nucleus, and also exhibit behavioral variability (Terburg et al., 2012).  
Systematic future investigations of these patients will be critical to begin to address the 
difficult question of the causal roles of particular amygdala subnuclei in humans.  
 These findings, and in particular the human case (Feinstein et al., 2011), raise two 
broad questions for how to conceive of the amygdala’s role in social perception.  First 
and foremost: at what point in processing (see Box 2.2.1) does the amygdala come into 
play?  Does it impair perception as such (detection, discrimination)?  Or does it impair 
the ability to associate meaning with what is perceived, or to modulate cognition based 
on the associated value of what is perceived (e.g., recognition, social judgment)?  Across 
all of the studies, human and nonhuman, the answer here has been relatively clear: 
amygdala lesions impair the associative ability, but not basic perception as such.  Yet 
even this conclusion is now being modified in light of the amygdala’s role in attentional 
processing. The second question is how selective the role is to the domain of fear.  Is the 
amygdala’s role in more complex social judgment reducible to a role in recognizing fear?  
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Or, alternatively, is its role in fear reducible to a more computationally abstract or basic 
function?  We take up these two related questions next. 
The Amygdala in Social Judgment 
 Monkeys with amygdala lesions show complex deficits in their interactions with 
other monkeys that are not obviously reducible to an absence of fear (Emery et al., 2001).  
In general, the deficits are surprisingly subtle, although they are invariably associated 
with negative social consequences (loss of social status, abandonment by the troop and 
death in the wild) (Kling & Brothers, 1992).  In fact, neonatal amygdala lesions in infant 
monkeys result in an exaggerated social fear behavior, something not seen following 
adult lesions (Prather et al., 2001). 
 The deficits in social behavior in humans with amygdala lesions are also very 
subtle, although this is perhaps not too surprising given the complex and interactive 
nature of the social environment and, specifically in humans, the compensatory aspects 
provided by others who know that a patient has an amygdala lesion (Adolphs, 2010).  
More experimental control can be obtained in studies that assess social judgments 
through ratings given to depictions of scenes, faces, or descriptions of scenarios.  In these 
studies, while there is also considerable variability, the deficit has been largely consistent 
with a lack of fear:  patients with bilateral amygdala lesions tend to judge other people as 
more trustworthy and more approachable and have difficulty recognizing fear (Adolphs, 
Tranel, & Damasio, 1998; Adolphs et al., 1999). 
 This conclusion in humans is to some extent borne out by functional neuroimaging 
studies.  For instance, face stimuli designed to parametrically vary in terms of their 
perceived untrustworthiness elicit a corresponding parametric activation of the amygdala 
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in healthy viewers (Winston, Strange, O'Doherty, & Dolan, 2002).  Yet there are 
notable discrepancies here.  In particular, the human amygdala is also potently activated 
by appetitive stimuli (e.g., erotic pictures (Hamann, Ely, Hoffman, & Kilts, 2002)); in 
fact, it is variably activated by all facial expressions across the board (Fitzgerald, 
Angstadt, Jelsone, Nathan, & Phan, 2006), although it may respond in particular to 
certain underlying dimensions such as valence (Todorov et al., 2008).   
 Beyond imaging studies focusing on social stimuli, a unifying attempt comes from 
the reward learning literature.  There is an extensive literature from lesion and 
electrophysiological studies in animals that argues for a role in reward learning and 
attention.  That literature historically emphasized fear or arousal, in the form of Pavlovian 
fear conditioning as well as instrumental avoidance learning (LeDoux, 1996) and 
modulation of declarative memory (McGaugh, 2004), but has now been extended to 
encompass both appetitive and aversive forms of learning, and both Pavlovian and 
instrumental mechanisms (Murray, 2007). Here, attempts to find a simple role have been 
frustrated by the sheer range of findings. Results from neuroimaging studies have been 
similarly diverse. 
 Given the very large number of human neuroimaging studies of the amygdala, it is 
possible to attempt to extract some possibly basic underlying dimensions from stimuli 
and tasks, across several sub-domains of research, which might most consistently activate 
the amygdala. 
Social Perception Meta-Analysis 
 To synthesize the neuroimaging research, we turned to Neurosynth 
(http://neurosynth.org), an automated meta-analysis approach that converges with manual 
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results (Yarkoni, Poldrack, Nichols, Van Essen, & Wager, 2011). At a basic level, 
Neurosynth produces forward and reverse inference maps that relate a certain 
psychological construct to a brain region. Specifically, forward inference maps represent 
the probability of observing activation in a brain region (within 6mm of a coordinate), 
given the presence of a particular term, e.g., “social”, in a research article at a certain 
frequency (default is once every thousand words); reverse inference maps represent the 
probability of a term occurring in an article given activation in a particular brain region. 
Probabilities are calculated based on a database of nearly 6000 studies. 
 Because Neurosynth uses a large database to create these reverse and forward 
inference term-to-activation mappings, its developers argue that their tool renders the 
reverse inference problem tractable. The reverse inference problem occurs when one 
incorrectly assigns a functional role to a region, as is easily done when only looking at 
results from a few hand-selected studies. Much more data, which is provided by 
Neurosynth, is necessary to make the probabilistic statements necessary to make 
functional inferences: a region should be both consistently (forward inference) and 
selectively (reverse inference) associated with a functional term.  
 Confirming the premise of this chapter that the amygdala is involved in social 
perception, a “social perception” reverse inference map included activation in the 
amygdala as well as other regions associated with social perception (Figure 2.1.3). 
Interestingly, this map exhibited some right lateralization, both in the amygdala, and 
across hemispheres. In the whole brain, 60% of voxels in the reverse inference map 
(Figure 2.1.3) are in the right hemisphere. Strong lateralization was observed in the 
amygdalae: 60% of voxels in the right amygdala had activation exceeding FDR 0.10 
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correction, compared to only 3% of voxels in the left amygdala.  
 
Figure 2.1.3. Social perception reverse inference map from fMRI studies. Combination 
of FDR 0.1 (dark green) and FDR 0.05 (bright green) corrected z-score maps of the 
probability, given observed activation at a particular voxel, that a study in the Neurosynth 
database is related to social perception.  These reverse inference maps were created by 
searching the database of nearly 6000 papers for those in which the terms “social” and 
“perception” both occurred at least once in every 1000 words. 128 papers met this 
criteria. AMY = amygdala; TP = temporal pole; FP = frontal pole; F = fusiform gyrus; 
IFG = inferior frontal gyrus; TC = temporal cortex. Surface rendering and visualization 
for this and following images were completed using the SPM surfrend toolbox 
(http://spmsurfrend.sourceforge.net) and Neurolens (neurolens.org). 
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 While the amygdala’s involvement in social perception that emerges from this 
data-driven analysis is unsurprising, how does its role differ from that of other “social 
perception” areas identified? We tested the specificity of the amygdala’s role in social 
perception by calculating association scores between 8 functional keywords and 11 
regions identified in the social perception reverse inference map (Table 2.1.1). While 
Neurosynth produced a long list of terms associated with activation in each of these 
regions, we wanted to summarize those lists to determine whether they were strongly 
associated with a small number of social perception concepts. These social perception 
“keywords” onto which to map the neurosynth list of terms were obtained by presenting 
neuroscientists (n=6) with the top 50 terms associated with each social perception region 
by Neurosynth, and asking them to generate words to summarize each list of terms. From 
these responses, 8 keywords were distilled and appear as the column headers in Table 
2.1.1. A second group of neuroscientists (n=5) rated (0= “No”; 1 = “Maybe”; to 2 = 
“Yes”) the relationship between each word associated with a region and these 8 
keywords. Neurosynth lists of words were truncated to only consider words receiving a z-
score>3; this resulted in a total of 118 unique terms being rated across all the brain 
regions. These ratings were converted into association scores, reported in Table 2.1.1.  
Table 2.1.1. Association score between each of 11 social perception regions (Figure 
2.1.3) and 8 social perception keywords obtained from fMRI studies.  An association 
score between each keyword and region was derived by creating a region x term 
association score for each subject, averaging across subjects, and thresholding 
High/Moderate/Low ratings by a third split of all mean scores. Each subject’s region x 
term association score was calculated as a weighted combination of ratings, normalized 
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by the number of terms considered. Ratings of 3 (“Yes”) were weighted by 2, ratings of 
2 (“Maybe”) were weighted by 0.5, and ratings of 1 (“No”) were weighted by -1.  AMY 
= amygdala; TP = temporal pole; IFG = inferior frontal gyrus;  FP = frontal pole; TC = 
temporal cortex; F = fusiform gyrus. 
 
 
 First, this keyword association analysis (Table 2.1.1) confirms that the amygdala is 
indeed involved in social cognition and perception, and has an especially strong 
association for domain-specific “social perception”, compared to domain general 
“perception”. This domain specificity may be skewed by the database of human 
neuroimaging articles used by Neurosynth. Beyond confirming the amygdala’s 
involvement in social perception, we demonstrate it is moderately to highly associated 
with all the other social perception functional concepts, with the sole exception of the 
concept language/communication. Appropriately, this last concept was strongly 
associated with the temporal cortex. As predicted by the large literature on the amygdala 
and faces, emotion, and gaze, the region was highly associated with those three concepts. 
However, these associations were not very specific, as several other regions were also 
associated with faces, emotion, and gaze. Meanwhile, the amygdala’s moderate 
association with the concept of value/valuation was more specific: the amygdala and the 
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frontal pole were the only regions in the Neurosynth social perception network 
associated with valuation. To a degree, these findings agree with the idea that the 
amygdala, anatomically intermediary between perceptual and cognitive regions, plays an 
intermediary role between perception and cognition by assigning value to (social and 
non-social) perceptual objects.  
Moving Forward: Anatomical Considerations 
 As a whole, the above reviews present a puzzle for the amygdala’s role in social 
perception.  To a degree, the amygdala’s role in this domain can be explained in terms of 
its role in basic reward and attentional processes. However, open questions remain, and a 
key challenge is resolving several potential explanations. The findings from our 
Neurosynth analysis begin to provide a comprehensive answer and highlight a promising 
direction.  
 One solution to the above predicament is to acknowledge that the question “what 
does the amygdala contribute to social perception” was rather ill-posed to begin with, 
since it leaves out the rest of the social perception network within which the amygdala is 
embedded, and whose functions we need to understand if we are to thus situate the 
amygdala’s.   
 One such network approach was taken in a study (Bickart, Hollenbeck, Barrett, & 
Dickerson, 2012) that seeded three regions of the amygdala in a resting-state functional 
connectivity analyses that elicited three main networks correlated with activity in those 
regions: a perception network associated with the ventrolateral amygdala, an affiliation 
network with the medial amygdala, and an aversion network with the dorsal amygdala. 
These networks mirrored known anatomical connectivity from monkey and rodent 
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literature; the large temporal component of the perception network was evocative of 
Freese and Amaral’s (2005) well characterized dense temporal connections (Figure 
2.1.4). 
 
Figure 2.1.4. Amygdala connectivity. Amygdala resting-state functional connectivity 
perceptual network map (left) from Figure 5 in (Bickart et al., 2012). Map kindly 
provided by Brad Dickerson. AMY= amygdala. This connectivity with temporal regions 
is reflected in a summary of known anatomical connections between the amygdala and 
ventral visual stream areas in the monkey (right). Projections are topographically 
organized, with ventral and rostral amygdaloid regions projecting most to rostral visual 
areas, and dorsal and caudal amygdaloid regions projecting most to caudal visual areas. A 
feedforward/feedback loop exists between area TE and the basal and lateral nuclei of the 
amygdala. Right-hand panel reproduced from Freese & Amaral (2005). The organization 
of projections from the amygdala to visual cortical areas TE and V1 in the macaque 
monkey. Journal of Comparative Neurology, 486(4), 295-317, with permission from 
Wiley-Liss, Inc. 
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Additionally, the results from Bickart and colleagues (2012; Figure 2.1.4) 
partially converged with our meta-analysis results (Figure 2.1.3): their social perception 
network, derived from a region similar to the basolateral nucleus, and our social 
perception regions partially overlapped, with 27% of the voxels in our Neurosynth social 
perception map (combination of FDR 0.1 and FDR 0.05) (Figure 2.1.3) also present in 
their map (Figure 4). While the different amygdala nuclei interact, these converging 
results suggest that the core social perception function might be assigned mostly to the 
basolateral amygdala, which is also the region of the amygdala that is lesioned most 
commonly in Urbach-Wiethe disease.  
 These converging anatomical observations are indicative of one of the most 
promising means of advancing our understanding of the amygdala’s role in social 
perception: a network approach. The amygdala’s role will not be understood in isolation. 
We should strive for a biologically-constrained role that seeks to understand the function 
of the amygdala as a group of structures that interact with one another and within 
networks. The field of optogenetics has much potential for advancing our network-level 
understanding of amygdala function. However, findings must be related across species 
(optogenetics research currently being limited mostly to mice) and subfields: here, it is 
crucial to conduct meta-analyses within species, and, across species, to carefully consider 
how sub-field-defined cognitive functions are related.  
 Moving forward, especially in the social domain, we must consider environmental 
context. Our social environment is rich and complex, and social cognition and perception 
are largely inferential. They rely upon correct incorporation of contextual cues. This 
context relates to stimulus value, which we already know is partially assigned by the 
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amygdala, differs among individuals, and is a product of stimulus history. Approaching 
our investigation within this framework is necessary for fleshing out a nuanced 
understanding of the amygdala’s network role in modulating perception and assessment 
of our complex social environment.   
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 C h a p t e r  2 . 2   
PEOPLE WITH AMYGDALA LESIONS SHOW A BIAS TO APPROACH FACES 
EVEN WHEN THEY ARE OCCLUDED4 
Approach and avoidance constitute a basic dimension of all animal behavior. A 
large literature documents approach and avoidance elicited by specific sensory stimuli, 
yet comparatively little is known about default approach biases when stimulus 
information is reduced. The amygdala is well known to contribute to approach and 
avoidance behaviors in response to specific sensory stimuli, and here we test whether the 
amygdala’s role might extend to situations where stimulus information is reduced. A 
novel task asked three rare patients with bilateral amygdala lesions to make approach-
related judgments about photos of faces when intact, and with all internal facial features 
occluded. Direct comparisons of these stimuli isolated a stimulus-independent bias. The 
patients showed a greater tendency than controls to default to rating occluded faces as 
more approachable than whole faces. These findings suggest that the amygdala’s role in 
approach behavior extends beyond responses to specific stimuli.   
 
Introduction 
From single-celled organisms to humans, all mobile species exhibit approach-
avoidance behavior. In humans, approach-avoidance behavior is regulated by motivation 
and influenced by emotion (Elliot, Eder, & Harmon-Jones, 2013); at a more primitive 
                                                
4 A version of this chapter is accepted for publication as Harrison, L, Hurleman R, & Adophs, R (In press). Psychological Science. 
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level, it is related to instinctive defensive behaviors (Blanchard, Griebel, Pobbe, & 
Blanchard, 2011; McNaughton & Corr, 2004).   
While basic, approach-avoidance behavior shows large individual differences. 
Whereas some people would walk into and explore an unfamiliar dark room, others 
would pause and gather more information, and some might even flee. What accounts for 
this behavioral variability? Prior experience might sway one’s response, but the example 
situation offers little information, and may not have been encountered previously. 
Nevertheless, a behavioral tendency will be observed. The amygdala is a brain structure 
known for its role in memory, learning, and emotion, and implicated in psychiatric 
disorders including anxiety.  We investigate what role the amygdala might play in 
regulating stimulus-independent behavior, termed a “default bias.” A default approach 
bias may be normal in certain contexts; here, we ask whether amygdala lesion patients 
exhibit an abnormally large approach tendency to low-information stimuli.  
An abnormal tendency to approach others and normally threatening stimuli in 
amygdala lesioned monkeys (Klüver & Bucy, 1939), rodents (Choi & Kim, 2010) , and 
humans (Feinstein et al., 2011; Kennedy et al., 2009) points to the amygdala as being 
important in regulating approach-avoidance behavior. However, the basis of this 
approach tendency is unclear.  
On the one hand, the bias may be specifically tuned for certain stimuli: much of 
what we know about the amygdala’s contribution to cognition and behavior has come 
from studies investigating faces. Single-unit amygdala response selectivity has been 
found for faces in humans (Rutishauser et al., 2011) and monkeys (Gothard, Battaglia, 
Erickson, Spitler, & Amaral, 2007) and fits with the known connectivity of the amygdala 
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with anterior temporal neocortex (Amaral et al., 1992), a region containing face-
selective cells (Perrett, Rolls, & Caan, 1982; Tsao, Freiwald, Tootell, & Livingstone, 
2006). Lesions of the human amygdala can result in a remarkably specific impairment in 
recognizing fear (Adolphs et al., 1999; Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1994; 
Broks et al., 1998) and trustworthiness from faces (Adolphs et al., 1998).  
On the other hand, the amygdala might contribute to stimulus-independent 
baseline or default biases, similar to the “tonic influence on behavior” theorized over two 
decades ago (Amaral et al., 1992). In amygdala lesion patients, some preliminary 
evidence for a general approach bias includes a propensity to approach other people or 
potentially dangerous situations, regardless of context (Feinstein et al., 2011; Kennedy et 
al., 2009).  
The amygdala’s roles in a face-specific or default approach bias are not mutually 
exclusive.  Trustworthiness and approachability judgments to whole faces in SM, a 
widely-tested amygdala lesion patient, already hint at two distinct processes: the first is a 
deviation from normal judgments that increases as faces become less trustworthy (i.e., an 
inability to process facial cues to untrustworthiness); the second is a more uniform 
positive bias across all faces irrespective of their perceived trustworthiness (i.e., a global 
bias towards trust; Adolphs et al., 1998; cf. Figure 2.2.8).  In the present study, we 
attempt to disentangle these two components, while also making two improvements: 
using more than a single case-study and controlling for regression-to-the-mean.  
One mechanism by which a default bias could be achieved is through sensitivity 
to ambiguity.  Between detecting a dangerous stimulus and launching a defensive 
response, the amygdala, in conjunction with the cortex, must contextually assess potential 
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danger (Davis & Whalen, 2001). When signals are ambiguous, the amygdala may 
increase vigilance and predictive information by lowering sensory thresholds (Whalen, 
2007). Sensitivity to ambiguity has been implicated across species; in mice and humans, 
temporal unpredictability in stimulus presentation elicits anxious behavior and amygdala 
activity (Herry et al., 2007). At a sufficiently long stimulus duration to permit appraisal 
(van der Zwaag, Da Costa, Zürcher, Adams, & Hadjikhani, 2012), ambiguous fearful 
faces with direct gaze elicit greater fMRI amygdala activation than unambiguous averted-
gaze fearful faces (Adams, Gordon, Baird, Ambady, & Kleck, 2003). Individual variation 
in state anxiety correlates with amygdala BOLD response to potentially ambiguous 
neutral faces (Somerville, Kim, Johnstone, Alexander, & Whalen, 2004). To our 
knowledge, we are the first to explore whether human amygdala lesions produce an 
abnormal approach tendency as a function of ambiguity.  
We tested the hypothesis that amygdala damage produces a stimulus-independent 
default bias by directly contrasting approach-related judgments for two sets of otherwise 
identical face stimuli, with one set modified such that the inner part of the face is erased 
(cf. Figure 2.2.2a).  Participants made trust and threat judgments, which are known to be 
processed relatively automatically from faces (Willis & Todorov, 2006). In the real 
world, distance (Sinha, Balas, Ostrovsky, & Russell, 2006), accessories (scarves, 
sunglasses), and objects naturally occlude facial features. In both our whole and occluded 
stimulus conditions, the same external-facial cues (hairline, shape) were available, but 
facial feature information was only available in the whole condition.  We operationalized 
a default occluded-approach bias as a tendency, within-subject, to judge the low-
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information occluded face as more trustworthy and less threatening than the 
corresponding whole face. 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Amygdala Patients. Selective bilateral damage to the human amygdala is 
extremely rare, but can arise from the genetic disease, Urbach-Wiethe disease (Hofer, 
1973).  Three women with bilateral amygdala calcification lesions (Figure 2.2.1) caused 
by Urbach-Wiethe disease were tested. Two patients, AM and BG, are identical twin 
sisters from rural southern Germany. They were 36 years of age at testing, are married 
with children, and have been in full-time employment since they received their 13 years 
of education in Germany. The third patient, AP, is American, was 27 years of age at 
testing, and has worked since she obtained her Bachelor’s degree. All three patients have 
an IQ in the average range (HAWIE-R: AM, 101; BG, 96; WASI: AP, 98), (Becker et al., 
2012). Their lesions are all similarly symmetric and confined to the amygdala (AM, 1.12 
cubic centimeter bilaterally; BG, 1.15 cc; AP, 0.71 cc). The damage includes complete 
ablation of the basolateral amygdala with minor damage of other amygdaloid regions, 
including anterior and ventral cortical regions at the rostral level and lateral and medial 
parts of the central nucleus and amygdalo-hippocampal area at the caudal level (Figure 
2.2.1).  All amygdala patients were tested individually in the laboratory. 
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Figure 2.2.1. Anatomical MRI scans of the patients’ amygdala lesions. Displayed are 1mm 
isotropic T1-weighted magnetic resonance imaging coronal sections of the patients’ 
anterior medial temporal lobes. Red arrows highlight AP, AM, and BG’s focal bilateral 
amygdala calcification damage. Images obtained at 3T in the Caltech Brain Imaging Center 
at the specified timepoints. R: right. 
Healthy Comparison Subjects. 81 age, gender, and education-matched controls 
with no current mental health diagnosis were tested. Of the control group, 61 participants 
were American (mean age: 30.5 ± 8.0 years) and 20 were German (mean age: 35.1 ± 6.1 
years). Americans were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and Germans were 
recruited through emails forwarded to acquaintances of the authors’ German colleagues. 
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All control participants completed the experiment using Qualtrics, an online survey-
hosting platform, under conditions that were otherwise identical to the in-lab tests 
completed by the lesion patients. All participants, including lesion patients and controls, 
gave informed consent/assent in accordance with a protocol approved by the Caltech IRB.     
Sample Size. For our normal controls, we tested a sample size (N=81) exceeding 
ones that have been investigated in approach/withdrawal in the past (N=46, e.g., Adolphs et 
al., 1998). With respect to the patients with amygdala lesions, these have in the past 
typically been reported as single case studies; here we report three. We present their results 
both individually and as a small group, and use bootstrap analyses to compare them 
statistically to the control group. 
Stimuli 
 The stimulus set consisted of 34 high-resolution color images (16 females and 18 
males between 20 to 50 years of age) showing essentially neutral facial expressions. 
Images were taken with the same camera, at the same angle with controlled lighting, and in 
front of the same plain background. After image capture, images were luminance matched 
on each RBG channel, using the SHINE toolbox (Becker et al., 2012). The 34 original 
images (“Whole”) were used to create a second set of images, which were oval-masked so 
that there were no inner facial features (“Occluded”), (Figure 2.2.2). All 68 images were 
resized such that the inter-ocular distance for all images was constant. All faces were 
unfamiliar to the participants. 
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Figure 2.2.2. Stimuli and construction of bias scores. Panel a. Sample whole (left) and 
occluded (right) facial images; occluded face stimuli contained less information than 
whole face stimuli. Panel b. Occluded bias scores were calculated by subtracting the 
whole from occluded rating for each face. Positive occluded bias trust scores indicate a 
tendency to find the occluded face more trustworthy; negative occluded bias threat scores 
indicated a face was less threatening in the occluded condition. Panel c. Composite 
occluded bias scores combined trust and threat occluded bias scores, subtracting threat 
bias scores from trust bias scores so that the two measures had the same directionality: 
faces with larger positive composite bias scores were more approachable (more 
trustworthy and less threatening) in the occluded condition.  
Experimental Design 
For each face, participants indicated whether or not they found the person 
threatening or trustworthy. Participants rated all images in a self-paced manner on a six-
point scale (“Strong No”, “No”, “Weak No”, “Weak Yes”, “Yes”, “Strong Yes”). The 
directionality of the rating scale was counterbalanced across participants. All occluded 
face stimuli were presented first. Preferably presentation order would be counterbalanced 
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or randomized; here, counterbalancing was not possible with a patient sample of 3 and, 
without a much larger stimulus set, it would have been difficult to control for memory 
effects with randomization. While our design therefore includes a presentation order 
confound, the same confound is present across participant groups and therefore does not 
affect our main question of interest, that of whether within-subject shifts in ratings 
between stimulus conditions differ between participant groups. Within the constraint of 
presenting occluded stimuli first, the trust and threat judgments were presented in a 
randomized order. Each judgment (threat or trust) comprised a block, in which all 34 
images (occluded or whole) were presented, also in randomized order.  For the German 
participants, the entire experiment was translated into German: ‘threatening’ was 
translated as ‘bedrohlich’ (synonyms: menacing, ominous); ‘trustworthy’ was translated 
as ‘zuverlässig’ (synonyms: reliable, trustworthy — note that this translation was 
probably more ambiguous than that used for threat). Translations were independently 
verified by five bilingual German/English speakers.   
Analysis 
Rescaling German Participants’ Scores. The rescaling discussed in this section 
does not affect the approach biases discussed below, which constitute our main effect of 
interest. Those biases are comprised of within-subject rating shifts, which are not affected 
by group-level manipulations applied uniformly to individuals’ scores.  This rescaling only 
affects separate reports of ratings for each stimulus condition (2: whole, occluded) by 
judgment (2: trust, threat), cf., Table 2 and Figure 2.2.3.    
 To control for cultural and language differences between the two nationalities, we 
minimally rescaled all German ratings with a fixed bias offset. The average American trust 
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rating across all faces (whole and occluded) and all control participants was subtracted 
from the same average rating for German control participants; the value of this difference 
between the two groups was subtracted from every single German rating, including those 
of the two German lesion patients. German threat ratings were rescaled following the same 
procedure. Rescaling was small, and likely simply reflects differences in language (N.b. 
trustworthiness, for which the German translation was likely more ambiguous than that for 
threat, had a larger absolute rescaling factor). German trust ratings were rescaled by 0.429 
and threat ratings by -0.188. Since there were no mean differences between American and 
German controls after rescaling (Figure 2.2.3), we pooled these control groups in all 
subsequent analyses.  
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Figure 2.2.3. German and American Face Ratings. 95% CI interval of mean rescaled 
German (red) and American (blue) threat (left) and trust (right) ratings for whole (top) and 
occluded (middle) faces, and for occluded minus whole scores.  
Comparing Patients to Controls: General Approach. Comparisons of the three 
lesion patients to controls was driven by asking how the three lesion patients would 
compare to three people randomly drawn from the general population. This comparison 
was estimated by building a bootstrapped population estimate from 100,000 bootstrap 
samples of the average rating of three randomly sampled controls, and calculating the 
proportion of this bootstrap distribution that lay in the tail of the distribution that exceeded 
the three patients’ average rating.  
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Defining Occluded-Approach Bias. We defined a bias score (Figure 2.2.2b), for 
each face, as the occluded minus the whole face rating given to that face. Positive shifts in 
trust judgments and negative shifts in threat judgments represented an occluded-approach 
bias. 
Determining Consistency of Approach Bias Across Judgments. To determine 
the consistency of the directionality of an approach bias across the two judgments, plots of 
mean control trust and threat bias scores for each face were overlaid (cf. Figure 2.2.4a), 
demonstrating that trust and threat occluded biases moved together in a consistent fashion. 
Each face’s threat bias scores were subtracted from its trust bias scores to form composite 
occluded-bias scores (Figure 2.2.2c) for each participant. Mean negative “occluded-
avoided” composite bias scores indicated faces that were avoided in the occluded 
condition, receiving higher threat and lower trust ratings than in the whole condition. Mean 
positive “occluded-approached” composite bias scores indicated faces that received lower 
threat and higher trust ratings in the occluded condition.  
Testing Difference in Occluded-Approach Bias in Patients. Each individual 
patient’s occluded bias scores were qualitatively compared to those of controls by 
overlaying their individual bias score for each face on a 95% confidence interval plot of the 
mean control bias score for each face, with higher scores indicating an approach bias in 
each patient. 
 The group of patients’ occluded bias scores were quantitatively compared to a 
bootstrapped distribution of controls’ ratings as described above for (1) all faces, (2) for 
faces with occluded-avoided (negative occluded bias) scores and (3) for faces with 
occluded-approached (positive occluded bias) scores. To remove any statistical dependency 
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between the face-classification and comparison of control and patient scores, faces were 
reclassified as occluded-avoided or occluded-approached on each bootstrap iteration 
according to the mean bias score of the 78 controls who were not randomly sampled on that 
bootstrap iteration.  
 Testing difference in “positivity” bias in occluded and whole faces. To 
disentangle the contributions of occluded and whole face ratings to an approach bias, we 
separately defined a “positivity” approach bias (cf. (Norris, Gollan, Berntson, & Cacioppo, 
2010)) in whole and occluded faces, as the trust minus threat rating for each whole or 
occluded face. More positive scores indicated faces that were approached with a 
“positivity” bias (more trustworthy than threatening) and more negative scores indicated 
faces that were avoided (more threatening than trustworthy). Bootstrap resampling 
compared patients’ and controls’ positivity bias for whole and for occluded faces.   
Results 
Overview 
 Results are fully detailed below, and have been summarized in Table 2.2.1 to quickly 
orient readers to our findings.  
Table 2.2.1. Results Summary. Main findings listed alongside relevant Results source.  
Finding Source 
A composite occluded bias score is derived by combining separate trust and 
threat occluded bias scores, which went in opposite directions: faces with an 
occluded-approach bias for trust ratings tended to have an occluded-avoid 
bias for threat ratings and vice versa.   
Figure 
2.2.4a 
Patients’ composite occluded minus whole bias scores tend to be more 
positive, representing an occluded-approach bias, than controls’ scores for 
each face. 
Figure 
2.2.4b-d 
Bootstrap analysis comparing 3 randomly sampled controls’ mean 
composite occluded bias score to the patients’ actual mean score shows a 
Figure 
2.2.5 
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stronger occluded-approach tendency in the patients for all faces, especially 
for faces controls tended to avoid in the occluded condition.  
Parametric visualization of the bias shown in Figure 3. To test whether 
patients’ bias results from greater difficulty in rating occluded faces, we 
generated synthetic patient bias scores derived from actual whole-face  
ratings and random occluded-face ratings, which did not explain their bias. 
Figure 
2.2.6 
Bootstrap comparison of controls’ and patients’ general “positivity” (trust 
minus threat) bias for whole and occluded faces separately shows (1) that all 
participants had a bias to approach occluded faces more than whole faces, 
but (2) also confirms this bias was greatly enhanced in the patients.  
Figure 
2.2.7 
Full reporting of patients’ individual scores and 95% CI of mean patient 
scores for each judgment X stimulus type.  
Table 
2.2.2 
 
Lesion Patients’ Composite Bias Scores Relative to Controls 
 We sought to demonstrate a general approach bias in amygdala lesion patients by 
exploring whether they tended to approach occluded stimuli more than whole face stimuli, 
relative to controls. 
 Before comparing the patients’ and controls’ occluded bias, we first confirmed the 
validity of a composite bias score. Controls’ trust and threat bias scores moved together in 
an expected manner (Figure 2.2.4a), such that faces that tended to be rated as more 
trustworthy (blue dots) when occluded were also rated as less threatening (red dots) when 
occluded, and vice-versa. Therefore, for each subject, the threat bias score for each face 
was subtracted from its trust bias score, combining biases in the two judgments into a 
composite bias score (black line), with negative scores denoting faces avoided in the 
occluded condition and positive scores denoting faces approached in the occluded 
condition.  
 The patients’ bias scores (teal dots) for each face were compared to the pooled 
controls’ mean bias scores (black line) (Figure 2.2.4b-c): overall, their bias scores indicated 
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a heightened tendency to approach faces in the occluded condition (this bias was not 
alternatively driven by a heightened tendency to avoid faces in the whole condition, see 
below and Table 2). Each patient’s mean bias score was higher than those of controls (M = 
0.59, SD = 0.76): AP’s mean score was 0.46 SD higher than controls’, AM’s 0.85 SD, and 
BG’s 1.28 SD.  
 
Figure 2.2.4. Composite bias score defined and compared to patients’ scores. Panel a. 
Overlaid plots of controls (N=81) mean occluded minus whole difference score (y-axis) for 
each face for trust (blue) and for threat (red) show that faces that were not trusted in the 
occluded condition also tended to be found threatening relative to the whole-face condition. 
This consistent bias contributed to the formation of a composite bias score (black; 95% CI 
in gray) defined by adding the trust and reversed threat bias scores for each face. Face 
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stimuli (x-axis) rank-ordered according to composite bias score. Faces with a negative 
bias score tended to be avoided in the occluded relative to whole condition (or, conversely, 
approached more in the whole face condition), while faces with a positive bias score tended 
to be approached more in the occluded face condition. Panels b-d. Controls’ mean 
composite bias scores (black; 95% CI in gray), with individual patients’ scores overlaid in 
teal, demonstrate a trend for patient bias scores to exceed controls’ scores. Ctrl=controls. 
 
 Further confirming the finding that patients have a general approach bias to rate 
occluded faces as more trustworthy and less threatening than whole faces, our bootstrap 
analysis showed that the patients’ composite bias scores (patient average shown as teal line 
in Figure 2.2.5) were indeed higher than controls’ scores (distribution shown by black line 
in Figure 2.2.5), with 7.6% of control bootsamples exceeding the mean patient bias score. 
In addition to this bootstrap analysis, the control and patient group averages were strongly 
distinct (d =1.13), with nonoverlapping 95% CIs [0.43, 0.76] and [0.90, 1.59], respectively. 
This difference from controls was weaker for those faces that controls also had a bias to 
approach in the occluded condition (bottom panel of Figure 2.2.5) (15.8% of control 
bootsamples exceeded the patient mean, and group averages were only moderately distinct 
(d = 0.74), with 95% CIs for controls [0.84, 1.20] and patients [1.19, 1.74]). As expected, 
this difference was, however, most pronounced for those faces that controls had a tendency 
to avoid in the occluded condition (middle panel of Figure 2.2.5 - 1.9% of control 
bootsamples exceeded the patient mean, and group averages were strongly distinct (d = 
1.53), with 95% CIs for controls [-0.81, -0.37] and patients [0.04, 1.22]).  
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Figure 2.2.5. Mean patient occluded bias scores compared to bootstrapped mean control 
bias scores. Density plot estimates (black) of the bootstrap distribution of three randomly-
sampled controls’ mean occluded-bias scores for all faces (top), “occluded-avoided” faces 
as classified by control ratings (middle), and “occluded approached” faces (bottom), with 
the three patients’ actual mean bias score overlaid in teal and the individual patients’ mean 
scores indicated by green and blue arrows on the x-axis. To remove statistical dependency 
between our classification of “occluded-avoided” and “occluded-approached” faces and 
our comparison of 3 randomly sampled controls to the patients, for each bootstrap iteration, 
occluded-avoided and occluded-approached faces were classified according to the 78 
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remaining controls.  Percent of bootstrap control estimates with a higher occluded bias 
rating is indicated on each plot, demonstrating that patients’ occluded-approach bias scores 
tended to be higher than controls’ scores. To test against these reported effects being driven 
by regression to the mean, bootstrapped estimates of 3 patients with random bias scores 
(built from raw trust and threat scores evenly distributed from 1 to 6) are overlaid in gray 
with their mean value overlaid in a pale blue dashed line. Demonstrating that the patients’ 
deviation from controls was driven by their occluded ratings, an average synthetic patient 
bias rating given their actual whole face scores and chance occluded scores is indicated on 
each plot with a purple arrow.  
 To test against the possibility that these effects were driven by regression to the mean 
(that is, that the amygdala lesion patients simply produced noisier, more random, ratings of 
the faces), bootstrapped estimates of 3 simulated patients with random bias scores (built 
from raw trust and threat scores evenly distributed from 1 to 6) were overlaid (grey lines) 
on the actual controls’ bootstrapped distributions (black lines) in Figure 2.2.5. Adding 
noise to the control data strengthened the separation of the controls’ and patients ratings for 
all faces (top panel of Figure 2.2.5), and occluded-avoided faces alone (bottom panel), as 
the random distribution (grey line) moved below the actual distribution (black line) for 
controls, increasing the separation between controls and the patients’ mean (teal line).  
While this increased separation was not observed for the occluded-avoid faces, the bias in 
the patients measured by our bootstrap analysis was strong with only 1.9% of randomly 
sampled control mean bias scores exceeding the actual patients’ mean bias score; in tandem 
with the effect of noise on the other groupings of faces, the possibility of regression-to-the-
mean is unlikely as an explanation for the patients’ impairment.   
  
55 
 
 To support the conclusion that this effect was driven by a specific bias in rating 
occluded faces relative to whole faces, we next derived synthetic difference ratings by 
subtracting actual whole face ratings from chance occluded-face patient ratings (i.e., 3.5, 
with a fixed bias offset for the German patients): these (indicated by purple arrows in 
Figure 2.2.5) tended to be lower than controls’ bias scores, once again going in a direction 
opposite to that seen for the actual ratings given by the amygdala lesion patients.  
 Binary classification of faces as occluded-avoided (middle panel in Figure 2.2.5) or 
occluded-approached (bottom panel) indicated that the patients’ occluded approach bias 
was strongest for faces avoided by controls in the occluded condition. We visualized how 
the patients differed from controls for each face by overlaying a 95% CI plot of controls’ 
rank-ordered mean bias scores (black line with grey area in Figure 2.2.6) with a plot of the 
patients’ mean score for each face (red dots), smoothed with a 10-face moving average to 
improve visualization of the general parametric trend. While the patients tended to have a 
higher bias scores than controls across all faces, the patients’ bias scores became less 
distinct from controls’ as a function of the controls’ occluded-bias scores. To again support 
the hypothesis that this effect was driven by a specific deficit in rating occluded faces, we 
also plotted synthetic ratings derived by subtracting actual whole-face patient ratings from 
chance occluded-face ratings (blue dots in Figure 2.2.6). These synthetic ratings did not 
positively deviate from controls’ ratings as did the patients’ difference ratings — in fact, 
they were lower — indicating that the patients’ deviation from controls’ scores were indeed 
driven by abnormal, but consistent, occluded-face ratings, i.e., the bias we report.  
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Figure 2.2.6. Parametric bias visualization. Overlaid plots of controls’ (N=81) mean 
composite bias score (y-axis, black; 95% CI in gray) and patients’ (N=3) mean composite 
bias score (red circles; smoothed with a 10 face moving average, with a step size of one 
face). The patients all tended to have a higher approach bias than controls, meaning they 
tended to approach occluded faces more than controls. Face stimuli (x-axis) rank-ordered 
according to mean control composite bias score. Synthetic patient ratings (light-blue 
squares, also smoothed with a 10 face moving average), indicate patient bias scores given 
actual whole-face ratings and chance occluded-face ratings; these scores test the hypothesis 
that the deviation of patients’ bias scores from controls’ scores was driven by abnormal 
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occluded-face ratings; since chance occluded ratings did not exceed controls’ bias scores, 
the effect was driven by the patients’ tendency to approach occluded faces more than whole 
faces.  
Trust-Threat “Positivity” Bias in Whole and Occluded Stimuli Alone 
 Separate examination of an approach-related “positivity” bias (positive for faces with 
stronger trust than threat ratings) for whole and occluded faces separately revealed a default 
positive approach bias to occluded but not whole faces in both controls and patients (Figure 
2.2.7). While a shift between whole positivity ratings (M=0.063) and occluded positivity 
ratings (M=0.656) was present in controls (p=5.90x10-10), this shift in positivity bias for 
occluded faces was markedly greater in the patients (M =0.373 for whole vs. M =1.618 for 
occluded faces, p=0.0199). 
 
Figure 2.2.7. Bootstrap comparison of patients and controls approach-related “positivity” 
biases. Density plot estimates of three randomly sampled controls’ mean positivity bias 
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(black lines), and the actual patients’ mean positivity bias (blue lines) for whole (solid 
lines) and occluded (dashed lines) faces. Patients and controls both had a greater approach-
related positivity bias for occluded than whole faces, but the magnitude of the shift was 
greater for the patients, who were also most distinct from controls for the occluded faces 
specifically. *p<0.05; ***p<0.001.   
Results Separated by Judgment and Stimulus Type 
Across comparisons, an occluded approach bias was defined as a tendency to give 
both higher trust (“Yes,” trustworthy) and lower threat (“No,” not threatening) ratings to 
occluded faces than to whole faces. While a composite approach bias was the most 
comprehensive way to describe our results, separate trust and threat biases obviously 
contribute to this construct. We thus also compared the lesion patients’ mean trust and 
threat occluded biases separately to bootstrapped control distributions, alongside patient 
performance for whole and occluded faces alone (Table 2.2.2), confirming that the patients’ 
observed approach bias was driven by abnormal ratings of occluded faces.   
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Table 2.2.2. Bootstrapped control samples exceeding mean and individual patient 
values. 
Judgment Stimuli Controls 
Exceeding 
Patients (%) 
Control 
Mean 
(95% CI) 
AP AM BG Summary 
Threat Whole faces 19.9 [3.2, 3.4] 3.3 2.7 3.2 AP & BG same, but AM lower 
Occluded faces 4.7 [2.8, 3.1] 2.6 2.2 2.1 All lower 
Occluded bias  12.1 [-0.5, -0.3] -0.7 -0.4 -1.1 AP and BG lower; AM not different, 
but already impaired for whole faces 
Trust Whole faces 23.7 [3.1, 3.3] 3.1 2.6 4.6 AP normal; AM low; BG high 
Occluded faces 3.9 [3.3, 3.5] 3.3 3.4 5.0 AP and AM normal; BG very high 
Occluded bias  8.9 [0.1, 0.3] 0.2 0.8 0.4 AP normal; AM and BG high 
Composite 
Bias  
 
All faces 7.6 [0.4, 0.8] 0.9 1.2 1.6 All higher 
Occluded-
avoided faces 
1.9 [-0.8, -0.4] 0.2 0.4 1.2 All higher 
Occluded-
approached faces 
15.8 [0.8, 1.2] 1.2 1.5 1.7 AP normal; AM and BG higher 
Note. Occluded bias defined as occluded minus whole face rating. Composite bias defined 
as occluded trust bias minus occluded threat bias. Occluded-avoided faces have a negative 
average composite bias score; occluded-approached faces have a positive average 
composite bias score. For threat, the percentage of lower bias scores were counted; for trust 
and composite bias, the percentage of higher scores were counted.  
 As a group, the patients’ whole-face ratings were not different from controls’ ratings, 
which was somewhat unexpected given a previous finding in amygdala lesion patient SM 
(Adolphs et al., 1998), which showed that SM gave abnormally high trustworthiness 
judgments to whole faces (albeit a different set of faces than the ones used in our present 
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study).  To verify that this discrepancy from SM’s behavior in our amygdala lesion 
patients was not driven by differences in the stimulus sets, we tested two of our patients 
(AM and BG) also on the original stimuli from that experiment with SM (Adolphs et al., 
1998). While AM and BG tended to deviate from controls, especially for the faces controls 
avoided most (Figure 2.2.8), they only exhibited a weak trend towards the prior finding in 
SM. Unfortunately, SM was not available for testing in our new task, and AP was not 
available for testing on the original task used by Adolphs et al. (1998).  
 
Figure 2.2.8. Amygdala lesion patients’ deviations from normal judgments of 
approachability (top) and trustworthiness (bottom) of 100 faces (circles; y-axis). Units are 
standard deviations of the normal control ratings. Stimuli are rank-ordered on the x-axis 
according to the ratings normal controls gave them. SM demonstrated a specific 
exaggerated impairment in her ratings of the faces rated least approachable or trustworthy 
by controls, but also displayed a global positive deviation from norms’ ratings for nearly 
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all faces. SM’s panels recreated with data from Figure 2 of Adolphs, Tranel, and 
Damasio, Nature, 1998. 
Discussion 
 A significantly enhanced approach-related bias, relative to controls, was uncovered in 
three rare patients with selective bilateral amygdala lesions by comparing ratings of faces 
in a whole and occluded condition.  A default bias was demonstrated by the patients’ 
greater willingness to approach a face (i.e., less threatening and more trustworthy ratings) 
in the low-information occluded condition. 
 Returning to our example situation of walking into a dark room, the normal response 
to an ambiguous situation is risk-assessment (Blanchard et al., 2011) — given insufficient 
information to determine whether a threat is present, one should pause and gather more 
information before proceeding; our patients’ ratings indicated that they would simply enter 
the room; at the other end of the spectrum, anxious individuals might flee the dark room 
before gathering further evidence.  Future experiments exploring individual differences 
(e.g., trait/state anxiety, perceived dominance, history of exposure to physical/social threat 
or betrayal) will be important to both validate our task and determine what factors beyond 
amygdala damage relate to heightened approach tendencies.  It is worth noting that in our 
sample a few control individuals had an approach bias similar to that of the patients, 
emphasizing the importance of future studies to determine the cause of these individual 
differences. 
 In humans, given a lack of stimulus information, an exploratory tendency may 
normally promote a default approach bias, the “positivity offset” in the Evaluative Space 
Model (Norris et al., 2010), similar to our observed shift in “positivity” approach ratings 
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between the occluded and whole face conditions (Figure 2.2.7). This occluded positivity 
bias was observed both in controls and patients, but enhanced in the patients. It is worth 
noting that while in this class of stimuli a lack of information, which was similar to 
ambiguity, encouraged approach behavior in both healthy controls and the amygdala lesion 
patients, for some classes of stimuli, given some additional contextual cues, ambiguity in 
and of itself might be perceived as threatening and prompt avoidance behavior, especially 
in healthy controls.   
 While patients gave stronger approach ratings than controls, they were not 
completely indiscriminate: their judgments differed more in degree than direction (Table 
2.2.2). Future work should test how their enhanced approach bias extends to (1) other 
classes of degraded stimuli (including non-linguistic tasks to better facilitate cross-cultural 
comparison), and (2) the real world.  Showing abnormal proxemic (i.e, personal space) 
behavior and a tendency to approach real threatening stimuli (e.g., snakes) in these three 
patients, as has already been done in patient SM (Feinstein et al., 2011; Kennedy et al., 
2009), would further corroborate a default approach bias.  As confirmed in preliminary 
testing, at least BG has abnormally small personal space and fear responses (D.P. Kennedy, 
J. Feinstein, & R. Adolphs, personal communication). Testing participants’ actual behavior 
is crucial – compensatory processing may allow them to give more “correct” explicit 
ratings: for example, although SM abnormally approached actual snakes without showing 
any fear, beforehand, she verbally insisted that she “hates” snakes and “tries to avoid them” 
(Feinstein et al., 2011).  
 Differences amongst the amygdala lesion patients need to be resolved. Amygdala 
damage can prompt two distinct approach processes — a default bias, as well as a face-
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specific bias — both of which can operate simultaneously. Removing facial feature 
information from facial stimuli allowed us to challenge participants to indicate a default 
bias while working within the general category of facial stimuli. Across all participants, 
responses to facial features were variable and the patients were similar to controls. SM’s 
whole face ratings had been different from controls (Adolphs, et al., 1998); this deviation is 
in line with the heterogeneity of impairments reported in bilateral amygdala damage 
(Adolphs et al., 1999; Hamann et al., 1996; Siebert, Markowitsch, & Bartel, 2003) and 
likely reflects compensatory processing (Becker et al., 2012; Scheele et al., 2012). SM’s 
impairment for whole faces hints at progressive amygdala damage/impairment, as is 
expected in Urbach-Wiethe disease (Appenzeller et al., 2006).   
 While patient differences in a face specific deficit need to be further explored and 
explained based on precise anatomical differences, the present study focused on isolating a 
stimulus-independent shift, which will clearly interact with responses to facial features. 
Sometimes, “good” facial features (determined idiosyncratically) helped occluded-avoided 
faces; sometimes “bad” features harmed occluded-approached faces. However, across the 
entire stimulus set, a general occluded-approach bias could be observed.  
 Mechanistically, the patients’ approach bias may relate to a specific cautionary 
deficit, related to disrupted vigilance (Davis & Whalen, 2001; Paul J. Whalen, 2007). This 
viewpoint is anatomically compatible with the amygdala launching a defensive behavioral 
response to coincident sensory and contextual danger signals, conveyed via the temporal 
and prefrontal cortices, respectively (Freese & Amaral, 2009).  
 However, the patients’ approach bias can be explained by a more general mechanism 
of amygdala function.  A general role in processing saliency/self-relevance (Cunningham 
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& Brosch, 2012; Harrison & Adolphs, 2015; Sander, Grafman, & Zalla, 2003) is 
compatible with a wider array of known amygdala activity. The amygdala contributes to 
negative and positive reinforcement (Murray, Izquierdo, & Malkova, 2009), and processes 
positively and negatively valenced stimuli (Anderson et al., 2003; Hamann et al., 2002). In 
rats (Hatfield, Han, Conley, Gallagher, & Holland, 1996) and nonhuman primates  
(Izquierdo & Murray, 2007; Málková, Gaffan, & Murray, 1997), basolateral amygdala 
lesions interfere with reinforcer devaluation, such that an animal will indiscriminately 
approach devalued food items, similar to our patients’ default approach bias. 
Hypothetically, the basolateral nucleus, damaged in our patients, updates the self-relevant 
value of a stimulus (Murray et al., 2009).  
 A saliency/relevance explanation binds our default bias finding with prior findings in 
amygdala lesion patients: amygdala lesions do not preclude the ability to experience fear - 
indeed, CO2 inhalation can induce fear and panic in amygdala lesion patients (Feinstein et 
al., 2013), but instead inhibit proper orienting to stimuli (Spezio, Huang, Castelli, & 
Adolphs, 2007), which often results in a diminished ability to experience (Feinstein et al., 
2011) or recognize (Adolphs et al., 2005) fear. Proper orienting can recover this ability: in 
SM, fear is correctly identified following explicit top-down instruction to look at the eyes 
(Adolphs et al., 2005).  
 Our finding of an enhanced default positivity bias suggests a further role for the 
amygdala in setting a default on what is potentially relevant or salient, normally preventing 
us from approaching situations that may be threatening, while simultaneously permitting 
exploration.  In our patients, this balance is shifted.  Similarly, in psychiatric disorders 
featuring dis-regulation of the amygdala (e.g., anxiety disorders (Davis, 1992; Etkin & 
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Wager, 2007) and autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 2000; Castelli, Frith, Happe, & Frith, 
2002; Dalton et al., 2005)), stimuli are not correctly evaluated, from shifted baseline biases 
as well as under- or over-weighting the threat, social importance, or relevance of stimuli.  
 In summary, contrasting judgments of occluded and whole faces, we 
uncovered a stimulus-independent approach bias following bilateral amygdala damage. 
Future directions include (1) testing for a default approach or avoidance bias in 
psychiatric disorders for which the amygdala is implicated, as well as (2) developing 
implicit tests of an approach bias to circumvent potential compensatory mechanisms, and 
(3) devising tests to provide a clearer mechanistic account of our findings. 
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C h a p t e r  2 . 3  
ECOLOGICAL STRUCTURING OF HUMAN DEFENSIVE RESPONSES: EVIDENCE 
FROM JUDGMENTS OF PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL THREAT SCENARIOS 
 
How humans react to threats is a topic of broad theoretical importance, and also 
relevant for understanding anxiety disorders. Many animal threat reactions exhibit a 
common structure, a finding supported by human evaluations of written threat scenarios 
that parallel patterns of rodent defensive behavior to actual threats. Yet the factors that 
underlie these shared behavioral patterns remain unclear. Dimensional accounts rooted 
in Darwin’s conception of antithesis explain many defensive behaviors. Across species, it 
is also clear that defensive reactions depend on specific situational factors, a feature long 
emphasized by psychological appraisal theories. Our study sought to extend prior 
investigations of human judgments of threat to a broader set of threats, including natural 
disasters, threats from animals, and psychological (as opposed to physical) threats. Our 
goal was to test whether dimensional and specific patterns of threat evaluation replicate 
across different threat classes. 85 healthy adult participants selected descriptions of 
defensive behaviors that indicated how they would react to 29 threatening scenarios. 
Scenarios differed with respect to ten factors, e.g., perceived dangerousness or 
escapability. Across scenarios, we correlated these factor ratings with the pattern of 
defensive behaviors endorsed. A decision tree hierarchically organized these correlation 
patterns to successfully predict each scenario’s most common reaction, both for the 
original sample and a separate replication group (n=22). At the top of the decision tree, 
degree of dangerousness interacted with threat type (physical or psychological) to 
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predict dimensional approach/avoidance behavior. Subordinate nodes represented 
specific defensive responses evoked by particular contexts. Our ecological approach 
emphasizes the interplay of situational factors in evoking a broad range of threat 
reactions.  Future studies could test predictions made by our results to help understand 
pathological threat processing, such as seen in anxiety disorders, and could begin to test 
underlying neural mechanisms.  
Introduction 
Darwin famously noted the striking phylogenetic continuity of emotional 
behaviors, including responses to threat (Darwin, 1872/1965). Defensive behaviors, 
ranging from flight to attack, have evolved to deal with environmental challenges that 
show a common structure across all animals: the need to attack an aggressor, to flee a 
predator, or to hide from an inescapable threat, to name only a few prototypical 
situations. Over the years, several empirical and theoretical studies, largely rooted in 
biology and ethology, have supported the idea of common structure in defensive 
behaviors across species, ranging from rodents to humans (Blanchard, Hynd, Minke, 
Minemoto, & Blanchard, 2001).  Various schemes have been proposed for how these are 
organized, ranging from ethologically-identified (Blanchard, Blanchard, & Hori, 1989) 
factors like risk assessment (Blanchard et al., 2011) to dimensional accounts including 
threat imminence (Fanselow & Lester, 1988) and a classic approach/avoidance account 
whereby all motivated/emotional behaviors are organized along an appetitive and 
defensive system (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1998). 
On the other hand, the literature in affective psychology has rarely incorporated 
specific details of the data from nonhuman animals, although this literature clearly does 
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acknowledge the biological roots of human defensive behaviors (Lazarus, 1991; 
McNaughton & Corr, 2004, 2009; Adam M. Perkins, Cooper, Abdelall, Smillie, & Corr, 
2010). Here, we asked people to select hypothetical defensive behaviors to descriptions 
of a range of physically threatening situations, as well as to situations of social 
psychological threat.  It is important to emphasize at the outset that we rely on verbal 
report and ratings, as is common in many psychological studies in humans (e.g., (Cottrell 
& Neuberg, 2005)), rather than on actual observed defensive behavior. Verbal report to 
hypothetical scenarios by humans has been found in previous studies to correlate with 
actual rodent behavior patterns across three laboratories (Blanchard et al., 2011), and we 
used it here as a first approach to assess responses for which live exposure would be 
ethically difficult to obtain. Specifically, in the current experiment, threatening situations 
include situations of social psychological threat, (e.g., blackmail), social physical threat 
(e.g., stalking), as well as physical threat from other species and natural disasters. 
Inclusion of these different threat categories underlies an attempt to bridge our 
understanding of basic approach-avoidance reactions to predators and other physical 
threats on the one hand, with a characterization of defensive reactions to less physical but 
more psychological intra-species threats that relate to issues of social inclusion, social 
hierarchies, and social dominance on the other hand. It is worth noting that socially 
modulated threat reactions have been observed across diverse phylogenetic classes, 
including fish (Fernald, 2012), and mammals (Tamashiro, Nguyen, & Sakai, 2005) 
ranging from rodents (Scheibler, Weinandy, & Gattermann, 2004) to primates (Abbott et 
al., 2003; Dewaal, 1986).  
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 Defensive behaviors in rodents and primates have been extensively 
studied, and related to human behavior, such as in the case of humans physically freezing 
in response to threatening stimuli (Hagenaars, Oitzl, & Roelofs, 2014). Innate patterns of 
defensive behavior have been identified in some detail in rats: e.g., high magnitude 
threats elicit a flight response, only if an escape route is available; if an escape route is 
not available, rodents will freeze, show a defensive threat (e.g., vocalization), or launch 
an explosive defensive attack depending on the distance of the threat (Blanchard & 
Blanchard, 1989). Very specific releasing-stimulus like cues can be sufficient to trigger 
the behavior: for instance, a predator-like visual looming stimulus (just an expanding 
black circle on the ceiling) is sufficient to produce robust freeze or flight (Yilmaz & 
Meister, 2013), with the likelihood of each behavior dependent upon the presence of a 
hiding place in the arena. The size of an enclosure also seems to affect the use of flight or 
freeze behavior (Kim et al., 2013). The validity of the use of rodent defensive behaviors 
as a model for human defensive reactions remains an open question, partially addressed 
by a study that attempted to make direct comparisons between the two species (Blanchard 
et al., 2001). In that study, written descriptions of physically threatening scenarios were 
manipulated in terms of factors known to alter rodent behavior, such as the magnitude of 
threat, escapability of the situation, ambiguity of the threat stimulus, distance between the 
threat and the subject, and the presence of a hiding place. Strikingly, most of the human 
participants’ choices of what they would do when faced with these scenarios paralleled 
the rodent behavior observed when a rat faced the same real situational factors. 
Moreover, the human choices of defensive behaviors paralleled the specific animal 
defensive behaviors (e.g., defensive attack for near threats; risk assessment for 
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ambiguous threats; hiding when there is a hiding place) across different cultural 
settings (see Table 2.3.6, Discussion), e.g., in Brazil (Shuhama, Del-Ben, Loureiro, & 
Graeff, 2008) and Wales (Perkins & Corr, 2006) with “minor or potentially easily 
explained differences” (Blanchard et al., 2011) compared to the original patterns 
observed in Hawaiian participants (Blanchard et al., 2001), suggesting cross-cultural 
generality at least for the physically threatening scenarios investigated in those studies. 
 These prior studies that built upon rodent behaviors fit well with 
dimensional accounts of emotion. Although Darwin is often cited in support of discrete 
emotion theories, Darwin’s early principle of antithesis (Darwin, 1872/1965) in fact set 
the framework for conceiving of emotional behaviors as having a dimensional structure:   
When actions of one kind have become firmly associated with any sensation or 
emotion, it appears natural that actions of a directly opposite kind…should be 
unconsciously performed…under the influence of a directly opposite sensation or 
emotion. (p. 67)  
Darwin’s notion of antithesis roughly maps onto the modern dimension of “valence”. 
However, the main point that he made, of course, was that emotions, including defensive 
behaviors, in humans would look similar and have a similar structure to that of other 
mammals. According to one theory, evolutionary selection can give rise to what have 
been called “rules of thumb” that advantageously guide behavior under typical ecological 
conditions (McNaughton & Corr, 2009). These rules of thumb can be conserved across 
species that have evolved in similar environments, such that emotional behaviors evoked 
by certain circumstances in one species will evoke similar emotional behaviors in another 
species faced with the same challenges. If the species are not too phylogenetically distant, 
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one would even expect these shared emotional responses to be mirrored in conserved 
neural structures (Gross & Canteras, 2012; LeDoux, 2012). It is unknown precisely 
which features of a shared environment would come into play in this picture, but there are 
some good candidate dimensions, such as predator imminence (the physical distance and 
time to discovery between predator and prey) (Fanselow & Lester, 1988) and uncertainty. 
Notably, these dimensions are broad, can be observed across many species and provide 
important context for many situations.  
 However, in addition to such broad dimensional structure, it is clear that 
emotions also exhibit patterns of response tailored to specific situations that evoke them. 
For instance, Gray and McNaughton (2000) have proposed that two clusters of defensive 
behaviors identified also in rodent studies (Blanchard, Blanchard, Rodgers, & Weiss, 
1990; Blanchard, Flannelly, & Blanchard, 1986) represent the action of two brain 
systems, one controlling anxiety, the other fears, and that differences in the reactivity of 
these systems give rise to personality differences and ultimately could explain 
psychopathology (Gray & McNaughton, 2000; McNaughton & Corr, 2004). It has been 
proposed that different circuits involving the amygdala and the bed nucleus of the stria 
terminalis (BNST) mediate phasic fear versus more sustained anxiety-like fear (Davis, 
Walker, Miles, & Grillon, 2010). The distinction between anxiety and fear is important, 
mapping onto those defensive situations where engagement and the acquisition of further 
information is adaptive (in the former case), and those where disengagement and survival 
are most important (in the latter case). 
 Social fear is yet another category, linked to a possibly domain-specific 
class of eliciting stimuli. There is evidence that social fear is processed differently from 
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other types of fear: in mice, independent hypothalamic circuits for social (intra-species) 
and predator (inter-species) fear have been identified (Silva et al., 2013).  Do patterns of 
threat response observed in other species extend to the social domain in humans, 
especially to more psychological as opposed to physical social threat scenarios? Although 
the Blanchard study (2001) and its replications (Perkins & Corr, 2006; Shuhama et al., 
2008) investigated physical threat between humans, psychological threat has rarely been 
directly compared to physical social threat. Social sources of threat have been studied 
experimentally in humans with paradigms such as the Trier Social Stress Test 
(Kirschbaum, Pirke, & Hellhammer, 1993), or the cyberball game (Williams & Jarvis, 
2006), which relates to ostracism and social hierarchy, issues that have been explored 
since Milgram’s famous obedience studies (Milgram & Van den Haag, 1978). Nonhuman 
primates have also been shown to be have mental representations of social hierarchy 
(Dahl & Adachi, 2013) (a capacity even demonstrated in fish (Grosenick, Clement, & 
Fernald, 2007)) and are sensitive to social inequality (Brosnan, Schiff, & De Waal, 2005).  
Testing the category of social psychological threat in the present experiment is 
pertinent to open questions remaining from the three prior physical threat scenario studies 
(Blanchard et al., 2001; A. M. Perkins & Corr, 2006; Shuhama et al., 2008). For instance, 
Blanchard (2001) argues that risk assessment can play a crucial role in detecting and 
analyzing threat stimuli.  Risk assessment is a highly adaptive process that takes into 
account the type and location of the threat, as well as the escapability of the situation to 
predict the most optimal defense mechanism.  In fact, risk assessment becomes more 
important when there is some degree of ambiguity in the situation (Blanchard et al., 
2011), as is more often the case in situations of psychological social threat — a threat 
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category we investigate here in our extension of the original Blanchard study (2001). In 
the psychological domain, most complexity arises from the situational context (with: 
peers, inferiors, or superiors; or location: work, novel setting, recreational location). We 
would thus expect that each of these situations creates a unique hierarchy of threat 
characteristics to be evaluated. Behavioral hierarchies are a prominent ethological 
concept: according to Tinbergen (1951), an animal will enter one of a handful of broad 
behavioral hierarches, e.g., defense or reproduction, that then dictate further subordinate 
behavioral repertoires, all depending on an animal’s evaluation of the environmental 
context.  
The situational evaluation emphasized by ethologists offers a point of contact 
with the human psychology literature, notably appraisal theory as articulated by Arnold 
(1960), Lazarus (1991), and Scherer (2001, 2009). Appraisal theory postulates so-called 
“stimulus-evaluation checks” — specific dimensions upon which stimuli are sequentially 
or hierarchically assessed — that are used to appropriately assess context across points in 
time (Scherer, 2001, 2009). For instance, first, a stimulus would be checked for 
relevance; if it were novel and/or (un)pleasant, it will be attended and possibly prompt 
initial approach or avoidance responses (e.g., pupil dilation, heart rate changes, 
locomotion). Once attended, the implications of the stimuli would be checked – whether 
they were likely to produce a consequence for the organism, reflecting the urgency with 
which they require a reaction. Subsequent checks relate to the organism’s coping 
potential for likely consequences as well as how those consequences relate to issues of 
normative significance such as ideas of self and social norms. Each of these hierarchical 
evaluations or stimulus-evaluation-checks relate to patterns of bodily, neural, and 
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behavioral response, and can be conceptualized as a temporal unfolding of emotion 
(Sander, Grandjean, & Scherer, 2005).  
The first goal of our study was to test the generalizability of dimensional factors 
and specific situational appraisal in guiding defensive responses across a broad range of 
threats. Recently, a Survival Optimization System (SOS) model has been theoretically 
proposed to account for cross-species threat responses (Mobbs, Hagan, Dalgleish, Silston, 
& Prévost, 2015). A notable feature of the SOS model is that it integrates dimensional 
(imminent threats elicit reflexive responses) and appraisal-like accounts of threat 
responses.  We predict that our empirical account of the ecology of human threat 
reactions will also highlight the relative strength of dimensional accounts in accounting 
for basic behavior (specifically, approach-avoidance), while situational appraisal will 
predict specific instantiations of approach and avoidance behaviors. 
In addition to extending the range of threat scenarios, and hence the anticipated 
range and specificity of defensive behaviors, a second goal of our study was to then use 
this more comprehensive inventory of threat responses to create a generalized model for 
characterizing human defensive behavior toward threat. Inspired by both the appraisal 
theory models discussed above, Tinbergen’s behavioral hierarchies (1951), and the recent 
SOS model (Mobbs et al., 2015), we aimed to build a hierarchical decision-tree that 
would accurately predict a participant’s threat response based on features of the threat 
stimulus. To build such a general decision tree, we aimed to sample different sources of 
threat, although each type of threat was only sparsely sampled by a few specific 
scenarios. We hypothesized that many types of defensive states — anxiety, fear, panic —
could be mapped to a proximity factor similar to that in predator imminence theory 
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(Fanselow & Lester, 1988). While basic approach/avoidance processes might remain 
the same across threat domains (e.g., psychological and physical), we also expected to 
find differences linked to the specific demands required by certain contextually 
dependent types of threat (Silva et al., 2013). We achieved our two aims of (1) 
contrasting ecological patterns of threat response across a broad class of threats, 
including psychological threats, as well as (2) organizing those patterns of threat response 
into a decision tree incorporating dimensional, approach-avoidance and hierarchical, 
appraisal-like features to eventually predict specific defensive responses.  
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
We tested five nonoverlapping groups of participants over the internet as 
described below. The dependent measures they provided are summarized in Table 2.3.1. 
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Table 2.3.1. Dependent Measures in Experiments. All dependent measures were given 
for all 29 threat scenarios (cf. Table 2.3.2).  
Experiment Measures    
Main; Replication 
(n=85; 22)  
Physical Scenarios Response Options 
1. Hide 
2. Freeze, become immobilized 
3. Run away, try to escape, remove self 
(flight) 
4. Threaten to scream or call for help 
5. Yell, scream, or call for help 
6. Threaten to attack 
7. Attack or struggle 
8. Check out, approach, or investigate (risk 
assessment) 
9. Look for something to use as a weapon 
10. Beg, plead for mercy, or negotiate 
 
Psychological Scenarios Response Options 
1. Hurt the other person physically 
2. Hurt the other person verbally or yell 
3. Verbal confrontation 
4. Avoidance or ignore the situation 
5. Hide or remove self from the situation 
6. Freeze up 
7. Ask for advice and/or plan a course of 
action 
8. Negotiation 
9. Report to a higher authority 
 
 
Approach-Avoid 
(n=31)  
 
Approach-Freeze-Avoid ratings on a 9 point slider    
Factor Ratings 
(n=33) 
Slider: Low (1) to High (5) 
1. Dangerousness 
2. Escapability 
3. Ambiguity 
4. Distance to threat 
5. Presence of a hiding place 
 
6. Immediacy 
7. Ability to communicate with the threat 
8. Ability to mitigate or change the threat 
9. Ability to harm the threat 
10. Ability of others to help 
 
 
Ethics statement. All participants provided informed assent to participate in 
research under a protocol (RA-392: “Anonymous Online Surveys of Threat Assessment”) 
that was approved by the Caltech Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects as 
Institutional Review Board exempt under Part 46.101(b)(2), “Protection of Human 
Subjects” of Title 45 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations. Instead of providing 
formal written consent, in our assent procedure, at the beginning of the online 
experiment, anonymous participants read a description of the experiment in which they 
were told they were free to cease participation at any point. 
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Main experiment. 88 English-speaking participants living in the United States 
were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Participants were paid approximately 
$8-10 upon the completion of the survey, and were given a maximum of 5 hours to 
complete the survey online. Responses from 85 (44 female) participants (age = 33±9 
years, mean±SD) were analyzed. Data from two participants were excluded since the 
subjects had a diagnosis of PTSD, and a third participant was excluded because of an 
anxiety diagnosis and high state anxiety as measured by the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(Spielberger, 1983). High state or trait anxiety cutoff scores were defined as 1.5 standard 
deviations greater than the mean score off all participants across all 4 experiments (all but 
the factor rating task); cutoff scores were 58 for state anxiety and 60 for trait anxiety. 
Forty-four percent of participants had a college degree or higher.  
Scenario factor ratings. An additional independent set of 33 (17 female) 
American raters (age = 34±11), were recruited through Mechanical Turk to quantitatively 
characterize the scenarios, on a scale from 1 (low) to 5 (high), with respect to 10 pre-
defined factors. The scenarios were designed in advance to vary along these dimensions; 
external ratings allowed us to validate and quantify variation in pre-assigned 
low/moderate/high ratings. 
Replication experiment. Results from the main experiment were used to build a 
decision tree that predicted people’s responses to threat scenarios. To test the reliability 
of that decision tree, an additional set of 25 American participants were recruited through 
Mechanical Turk to replicate the original threat scenario experiment. Responses from 22 
(13 female) participants (age = 33±11) were analyzed; 3 participants were excluded for 
anxiety diagnoses and high trait anxiety.  
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Approach-avoidance experiment. To directly relate responses for 
psychological and physical threat scenarios, whose specific response options differed and 
thus made them impossible to compare directly in the main experiment, approach-
avoidance responses to all scenarios were collected from 35 participants. Responses from 
31 (18 female) participants (age = 33±9) were analyzed; 2 were excluded because of a 
diagnosis of PTSD, and a further 2 were excluded because of diagnoses of anxiety and 
high state and trait anxiety.  
Materials 
Participants were presented with twenty-nine scenarios in total (Tables 2.3.2). We 
designed the scenario descriptions to be relatively concise, simple, and clear. Each 
scenario contained an instance of one of four categories of potentially threatening 
situations: one that involved a natural disaster (N; 4 scenarios), an animal (A; 5 
scenarios), a physical interaction with another person (P; 11 scenarios), or, in opposition 
to these three physically threatening categories (20 scenarios total), an interaction with 
another person that was more psychologically threatening (S; 9 scenarios). All scenarios 
included in the human physical category were directly taken from Blanchard et al. 
(2001). 
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Table 2.3.2. Threat Scenarios Presented to Subjects. Each scenario is assigned a brief 
descriptor and label, used throughout the paper. N = Natural; A = Animal; P = Physical; S 
= Psychological. All Physical scenarios taken from (Blanchard et al., 2001). 
Descriptor Scenario Label 
Hurricane  
10 min 
Imagine you are living in New York City, and you hear on the news that a new 
hurricane is arriving in 10 minutes. It is going to hit the city any moment now. This 
one is going to be even bigger than Hurricane Sandy, and no one knows what to make 
of it. 
 
N1 
Hurricane 
24 hr 
Imagine you are living in New York City, and you hear on the news that a new 
hurricane is coming tonight. This one is going to be even bigger than Hurricane Sandy, 
and no one knows what to make of it. 
 
N2 
Tornado  
10 min 
Imagine you are living in Kansas, and you hear on the news that a tornado is 
approaching your town in the next 10 minutes. You couldn't have anticipated this, and 
this is an emergency. You live on the countryside, and it takes at least 1 hour to reach 
another house or any form of help. 
 
N3 
Tornado 
24 hr  
Imagine you are living in Kansas, and you hear on the news that a tornado is 
approaching your town tonight. You live on the countryside, and it takes at least 1 hour 
to reach another house or any form of help. 
 
N4 
Bear  
50 yds 
You are camping in the mountains. You go out by yourself to take a walk, and you 
suddenly see a bear approaching from 50 yards away. 
 
A1 
Bear 
1 yd 
You are camping in the mountains. You go out by yourself to take a walk, and you 
suddenly see a bear approaching from 1 yard away. 
  
A2 
Bear  
10 yds 
You are camping in the mountains. You go out by yourself to take a walk, and you 
suddenly see a bear approaching from 10 yards away. 
 
A3 
Shark  
100 yds 
You are swimming near the beach, and you suddenly realize there is some animal that 
is approaching you from 100 yards away.  It may be a shark but you are unsure. 
 
A4 
Shark   
10 yds 
You are swimming near the beach, and you suddenly realize there is some animal that 
is approaching you from 10 yards away.  It may be a shark but you are unsure. 
 
A5 
Whisper Alone at home one night, you have settled down to read a book when you hear some 
movement right outside of your window.  You cannot see anything, but when you 
listen more closely, it sounds like people whispering. 
P1 
   
Elevator You are alone in an elevator late at night.  As it stops and the doors open, a menacing 
stranger rushes in to attack you, blocking the door. 
P2 
   
Stoplight You are alone in a car on your way home.  While stopped at a traffic signal, an angry 
stranger begins banging on your car window and yelling threatening things at you. 
 
P3 
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Tailgating Driving along a two-lane road, you see in your rear-view mirror that a car is 
dangerously tailgating you.  They cannot pass and begin honking their horn 
aggressively at you while continuing to follow too closely. 
 
P4 
Corner It is past midnight and you are walking through an unfamiliar part of town.  As you 
round a corner, you accidentally run into a man.  He becomes angry and shoves you. 
 
P5 
Acquaintance You and someone you do not really know that well are standing around and talking in 
an empty parking lot.  The acquaintance begins to shove and push you.  You are 
unsure whether s/he (same sex as you,) is serious or just kidding around. 
 
P6 
Park You are outside in a park area at night when you see a menacing stranger with a knife 
about 30 feet away directly approaching you.  It is obvious the person is planning to 
attack you. 
P7 
   
Grab You are alone as you exit an empty campus building late one night.  Just as you get 
outside you feel a hand grab your arm. 
P8 
   
Noise You are sleeping in bed during the night, but suddenly wake up thinking you have 
heard a suspicious noise.  It is dark and you are alone. 
P9 
   
Phone You are alone at home one night about to go to bed when the phone rings.  You answer 
it, and there is an unfamiliar voice on the other end.  It tells you that he or she is right 
outside of your house and hangs up. 
 
P10 
Bomb Coming home one day, you find an unexpected shoe-box-sized package waiting for 
you by the mailbox.  As you sit down to open it, you notice a faint ticking sound that 
appears to come from inside the package. 
P11 
   
Blackmail 
Email 
One of your colleagues has blackmailed you via e-mail, saying that he or she will 
spread rumors about you.  The rumor is an embarrassing one that deals with your 
personal issues. 
S1 
   
Blackmail 
Face 
You are taking a break at work and one of your co-workers approaches you.  He/she is 
blackmailing you face-to-face.  He or she threatens to spread rumors about your 
personal issues. 
 
S2 
Boss It is almost the holiday season and you are planning to take a few days off from 
work.  You bring this up at your weekly meeting, and your boss disapproves.  Your 
immediate boss threatens to fire you if you take a break. 
S3 
    
Rumor Recently, you have noticed that one of your co-workers have been talking behind your 
back at work.  He/she has been spreading rumors, and seems to drop negative remarks 
about you to your immediate boss as well.  
 
S4 
Cellphone You are working for a cellphone company, and you have had a new design for a phone 
in mind.  You decide to share it with a colleague.  You tell him/her that this may be 
revolutionary and that he/she should keep it confidential.  Sooner or later, you realize 
that the colleague has already spread the idea and has taken credit for it. 
 
S5 
Party Your close friend is having a holiday party, and has not invited you to this party. 
 
S6 
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Bar A group of your colleagues go out to a bar after work, but no one asks you to join 
them. 
 
S7 
Homophobic Imagine you are secretly gay and a close family member is homophobic.  During a 
family party, they make a derogatory comment toward gay people.  
 
S8 
Political You realize that you and your boss hold very different political views.  After work, 
you and your boss get together and he/she asks about your political views. 
S9 
 
These scenarios were designed to vary along 10 different factors (Table 
2.3.1). The first five factors were derived from Blanchard et al. (2001), and we included 
additional factors  (e.g., ability to communicate to capture human vs. animal scenarios; 
ability to mitigate to capture elements of social support and social hierarchy) to reflect 
our expanded set of scenarios. 
 In order to rate each of these scenarios along the above dimensions, 
independent raters were each presented with 10 randomly selected scenarios from the set 
of 29 and asked to rate each of those scenarios for each factor (dangerousness, 
escapability, etc.) on a scale of 1 (low) to 5 (high) for all 10 factors.  Through random 
assignment, each scenario was rated by at least 8 and up to 15 individuals (mean = 11.4).   
In order to rate each of these scenarios along the above dimensions, independent 
raters were each presented with 10 randomly selected scenarios from the set of 29 and 
asked to rate each of those scenarios for each factor (dangerousness, escapability, etc.) on 
a scale of 1 (low) to 5 (high) for all 10 factors.  Through random assignment, each 
scenario was rated by at least 8 and up to 15 individuals (mean = 11.4).   
Procedure 
 Main and Replication Experiment. Participants were asked to read each 
scenario and indicate their most likely first-responses. Participants also had the option to 
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choose up to two additional options.  If they had selected multiple options, participants 
were asked to rank their responses from 1 (most likely) to 3 (least likely); here we 
analyze only the data from the top response option. The psychological scenarios were 
given a separate category of response options. There were 10 response options for the 
physical scenarios (natural, animal, and human) and 9 for the psychological scenarios 
(Table 2.3.1). 
Scenario Factor Ratings. Participants were randomly presented 10 of the 29 
scenarios, and asked to use a sliding scale to provide factor ratings for each scenario on a 
scale from 1 (low) to 5 (high), with respect to all 10 of our pre-defined factors (cf. Table 
2.3.1). The starting position of the sliders was randomized. Because participants were 
only presented 10 of the 29 scenarios, factor ratings for each scenario were provided by a 
subset of the 33 participants. A minimum of 8 and maximum of 15 participants rated each 
scenario, with 21 of the 29 (72%) scenarios being rated by at least 10 participants.  
Approach-Avoidance Experiment. Participants were instructed to read each of 
the 29 scenarios and imagine how they would respond to the threat in terms of 
approach/avoidance. An illustration (Figure 2.3.1) explained the concept of 
approaching/freezing/avoiding a threat. Participants indicated their response on a 9-point 
slider, which began in the middle of the range. Participants were asked to imagine 
themselves as the slider moving either toward (left) or away (right) from the threat. 
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Figure. 2.3.1. Approach/avoid instructions. Participants (n=31) in the approach-avoid 
experiment viewed these instructions, which made explicit that approach-avoidance ratings 
related to taxis relative to the source of threat. 
Analyses 
 Factor ratings. Means and standard deviations are reported for the 
independent ratings along 10 factors, and were used to characterize each scenario. The 
averaged independent ratings ranging from 1.00 to 5.00 were normalized across all 
scenarios (Normalized Scenario Score = (Scenario Score - Minimum Factor 
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Score)/(Maximum Factor Score - Minimum Factor Score)) such that the lowest rated 
scenario for a factor received a score of 0, and the highest rated scenario received a score 
of 1.  
Factor-specific response correlations. To quantify relationships between each of 
these rated factors and the set of defensive behaviors, we calculated Pearson product-
moment correlations for every possible factor-response pairing. The first vector in this 
correlation consisted of the mean factor rating given to each scenario; the second vector 
consisted of the proportion of participants who chose a response option as their first 
choice for each scenario. Because response options differed between physical and 
psychological scenarios, all analyses were conducted separately for those scenario 
categories. To visualize patterns of correlations, correlation coefficients were reported in 
heatmaps with factors and response options organized along rough imminence and 
approach-avoidance continua, respectively. 
Factor-approach/avoid response correlations. To directly relate responses to 
psychological and physical threat scenarios, the same correlational analysis completed for 
specific response options was completed according to the proportion of subjects who 
chose approach-avoid ratings corresponding to categorical approach/freeze/avoid 
responses. 
Gender differences. The above analyses were completed for males and females 
separately, as well as together. While minor differences were found between male and 
females’ first choice defensive behaviors for some scenarios, as these differences 
mirrored prior findings (Blanchard et al., 2001) (Table 2.3.3) and did not reflect our 
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primary interest, males and females are consequently pooled in the results with specific 
differences noted only as they arise.  
 
Table 2.3.3. Gender Differences. Comparison of male and female top response options in 
scenarios for which their first responses differed. When applicable, these differences are 
compared to prior results (Blanchard et al., 2001) in the comments column. While the top 
response option in scenario P10 did not differ between males and females, the scenario is 
reported since Blanchard (2001) had observed a gender effect. * Denotes a tie between 
first-choice response options. 
Scenario Male Top Responses 
(n=41) 
Female Top Responses 
(n=44) 
Comments 
P2 
Elevator 
1. Attack or struggle 
2. Yell or scream 
1. Yell or scream 
2. Attack or struggle 
Blanchard found the same first choices.  
First and second choices switched by gender.  
P8 
Grab 
1. Attack or struggle* 
1. Risk assessment* 
2. Yell or scream 
1. Yell or scream 
2. Risk-assessment 
3. Attack or struggle 
Blanchard found the same first choices. 
Top three choices the same across genders. 
P10 
Phone 
1. Look for a weapon* 
1. Risk-assessment* 
2. Yell or scream 
1. Look for a weapon 
2. Yell or scream 
3. Risk-assessment 
Observed no difference in first response. 
Top three choices the same across genders. 
Blanchard’s first female response was hide. 
N2 
Hurricane 
1. Flight 
2. Risk-assessment 
1. Risk-assessment 
2. Flight 
Comparison to Blanchard not applicable.  
First and second choices switched by gender.  
S1 
Blackmail 
1. Report to an authority 
2. Verbal confrontation 
1. Verbal confrontation 
2. Report to an authority 
Comparison to Blanchard not applicable.  
First and second choices switched by gender.  
 
Single approach-avoid score. A single approach-avoidance score across 
participants’ ratings was derived for each scenario, with more positive scores indicating 
approach, more negative avoidance, and those close to zero either indifference or 
freezing. To construct this score, first, approach, freeze, and avoidance scores were 
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calculated for each scenario. These scores were the proportion of subjects choosing 
categorical approach (ratings of 1, 2, 3, 4)/freeze (ratings of 5)/avoid (ratings of 6, 7, 8, 9) 
for each scenario, with the proportion of subjects choosing an approach or avoidance 
rating weighted by subjects’ median approach or avoidance score. All categorical 
approach/freeze/avoid scores were rescaled on a 0 to 1 interval.  Then, a single approach-
avoidance score took the signed absolute value of the difference between the rescaled 
approach and avoidance scores, and penalized it by subtracting the magnitude of the 
rescaled freeze score for that scenario, such that the single approach-avoid score for 
scenarios that had larger freeze scores were closer to zero. 
 Decision tree.   
A descriptive decision tree that predicted responses to threat scenarios based on 
features of those scenarios was created through a multi-step process.  
The first major step was describing convergence or divergence between physical 
and psychological scenarios. Two analyses guided this step. First, to test our hypothesis 
that psychological and physical threats are characteristically distinct, we calculated the 
dissimilarity between all pairs of scenarios based on the factor ratings of those scenarios, 
using the correlation distance measure in Matlab’s pdist function. These pairwise 
scenario dissimilarities were then visualized both (1) as a dissimilarity matrix heatmap, 
organized by scenario type — animal, natural, human physical, and psychological — and 
(2) according to multidimensional scaling of the dissimilarity distances between each 
scenario, to determine whether physical and psychological threats cluster separately. The 
results of this analysis partially guided early splitting of physical from psychological 
threat.  
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Secondly, we sought to determine whether basic approach/avoidance behavior 
to psychological and physical threats diverged according to any factors. To do this, the 
single approach-avoidance scores were correlated with factor scores to guide construction 
of the beginning of the decision tree. 
After forming the top branches of the tree, which predicted primary 
approach/avoidance responses, we extended the tree to predict appraisal-related specific 
responses (e.g., risk assessment, attack, verbal confrontation, etc.). This portion of the 
tree was constructed by summarizing how scenarios with the same most popular response 
options varied with respect to factor ratings. In organizing these nodes of the decision 
tree, priority was given to explanatory factors that (1) clustered consistently to yield a 
common top response option (close ties were allowed), and that (2) made ecological 
sense or adhered to a priori hypotheses (e.g., about the importance of communication, 
threat imminence, etcetera). While there were no overall gender differences in basic 
approach-avoidance behavior, specific responses to scenarios sometimes varied with 
gender; therefore, when appropriate, gender was used as a late node in the tree. 
After construction, we tested the predictive success of the tree by calculating the 
proportion of each individual participants’ responses that were correctly predicted for both 
the original and replication groups and comparing this prediction to chance performance of 
around 10% (10 vs. 9 specific response options for physical and psychological threat, 
respectively). Importantly, the decision tree was derived based only on the original group’s 
data, and thus the replication group was an independent set of data on which to test.
 Results  
Independent Factor Ratings  
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The scenarios were designed to vary along the 10 specified factors. Externally 
validating our construction, low (0)/moderate (0.5)/high (1) pre-determined factor ratings 
(assigned by the experimenters when constructing the scenarios) correlated significantly 
(p<0.001) with all measured factor ratings (scale 1 to 5) (measured in the factor-rating 
experiment (n=33)).  
Across all four threat categories (physical, natural, animal, psychological), 
scenarios spanned the range of participants’ (n=33) raw factor ratings well (Table 2.3.4). 
The physical scenarios had the highest ratings for escapability, ambiguity, and ability to 
harm (Table 2.3.5); these ratings were similar to the previously reported ratings for these 
scenarios (Blanchard et al., 2001). The natural scenarios were rated as especially 
dangerous and low in ability to communicate. The animal scenarios were rated high in 
immediacy, and, like the natural scenarios, low in ability to communicate.  The 
psychological scenarios were rated high in ability to mitigate and ability of others to help 
as well as the ability to communicate. 
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Table 2.3.4. Scenario Factor Ratings. Lefthand columns demonstrate the range of raw 
ratings by factor, with lowest and highest rated scenarios listed. Righthand histograms 
show the number of scenarios that received an average rating corresponding to a score of 
1 (low) to 5 (high). 
Factor Low Low scenario High High Scenario Histogram of Ratings 
Across Scenarios 
Dangerousness 1.00 Party; bar 4.94 Bear 1yd 
	  
Escapability 1.70 Hurricane 10 min 3.44 Acquaintance 
	  
Ambiguity 1.25 Boss 4.5 Acquaintance 
	  
Distance  1.08 Grab 3.14 Tornado 24hr 
	  
Availability of a 
hiding place 
1.25 Bear 1yd 3.46 Whisper 
	  
Immediacy 1.95 Party 4.92 Elevator 
	  
Ability to 
communicate 
1.00 Bomb; Hurricane; 
Tornado 
4.53 Blackmail face  
	  
Ability to mitigate 1.42 Hurricane 24hr 4.15 Political 
	  
Ability to harm 1.00 Hurricane 3.89 Acquaintance 
	  
Ability of others to 
help 
1.60 Noise 3.58 Homophobic 
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Table 2.3.5. Category Factor Ratings. Normalized factor ratings (Mean ± SE) by 
scenario category.  
Factor Natural 
(n=4) 
Animal 
(n=5) 
Physical 
(n=11) 
Psychological 
(n=9) 
Dangerousness 0.89 ± 0.05 0.84 ± 0.05 0.72 ± 0.04 0.26 ± 0.08 
Escapability 0.45 ± 0.13 0.53 ± 0.14 0.69 ± 0.07 0.51 ± 0.07 
Ambiguity 0.41 ± 0.04 0.42 ± 0.14 0.56 ± 0.08 0.28 ± 0.06 
Distance 0.62 ± 0.16 0.51 ± 0.14 0.36 ± 0.08 0.60 ± 0.09 
Availability of a hiding place 0.69 ± 0.08 0.19 ± 0.08 0.45 ± 0.11 0.28 ± 0.09 
Immediacy 0.68 ± 0.10 0.76 ± 0.07 0.75 ± 0.05 0.38 ± 0.08 
Ability to communicate 0.00 ± 0.00 0.04 ± 0.01 0.51 ± 0.08 0.84 ± 0.05 
Ability to mitigate 0.22 ± 0.11 0.16 ± 0.04 0.53 ± 0.06 0.65 ± 0.07 
Ability to harm 0.00 ± 0.00 0.23 ± 0.03 0.65 ± 0.06 0.47 ± 0.08 
Ability of others to help 0.40 ± 0.11 0.22 ± 0.10 0.37 ± 0.05 0.57 ± 0.09 
 
Specific situational factors elicit specific behaviors 
 Correlations between the mean factor ratings and the proportion of 
subjects endorsing defensive behaviors were calculated to determine whether human 
defensive behavior could be predicted by certain situational factors across categories of 
threat.  All non-psychological scenarios (natural, animal, and human physical) were 
combined in the correlations (Figure. 2.3.2a), with results for psychological scenarios 
reported separately (Figure. 2.3.2b).  
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Figure 2.3.2. Factor-Response Option Correlations. Heatmap of correlation coefficients 
from Pearson’s correlations between mean factor ratings and specific defensive behaviors 
(a,b) or approach/freeze/avoid (c,d) for physical (left) and psychological (right) threat 
scenarios. Row-wise factors organized along an approximate low to high imminence 
continuum. Column-wise response options organized along an approximate approach-
avoidance continuum. Original distance scores were reversed to far-to-near to in 
accordance with the imminence continuum.  
Many of the highest correlations were predictable: in the physical scenarios, the 
ability to communicate with the source of threat was strongly correlated with threatening 
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to attack or threatening to scream; in the psychological scenarios, the presence of a 
hiding place was strongly correlated with hiding. A global pattern existed, such that 
imminent threats tended to be approached, and less imminent threats were avoided. For 
example, threats that were high in immediacy, dangerousness (all scenarios were 
dangerous, but some more so than others), ability to harm, or proximity were positively 
correlated with responses that required approaching the source of threat, like attacking, 
screaming, or threatening to do so. Similarly, threatening scenarios that were escapable, 
ambiguous, or had a hiding place available were negatively correlated with those 
approaching actions and positively correlated with avoidant actions including risk-
assessment and hiding. This pattern was strongest for the most imminent threats, 
suggesting a more rigid and restricted set of response patterns to these scenarios.     
Comparison of Psychological and Physical Threats with Direct Approach-Avoid 
Ratings 
Direct comparisons of responses to psychological and physical threats as a 
function of factor ratings were made using approach-avoidance ratings. Correlations 
between the proportion of subjects choosing to approach, freeze, or avoid a threat and the 
factor rating of a threat elicited a similar pattern observed for specific responses, whereby 
more imminent threats were approached and less imminent threats avoided (Figure 
2.3.2c,d). This pattern held for both physical and psychological threats, with a notable 
exception for the factor of dangerousness (the magnitude of the threat): dangerous 
physical threats were avoided, and dangerous psychological threats approached. 
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Decision Tree 
 A data-driven decision tree (Figure 2.3.3) that predicted a person’s choice 
of defensive behavior for all scenarios summarized the most deterministic relationships 
between scenario factors and defensive behaviors. The construction of this tree was based 
entirely on data from the original sample (n=85), and was later tested on data from the 
replication sample (n=22). Partially supported from a clustering of scenarios based on 
patterns of factor ratings (Figure 2.3.4), the beginning of the tree separated psychological 
from physical threats. 
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Figure 2.3.3. Decision Tree for Defensive Behaviors to Threatening Scenarios.  Panels 
a, b. Decision tree predicting the defensive behavior chosen by the majority of participants 
based on characteristics of that threat scenario. The tree consists of four main branches, 
with primary approach/avoid responses predicted by the 2x2 interaction of danger (high, 
moderate) and threat type (psychological, physical threat). Appraisal of factors along 
further nodes predicts specific defensive responses for each scenario, denoted by the 
scenario labels used in Table 2.3.2. Where appropriate, gender differences are noted. The 
tree successfully predicts the group majority decisions of both original participants (n=85) 
and replication study participants (n=22) for all scenarios. Panel c. The average proportion 
of original and replication study participants’ first responses correctly predicted for all 
scenarios (n=29), physical scenarios (n=20), and psychological scenarios (n=9).  Male and 
female performance reported separately. Dashed line around 0.12 (All: 0.128; Physical: 
0.130; Psychological: 0.123) represents chance performance. 
 
 
Figure 2.3.4. Panel a. Heatmap of scenario factor ratings dissimilarity matrix. 
Dissimilarity scores (legend right of heatmap) represent the distance between pairs of 
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scenarios, calculated as one minus the sample correlation between the ten factor ratings 
for each pairwise scenario comparison. Scenario labels indicated on top and left of 
heatmap, with individual scenarios denoted by each row/column (i.e., 4 “Natural” 
scenarios: N1, N2, N3, N4). Black diagonal indicates scenarios are minimally dissimilar 
to themselves; dark clusters indicate within-category scenarios are most similar according 
to factor ratings. Psychological scenarios are most distinct from the other categories. 
Within category similarity exceptions exist, e.g., P1, P9, P11 and S3. Panel b. Two-
dimensional multidimensional scaling (MDS) of Euclidean distance between scenarios 
based on factor-rating dissimilarity scores. Human psychological threat scenarios (red 
stars) mostly clustered separately from physical threats (blue circles: animal and natural 
threats; black triangles: human physical). A scree plot of stress by MDS dimensions 
justified the use of 2 dimensions, which had a stress of 0.140. While the primary value of 
our MDS analysis is as a visualization of the similarity space of scenario factor ratings, 
we cautiously suggest that the first MDS dimension, positively related to the ability to 
mitigate (r=0.68) and to communicate (r=0.90) with the threat, while inversely related to 
dangerousness (r=-0.88) and immediacy (r=-0.63), relates to “social power” or the 
threatened individual’s ability to communicate with and influence the threat. Meanwhile, 
the second MDS dimension, inversely related to immediacy (r=-0.68), and positively 
related to distance (r=0.74) and the presence of a hiding place (r=0.75), captures the 
threatened individual’s ability to thwart the threat and “control” the situation. 
 
The primary difference in reactions to psychological and physical threat is 
concisely summarized by differences in the interaction between dangerousness and basic 
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approach/avoidance responses. Correlations between the single approach-avoidance 
scores and factor ratings for psychological dangerousness and physical dangerousness 
separately showed a significant positive correlation with psychological dangerousness 
(r=0.68, p=0.000) and a significant negative correlation with physical dangerousness (r=-
0.57, p=0.001). In other words, dangerous psychological scenarios were approached, and 
dangerous physical scenarios were avoided. This pattern held for both females 
(psychological: r=0.50, p=0.006; physical: r=-0.52, p=0.004) and males (psychological: 
r=0.49, p=0.007; physical: r=-0.39, p=0.037).  
The pattern of this interaction separated the four major branches of the decision 
tree: (1) high and (2) moderate danger physical threats, and (3) high and (4) moderate 
danger psychological threats. The primary response tendency for (1) and (3) was 
avoidance; types (2) and (4) were primarily approached.  
The latter portion of the tree predicted specific responses. Traversing down the 
tree, an assessment was made at each node, related to a specific factor, to ultimately 
predict an action. The dominant response to low-threat psychological scenarios was 
simply avoidance; low-threat physical scenarios were predominately assessed for risk. 
The path to specific responses for high danger scenarios was more complicated. 
The ability to communicate with the source of threat split human from non-human 
scenarios early in the tree. Animals and natural disasters, which could not be 
communicated with, and which were also physically difficult or impossible to fight, 
prompted flight, unless they were quite close, in which case risk assessment or hiding, 
and freezing (for especially imminent threats) were employed. For human physical 
threats, immediacy, ambiguity, escapability, and gender interacted to predict responses. 
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For psychological threats, verbal confrontation was a popular approach option, with 
negotiation employed in a scenario involving a boss where there was low ability to harm 
the source of threat, and reporting to an authority a popular option for more distant 
threats.  
This decision tree correctly predicted the most popular response for all 29 
scenarios in both the original and replication groups and performed much better than 
chance (about 12% since some scenarios allowed more than one valid response option) at 
predicting individual participants’ responses for both the original and replication groups 
(Figure 2.2.3c). 
Discussion 
Main Findings 
Correlations. Whilst using a new methodology (internet collection of scenario 
responses), we replicated prior findings that human reactions to human physical threats 
mirror patterns of defensive responses observed in rodents (Blanchard et al., 2001; A. M. 
Perkins & Corr, 2006; Shuhama et al., 2008) (Table 2.3.6). We extended this to show that 
similar patterns exist for defensive responses to non-human physical threats (natural 
disasters and animals), as well as social psychological threat, with some notable 
differences.  
Table 2.3.6. Comparison of correlations coefficients between defensive behaviors and 
scenario characteristics obtained in 4 studies. Comparison between Blanchard (2001), 
Perkins and Corr (2006), and Shuhama (2008) reproduced from Blanchard (2011). The 
first 3 studies (left of line) used Blanchard’s original 12 physically threatening scenarios 
and report male (top) and female (bottom) correlation values separately. The present 
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study’s (right of line) 20 physical scenarios included 11 of the original physically 
threatening scenarios, along with 4 natural disaster and 5 animal scenarios. For the 9 
psychological scenarios, comparable defensive response options are reported. V.C. = 
verbal confrontation. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, n.s. = not significant with p<0.05; p-values not 
reported in Shuhama et al. (2008).  
Defensive 
behavior/factor 
Blanchard  
(Hawaii) 
Perkins & 
Corr 
(Wales) 
Shuhama 
(Brazil) 
Original 
(USA) 
Animal; 
Natural 
(USA) 
Physical 
(USA) 
Psychological 
(USA) 
Risk 
assessment/ 
ambiguity 
0.89** 
0.86** 
0.89** 
0.85** 
0.91 
0.88 
0.93*** 0.08 0.62** 0.13 (plan) 
Flight/ 
ambiguity 
-0.50 
-0.63 
-0.56 
-0.59* 
-0.69 
-0.61 
-0.50 0.73* -0.20 -0.48 (hide)  
-0.13 (avoid) 
Defensive 
attack/ 
ambiguity 
-0.53 
-0.23 
-0.54 
-0.44 
n.s. 
n.s. 
-0.42 -0.50 -0.23 0.41 (V.C.) 
Flight/ 
escapability 
0.10 
0.04 
0.12 
0.10 
n.s. 
n.s. 
0.35 0.81** 0.33 0.66 (hide)  
0.23 (avoid) 
Defensive 
attack/ 
escapability 
-0.76* 
-0.65* 
-0.87** 
-0.89** 
-0.76 
n.s. 
-0.67* -0.60* -0.30 -0.38 (V.C.) 
Defensive 
attack/distance 
-0.59* 
-0.64* 
-0.62* 
-0.69* 
n.s. 
-0.69 
-0.47* -0.71* -0.43 -0.72* (negotiate) 
Hiding/hiding 
place 
0.59* 
0.63* 
0.33 
0.30 
0.61 
0.59 
0.81** 0.44 0.29 0.84** (hide) 
 
Decision Tree. Features of the threat scenarios determined behavioral responses; 
these patterns were summarized in a decision tree that successfully predicted scenario 
responses for the original participant group as well as generalized to a replication sample. 
This tree demonstrated two processes at play in threat reactions: (1) basic 
approach/avoidance behavior and (2) situational appraisal. The first set of processes 
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distinguished psychological from physical threats based on a single factor: the 
magnitude of the threat; more dangerous physical threats were avoided while more 
dangerous psychological ones were approached.  Subsequently, appraisal of further 
factors determined the best specific response for a particular threat scenario.    
Imminence Framework. While our decision tree splits psychological from 
physical threat as a function of dangerousness, a general dimensional framework across 
both threat types emerges from the pattern of correlations between situational factors and 
favored defensive behaviors. Looking across the heatmap columns in Figure 2.3.2, 
behavioral responses can be organized along an approach-avoidance continuum, with 
freezing in the middle, while, going down the rows, situational factors exist on an 
imminence continuum. As a threatening situation becomes more imminent — immediate, 
close, and dangerous — attack responses are chosen; as the immediate threat wanes, 
avoidant behaviors, which are less costly to the organism, are adopted. Approaching 
actions (e.g., attack, negotiate) are only taken when an organism is pressed by imminent 
threat, with the exception of imminent but escapable threats, which are avoided. This 
structure mirrors a previously described pattern (Chang et al., 2013) whereby regardless 
of whether a predator or social conspecific posed a threat, imminent threats (e.g., a cat to 
a rodent or a dominant rhesus macaque to another rhesus macaque) evoked fast reflexive 
behaviors (escape/freeze/defensive aggression) while more distant threats (e.g., cat odor 
or a photo of a dominant rhesus macaque) are cautiously explored; this pattern of 
imminent threats evoking fast, reflexive responses was recently emphasized in the 
theoretical Survival Optimization System (SOS) model (Mobbs et al., 2015). Likewise, in 
conditioned fear paradigms, a conditioned stimulus is an imminent predictor of an 
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aversive stimulus and elicits a prompt response. Our findings agree with the pattern of 
imminent responses eliciting rapid responses: across domains, imminent threats provoke 
fast, reflexive actions while more distal threats permit exploration; these generic patterns 
observed across specific threats likely reflect conserved adaptive mechanisms that 
evolved to cope with physical predator threat and that were subsequently co-opted also 
for coping with social/psychological threats.  
The importance of threat imminence to explaining defensive behaviors in this 
two-dimensional manner is in line with prior work on predator imminence (Fanselow & 
Lester, 1988; McNaughton & Corr, 2004).  Indeed, the brain is in fact sensitive to the 
literal distance to a threat: brain activity shifts from the ventromedial prefrontal cortex to 
the periaqueductal grey as the imminence of a virtual predator in an fMRI experiment is 
increased (Mobbs et al., 2007). It is even the case that activation in the amygdala 
discriminates the directionality of a threat — a tarantula — either towards or away from a 
subject, regardless of actual distance. This ability of the brain to monitor many 
dimensions of threat provides direct neurobiological evidence that we “fractionate” basic 
fear into component mechanisms (Mobbs et al., 2010).  A major challenge for the future 
will be to map such neural components, as revealed with fMRI (Mobbs et al., 2010) or 
cellular techniques (Silva et al., 2013), onto the appraisal-like components we identified 
in our decision tree (Figure 2.3.3). While our stimuli here were designed to be concise for 
this behavioral experiment, it would be useful to design future stimuli that could also be 
used in fMRI tasks; such stimuli would need to control more stringently for a host of 
lexical and semantic confounds including length, word frequency, readability, 
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concreteness, and arousal, all of which were not controlled for in our small sample of 
stimuli.  
Interaction Caveat. An important caveat to all these dimensional analyses is that 
situational factors interact; therefore, it is important to be mindful of the entire context 
when assessing a behavior in any species. For example, it is the interaction between 
imminence and perceived magnitude of the danger that explains why imminent 
psychological threats are only reflexively approached (defensive aggression), while 
escape is a popular reflexive response for (escapable) imminent physical threats. Notably, 
while flight was a common behavioral response and was predicted well by our decision 
tree (cf. Figure 2.3.3b), it did not strongly correlate with any individual physical threat 
features (cf. Figure 2.3.2a), likely because of the interaction between factors. The concern 
about careful contextual analysis extends to comparative animal research: different tests 
can differentiate diverse anxiety phenotypes in non-human primate models for clinical 
comparisons to humans; however, these tests often do not correlate well with observed 
diagnostic behaviors, likely exhibiting context dependency which is not generalizable 
across tests (Coleman & Pierre, 2014).  
Study Limitations. This study does not directly measure real threat behavior in 
humans, but rather ratings about hypothetical scenarios. Therefore, one could argue that 
the behavior captured here relates to an intuitive, culturally learned “folk” knowledge of 
how one ought to respond to a threatening situation. However, it is compelling that the 
patterns described here in humans from reactions to hypothetical threat scenarios in fact 
relate well to patterns observed in the actual behavior of rodents, as also seen in three 
other studies using the same methods (Blanchard et al., 2011). As such, it is our 
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assumption that our data reflect the actual behavioral structure of threat. However, it 
is clear that future experiments should attempt to (1) observe humans’ responses in actual 
threatening encounters in an observational (but non-experimental) context, (2) observe 
behavioral responses in an experimentally-controlled virtual-reality type of experiment in 
which participants “experience” a threat but are not placed in danger, and (3) record 
implicit measures including changes in autonomic arousal, body sway/freeze, and 
emotional expression in response to these stimuli.  
Additionally, it should be noted that additional features could be added to our 
model, for example nodes determining whether both the potential attacker and threatened 
individual are aware of the threatening situation (Lima & Dill, 1990). All our scenarios 
involved an established threat situation, but future work should also incorporate 
evaluations antecedent to this point in the threat evaluation process.  
What’s Different for Non-Human Physical and Human Psychological Threats? 
 Non-Human Threats. In contrast to the results from human physical 
threat, in our correlation analysis, there was a weaker positive relationship between risk 
assessment and ambiguity for animals and natural disasters (cf. Table 2.3.6). 
Additionally, for these two physical threat types, the relationship between flight and 
ambiguity reversed from negative to positive, and the positive relationship between flight 
and escapability was stronger. In the decision tree, these threats were never approached. 
These changes are likely a function of the increased danger and decreased ability to 
communicate with or mitigate the source of threat in animal and natural scenarios as 
compared with human physical scenarios — in such situations escape is prioritized. 
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Psychological Threats. While similar to human and non-human physical 
threats in our dimensional analysis, psychological threats were the most distinctive threat 
category, requiring unique specific response options. Empirically supporting our 
hypothesis that while defensive reactions to all threat types draw on similar processes, 
psychological threats are qualitatively different.  Factor ratings (Figure 2.3.4) and 
approach-danger tendencies distinguished psychological from physical threats. Specific 
differences for psychological threat arise from two main differences: the timescale of the 
threat and the specific type of harm inflicted. 
 Psychological and physical threats might be continuously mapped onto a dimension 
of temporal immediacy: psychological threat decouples the immediate physical threat from 
cues that signal it. On an interesting side note, while unconditioned fear stimuli are directly 
linked to physical threat, conditioned fear stimuli are separable from actual physical threat 
and therefore similar in nature to our psychological threats. Tautologically, in our study, 
imminent psychological threats were dangerous because they were imminent, could not be 
avoided, and required a rapid response. Typically, psychological threats and reactions to 
them unfold more slowly over time, allowing individuals to gather information and plan an 
optimal response, often drawing on the advice and help of others. In our most 
immediate/dangerous psychological scenarios, these options were not available. 
 In humans, there can then be yet another layer to psychological threat that is 
something like "symbolic threat", e.g., blackmail, where there is no physical threat at all, 
but instead relevance to factors such as social reputation.  Other species show such 
“psychological" threat to some degree, related to social rank and social ostracism, one of 
the most potent social threats (Williams, 2007). In other species, these concerns relate more 
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directly to physical concerns (access to food, protection, etc. with strong social bonds 
even increasing longevity in baboons (Silk et al., 2010)), while humans’ worries about 
social reputation and social exclusion have less immediate physical ramifications (although 
admittedly, status relates to physical outcomes). Nevertheless, human fMRI studies suggest 
that aspects of social threat (social exclusion) activate regions that overlap with those 
activated by physical threats (physical pain) (Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003). 
The two types of pain share common pathways across several species; this evolutionary 
overlap has been attributed to physical pain mechanisms being used to prompt appropriate 
defensive reactions for social threats to inclusion (MacDonald & Leary, 2005). Indeed, 
some social psychological threats (angry faces) prime defensive bodily reactions, including 
freezing (Roelofs, Hagenaars, & Stins, 2010). 
 One notable exception to the observation that behavioral patterns to 
psychological threat mirror those to physical threat occurred in the case of ambiguous 
scenarios: defensive attack was not chosen in ambiguous physical scenarios, while verbal 
confrontation, which is analogous to attacking, was chosen in ambiguous psychological 
threat scenarios. In the psychological case, it seems that the cost of confrontation is not as 
high as in the physical case, where attack could likely result in bodily harm. Instead, the 
psychological form of attack — verbal confrontation — might even garner clarification 
of the ambiguous situation. 
Future Directions 
Three observations about our decision tree relate to future directions. Moving 
beyond Blanchard’s (2001) correlational approach, the decision tree allowed us to 
recapture the complex interaction of situational factors in guiding threat responses. 
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Hierarchically organized, our decision tree emphasized (1) the importance of stimulus 
category (early branches separate psychological from physical threat, and then physical 
threat in which another human is or is not present); (2) that certain factors are more 
relevant and processed earlier (e.g., danger and immediacy are assessed early because 
highly imminent situations require immediate action); (3) appraisal occurs at each node, 
and must integrate information from the prior path traveled to reach that node. The length 
of a path traversed is relevant: throughout the tree, the general principle of 
attacking/actively responding to imminent risk and retreating/avoiding in less imminent 
situations holds constant across situational factors and categories of threat and fewer 
appraisal nodes are traversed for imminent than less-imminent threats. Each of these 
three observations relate to other findings and future directions. 
Neural support. First, the importance of stimulus category raises the key 
question of what neural support exists for psychological theories. While common 
pathways have been discussed, and are evolutionarily efficient, some separate processing 
of social threat is supported by the finding that different hypothalamic circuits exist for 
predatory and social fear (Silva et al., 2013). A neural approach may also answer the 
open question of to what degree appraisals are automatic or controlled (deliberative); 
different appraisals may participate in different circuits, with varying degrees of 
automaticity (Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010).  
 Appraisal theory and relevant factors. Non-human primates appear capable of 
behavior similar to situational appraisal: woolly monkeys learned to react differently to 
three types of human intruders; learning when it is appropriate to launch a defensive 
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response to humans’ presence saves energy, leaving time for foraging (Papworth, 
Milner-Gulland, & Slocombe, 2013).   
That certain factors have priority for appraisals can be related to the sequential 
nature of stimulus-evaluation checks postulated by some appraisal theories (Scherer, 
1984, 2001). Interestingly, the enhancement of visual and olfactory sensory acquisition 
by fear expression (Susskind et al., 2008) relates to the cumulative nature of the appraisal 
process: being afraid involves gathering and assessing information about the source of 
threat. Appraisal theory identifies pertinent stimulus attributes. For instance, Scherer 
(2009) proposes four broad sets of such stimulus-evaluation checks that assess, in 
sequence: personal relevance of the stimulus; evaluation of how it affects well-being; 
coping potential; and normative significance.  While our limited and in general 
psychologically simple set of scenarios was not designed to probe psychological 
appraisal theories, they share with such theories the need for a prioritized and integrative 
structure in how their threat is evaluated. Hierarchical assessment (cf. Tinbergen, 1951) 
and the contextual nature of that assessment are shared features of Scherer’s component-
process model and our decision tree. Appraisal theory is concerned with emotional states 
(Sander et al., 2005), which may elicit a behavior, but need not do so. Meanwhile, our 
decision tree focuses on the outcome of an emotional state, while remaining relatively 
agnostic about that state (neither we nor Scherer restrict these states to basic emotions). 
In the future, emotional evaluations/reactions as well as psychophysiological responses to 
different threatening scenarios should be empirically assessed. A second nuanced 
difference concerns the timescale considered in our model and appraisal theories: an “end 
point” is reached in our model when a first behavioral response is made. This occurs 
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relatively early, especially compared to the complex psychological processes most 
appraisal theories describe. It is important to keep in mind that all of our data relies solely 
on descriptions of threat, and on verbal report of what people would do, which may 
further simplify and truncate the decision process.  
Individual differences and psychopathology. Individual differences extending 
to impairment offer insight into the relationship between nodes. Each node in the tree will 
be given different weights, according to individual differences, including trait and 
personality differences (Perkins & Corr, 2006) and personal experience (Gawronski & 
Cesario, 2013), including prior exposure to or knowledge about “appropriate” responses 
to a specific scenario, e.g., the “correct” response to a hurricane. However, a node can 
also be broken.  Psychiatric illnesses may be “linked to aberrant processing of 
environmental uncertainty” (Bach & Dolan, 2012) and amygdala lesions in rhesus 
macaques (Raper et al., 2013) affect contextual modulation to certain social threat cues, 
like eye gaze, and approach behaviors in humans (Kennedy et al., 2009). In healthy 
adults, there is individual variation in peripersonal space around the face according to 
variations in trait anxiety scores (Sambo & Iannetti, 2013), suggesting that individuals 
will respond variably to cues like distance in our decision tree model.  
Anxiety disorders are of special interest for this model. It is known that 
individuals with anxiety attend to threats differently: a metanalysis (Bar-Haim, Lamy, 
Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & Van Ijzendoorn, 2007) showed that threat-related 
attentional bias is a robust phenomenon across many types of anxious individuals but not 
in non-anxious individuals. The type of threat that is overly attended seems to be affected 
by type of anxiety: individuals with panic disorder are sensitive to physical threats 
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(Asmundson, Sandler, Wilson, & Walker, 1992) while those with social anxiety are 
selectively sensitive to social threats (Asmundson & Stein, 1994; Goldin, Manber, 
Hakimi, Canli, & Gross, 2009). There is also individual variation in sensitivity to threat 
in other primates: a cognitive bias to social threat develops between 3 and 9 months of 
age in rhesus macaques, and is sensitive to the social rank of and protectiveness of their 
mothers, with infants of high status and more protective mothers being more vigilant 
towards social threats (Mandalaywala, Parker, & Maestripieri, 2014). On the other hand, 
oxytocin, a neuropeptide known to mediate pro-social behaviors, decreases social 
vigilance in adult male macaques (Ebitz, Watson, & Platt, 2013). Male and female rhesus 
macaques show differential response profiles to social threat, including greater high-risk 
aggression and gregariousness/boldness in males than females (Schwandt et al., 2010), 
mimicking gender differences observed in our decision three. In macaques, this gender 
effect interacted with the expression of the serotonin transporter-linked polymorphism (5-
HTTLPR) and early environmental exposure to adversity in development (Schwandt et 
al., 2010). Together, these findings support future investigation of individual differences 
in threat assessment, including gender, environmental, personality, and other individual 
differences, which we hope to ultimate relate to neural and genotype differences. 
Moving forward. Finally, it is worth returning to Darwin’s belief that emotional 
behaviors could be classified across species. Although there are of course well known 
problems in anthropomorphizing the subjective feelings of emotions in nonhuman 
animals, characterizing the structure of context-dependent stimuli and emotional 
behaviors across species is a high priority in animal models of psychiatric illness, and 
methods for the behavioral phenotyping of rodents (Crawley, 1999, 2003) are well 
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established.  There are now a wealth of genetic and optogenetic manipulations in 
rodents that all inform mood and anxiety disorders in humans.  To utilize the data from 
these animal models, it is essential to be able to map particular types of emotional 
behaviors from rodents to humans (Anderson & Adolphs, 2014; Holmes, Murphy, & 
Crawley, 2003), which may well require a shift towards focusing on both physiological 
and behavioral changes across species (Björkqvist, 2001). We would hope that 
characterizations such as the decision tree derived in the present study (Figure 2.3.3) 
could be developed for such comparisons, linking components of emotional behaviors 
and their possible pathology across species. 
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C h a p t e r  3  
FACE-TO-FACE SOCIAL COGNITION 
In the first chapter, we proposed that distinct social cognition might occur when a 
person is interacting with, rather than observing a representation of another person, no 
matter how many perceptual contextual cues that representation might contain. In this 
chapter, we test whether social cognition changes in interaction. Specifically, we test 
whether neural processing of gaze, a potent social cue, is modulated by social interaction.  
This last chapter complements the previous chapters in several respects. First, it 
uses fMRI rather than lesions to investigate neural function. As such, it takes advantage of 
a whole-brain field-of-view, allowing us to investigate several cortical networks in addition 
to the amygdala. Second, it extends our investigation of real-world social cognition to a 
psychiatric population that features profound difficulties with real-world social interaction: 
individuals with autism spectrum disorder. 
The overlap with the preceding chapters in also apparent in three respects: (1) this 
chapter also investigates ecological validity, in this case focusing on the theme of 
interaction; and, (2) it also uses faces, and, potentially, threat signaled by faces (through 
sustained direct gaze). Also relevant to the previous chapter, (3) individuals with amygdala 
lesions do not use information from the eyes normally.  
Unlike the previous chapter’s three studies which represent completed, nearly-
published work, the project featured in this final chapter is not published at the time of this 
thesis submission, and is intended to be so submitted over the coming summer.  
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C h a p t e r  3 . 1  
USING FACE-TO-FACE FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING TO 
INVESTIGATE THE SOCIAL BRAIN IN AUTISM 
 
In 1943, Leo Kanner observed children with autism having “a far better 
relationship with pictures of people than with people themselves.” While a large 
literature documents abnormal processing of faces and eye gaze in people with autism 
spectrum disorder, the vast majority of stimuli used in those studies are pictures or 
videos, rather than people in the flesh. Yet, as Kanner’s quoted observation, our own 
experience, and the growing literature on interactive social cognition argue, pictures and 
real people are processed in quite different ways, which may be dissociatively impaired 
in autism. As autism is partially characterized by a persistent deficit in social interaction, 
it is reasonable to presume deficits, including in gaze, may be accentuated in actual 
interaction with another person. Findings from eye tracking studies indicate gaze 
behavior is influenced by the direct presence of another person. It is unknown whether 
direct live gaze is differently represented in the brains of individuals with autism. 
This study comprised two main objectives. The first objective was to determine 
whether controls and individuals with autism are sensitive to the difference between live 
and recorded gaze, namely, whether the neural response to gaze changes as a function of 
the presence of another person. The second objective of the study was to characterize the 
differential neural response to live and recorded gaze as a function of autism severity. 
We explored these aims with a novel fMRI paradigm that used a live person as a 
stimulus. Participants viewed a real actor sitting behind the scanner in a Live condition; 
this was contrasted with a Video condition.  
Participants included 14 males with autism and 14 age, gender, and IQ-matched 
controls. In a Live condition, participants monitored the gaze of a live actor sitting 
behind the bore of the magnet. Audio instructions delivered to the actor’s headphones 
cued three trial conditions: direct gaze, averted gaze, or eyes closed. In the Video 
condition, equivalent video recordings of the Live condition were used. 
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Distinct patterns of neural activation in putative Mirror Neuron System, 
Theory of Mind, face-processing, and control regions were seen in individuals with 
autism compared to controls for Live but not Recorded gaze. Activity in some of these 
areas correlated with autism severity, as well as performance on the Eyes in the Mind 
Task. Mirroring Kanner’s original observation, these findings provide insight into the 
difficulty individuals with autism face in directly interacting with other people in 
everyday life. 
Introduction 
Scientifically, social neuroscientists are interested in whether interaction 
modulates social cognition (Kingstone, 2009; Schilbach et al., 2013; Schilbach et al., 
2013). More than a basic scientific question, differences in reactivity to real, live social 
interaction and representational approximations thereof may have profound clinical 
importance. To that end, this study investigates the neural response to a Live and Video 
person in individuals with autism. We chose to investigate social gaze in this first Face-
to-Face neuroimaging study. Gaze is a potent social cue that is both amenable to 
investigating in the scanning environment and is implicated in autism.  
Autism Spectrum Disorder 
Autism spectrum disorders (ASD) are developmental disorders partially 
characterized by atypical development of social and communication skills. In high-
functioning adults with an ASD, these impairments can be debilitating in everyday life: 
they may have difficulty maintaining friendships and jobs, and difficulty understanding 
and communicating effectively with other people. Further, because of their potentially 
unusual or awkward social behaviors, high-functioning people with ASD often stand out, 
leading to discrimination and negative social interactions. Understanding how people 
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with ASD actually process other people is important to understanding their 
difficulties, and therefore aiding therapy targeted at improving their social interaction 
capabilities. Nevertheless, because all neuroimaging studies to date have used 
photographs or videos of people as stimuli, rather than real people, our knowledge of 
their specific deficits in processing social interaction is limited. Admittedly, evidence is 
beginning to be accumulated in this area of research: more interactive, dynamic stimuli 
including eyetracking-controlled virtual characters or avatars (Wilms et al., 2010), a 
video-feed interaction with a live actor (Redcay et al., 2013; Redcay et al., 2010), and a 
real-time interaction with a “person” played by a computer (Tanabe et al., 2012) have all 
been used. However, to our knowledge, no neuroimaging study to date has examined the 
response to gaze from a real live person not mediated by a computer (let alone 
investigated this in ASD). Thus, the current study is highly novel; as such our approach 
and analyses are admittedly relatively exploratory at this stage. While our approach is 
novel, there is substantial rationale for hypothesizing differences in how the brain 
processes gaze from a real person as compared to a video of them: actual eye-contact 
feels qualitatively very different from a photograph or video; we look at real people 
differently during interactions, increasing the amount of reciprocated direct gaze during 
face-to-face interactions (cf. Figure 3.1.1); and skin conductance responses are greater for 
live than recorded gaze stimuli (Hietanen, Leppänen, Peltola, Linna-aho, & Ruuhiala, 
2008). 
Gaze and Autism. Gaze is a highly salient social cue and is differently processed 
in autism (Pitskel et al., 2011). Many developmental disorders exhibit prominently 
abnormal levels of eye contact, including fragile X syndrome (Farzin, Rivera, & Hessl, 
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2009), Williams Syndrome (Riby & Hancock, 2008), and, most notably, ASD. Both 
clinical and anecdotal evidence suggests that reduced or absent eye contact is a pervasive 
feature of ASD (Kanner, 1943; Lord et al., 2000; Lord, Rutter, & Le Couteur, 1994). 
Clinically, impaired eye gaze is part of the set of impairments by which ASD is diagnosed 
(Lord et al., 2000; Lord et al., 1994; Wetherby et al., 2004). 
Several prominent studies have documented abnormal eye gaze to static images of 
faces or to films in people with ASD (Kliemann, Dziobek, Hatri, Baudewig, & Heekeren, 
2012; Kliemann, Dziobek, Hatri, Steimke, & Heekeren, 2010; Klin, Jones, Schultz, 
Volkmar, & Cohen, 2002; Pelphrey et al., 2002). It has also been shown that there is a 
failure to make use of information from the eye region of faces in order to make social 
judgments about faces, in both ASD (Spezio, Adolphs, Hurley, & Piven, 2007) and in 
parents of people with autism who are characterized as having a broad autism phenotype 
(Adolphs, Spezio, Parlier, & Piven, 2008). One recent hypothesis has been that perceiving 
the direct gaze of another person triggers exaggerated emotional responses in people with 
autism, possibly mediated through a neural system for gaze processing that includes the 
amygdala (Dalton et al., 2005). While neuroimaging studies have examined the neural 
correlates of gaze perception (Carlin, Calder, Kriegeskorte, Nili, & Rowe, 2011; 
Nummenmaa, Passamonti, Rowe, Engell, & Calder, 2009; Pelphrey, Viola, & McCarthy, 
2004), as well as abnormalities in gaze processing in ASD (Dalton et al., 2005; Kliemann 
et al., 2012; Pelphrey, Morris, & McCarthy, 2005), none have compared this with gaze 
from a real person, i.e., the type of stimulus faced in the real world.  
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Face-to-Face Eyetracking in ASD. Experimental evidence of gaze behavior 
during a real conversation indicates that individuals with ASD do not appropriately socially 
modulate their gaze behavior according to the presence of another individual (Figure 3.1.1) 
(Harrison, Spezio, Tyszka, Elison, & Adolphs, 2014). In that experiment, we had 
individuals with autism (N=10, 2 female, age=27±4) and controls matched for age and 
approximate IQ (N=27, 11 female, age=28±2) conduct a conversation with an actor in two 
conditions: Face-to-Face, and Live Video. Data from that experiment supports the assertion 
that gaze behavior, and presumably gaze processing, are differently influenced in 
individuals with ASD and controls by social presence (not just interaction, as has been 
manipulated in other fMRI studies).  
 
FACE-TO-FACE LIVE VIDEO
NT: Face-to-Face NT: Live Video ASD: Face-to-Face
a.
b. c.
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Figure 3.1.1. Face-to-Face Eyetracking in ASD. Wearing a head-mounted eyetracker 
(Eyelink II, SR Research), participants took part in a live conversation with an actor in 
two conditions: (a) a Face-to-Face condition in which they sat directly across from the 
actor, and a Live Video condition in which the actor sat in another room, and the 
conversation was mediated by a live video feed that allowed the participant to hear and 
see the actor in real time, but the actor could only hear the participant, removing any 
necessity for the participant to appropriately socially-modulate their gaze toward the 
actor. This condition manipulation affected gaze performance in controls, with heatmaps 
of gaze behavior in three sample participants (b) showing increased gaze to the mouth in 
the Live Video condition (n.b., only time points when the actor was not speaking were 
analyzed to remove lip-reading confounds). ASD participants did not appropriately 
modulate their gaze by social condition, (c) showing an abnormally high amount of gaze 
to the mouth in the Face-to-Face condition. Quantitatively, control participants showed 
significant mouth gaze in the Live Video compared to Face-to-Face condition (χ2(1, 
N=26)=9.02, p<0.01). Research reported from (Harrison et al., 2014). 
 
Neural Systems for Gaze Processing 
Gaze is a core social cue in primates and essential for human communication 
(Emery, 2000). Our ability to use gaze to infer social attention plays a crucial role in 
social interactions in humans and other primates, starting from infancy (Emery, 2000; 
Farroni, Csibra, Simion, & Johnson, 2002; Johnson, 2005; Keating & Keating, 1982).  
Based on existing literature from human fMRI and primate single-unit recordings, 
social gaze is primarily processed by three neural systems. The first is a perceptual 
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network that includes the inferior parietal lobule (IPL, also implicated in the putative 
Mirror Neuron System), the fusiform gyrus, and a head-view invariant region in the 
anterior superior temporal sulcus (aSTS, also implicated as a theory of mind (TOM) 
region) (Calder et al., 2007; Calder, Jenkins, Cassel, & Clifford, 2008; Carlin et al., 
2011). Together, these regions rapidly detect dynamic gaze shifts and gaze direction 
(Conty, N’Diaye, Tijus, & George, 2007; Sato, Kochiyama, Uono, & Yoshikawa, 2008). 
The second system is a system for associating perceived gaze with its social significance, 
comprised of the right posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS, also implicated as a 
TOM region), right anterior insula (Ethofer, Gschwind, & Vuilleumier, 2011), and 
amygdala (Adolphs et al., 2005). The third system is a system for inferring mental states 
and social attention of another person from their gaze, comprised of the anterior insula 
(bordering the right inferior frontal gyrus, a putative Mirror Neuron System region), as 
well as TOM-associated regions, including the temporal parietal junction (TPJ), medial 
prefrontal cortex (mPFC), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and temporal poles (Amodio 
& Frith, 2006; Frith, 2007; Frith & Frith, 2007; Saxe, 2006; Spunt, Satpute, & 
Lieberman, 2011). These three systems correspond to three components of social gaze 
processing: gaze detection, extracting social significance/value, and higher-order 
mentalizing.  
In addition to these systems involved in face and gaze processing, which include 
regions involved in social processing (putative Mirror Neuron System and Theory of Mind 
regions), in a live gaze monitoring study, we would expect recruitment of brain areas 
involved in cognitive control and engagement, such as the anterior cingulate cortex 
(involved in the Stroop task, for example (Pardo, Pardo, Janer, & Raichle, 1990)), as well 
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as the precuneus, a “social” region implicated as a default mode network hub (Utevsky, 
Smith, & Huettel, 2014).  
 
Experimental Aims and Hypotheses 
In this novel, and admittedly somewhat exploratory, experiment, I test three main 
hypotheses: (1) that across gaze directions (Direct, Averted, Closed), the brain responds 
differently to the presence of a real person than to videos of them, (2) that there are 
differential neural responses to direct than to averted gaze (joint versus non-joint gaze); 
and, most importantly, (3) that the differences between people with ASD and matched 
controls will be most pronounced for the real person stimuli than for the videos. The 
precise pattern of results will give us insight into what cognitive processes that are engaged 
when we have a real person looking at us, and which of these is abnormal in ASD. The first 
aim of the study is to address these three hypotheses concerning neural differences in 
response gaze from a live and recorded person. The second exploratory aim of this study is 
to explore whether individual differences, such as autism severity, correlate with the neural 
response to face-to-face gaze.  
To achieve these aims, in a blocked-design fMRI experiment, we ask individuals 
with autism and matched controls to observe gaze shifts in an actor, both in a Live, face-to-
face condition and a visually matched recorded Video condition.  
 
 Materials and Methods 
Participants 
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30 individuals participated in our experiment: 15 high-functioning adult males 
with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) diagnoses, and 15 typically-developed controls 
matched for age, gender, and IQ (Table 3.1. 1).  
All participants with autism were diagnosed according to DSM-IV criteria in a 
clinical psychologist’s interview and administration of the ADOS.  
One individual was excluded from the ASD group for an incidental finding in his 
anatomical MRI scan; one individual was excluded from the control group for markedly 
anxious behavior during both this experiment and another laboratory member’s 
experiment.   
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 13 of the 14 included 
participants in each group were right handed. All participants provided informed consent 
to participate in research under a protocol approved by the Caltech Institutional Review 
Board.  
Table 3.1.1. Characterization of Participants. Group means and standard deviations 
reported. 
Group N Gender Age (Years) FSIQ AQ 
ASD 14 Male 33±12 111±13 29.8±7.6 
Controls 14 Male 29±9 112±9 14.5±3.8 
 
Experimental Set-Up 
Participants completed a gaze-monitoring task while exposed to two experimental 
conditions: (1) Live and (2) Video gaze (Figure 3.1.2). In the Live condition, participants 
monitored the actor’s gaze through a mirror while lying in the scanner. The actor sat 
behind the bore of the scanner. A large white screen made of white fiberboard and 
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supported by a PVC pipe structure was placed behind the actor to provide a clean and 
consistent visual background.  The actor wore headphones, through which auditory 
commands from Matlab were relayed, instructing the actor how to direct their gaze on 
each trial. The actor’s eyes were either closed, directed forward, or averted left or right 
(cf. Figure 3.1.3).  In the averted gaze trials, the actor used specific fixation points in the 
scenery to ensure consistent gaze behavior across trials and participants. Prior to the 
participant’s entering the scanner, they were introduced to both actors to further impress 
upon the participants that the actors were indeed real; participants also watched the actors 
seat themselves behind the bore of the magnet. In the Video condition, participants once 
again monitored the same actor’s gaze, but, instead of viewing a Live person behind the 
bore of the magnet, a video recording of the same actor was projected onto a display 
screen at the end of the bore. In the Video condition, trial type was controlled Matlab’s 
Psychophysics toolbox.  
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Figure 3.1.2. Live and Video Experimental Conditions. Participants monitored the 
same actor’s gaze in both a Live (top) and Video (bottom) condition.  
 
Experimental Design 
Overall, we employed a 2(Subjects: NT, ASD) x 2(Condition: Live, Video) x 
3(Gaze: Direct, Averted, Closed) design. Within each condition (Live, Video), two actors 
were used; results across them were combined for each subject in a mixed effects model 
(see fMRI analysis methods below).  
Each participant completed 4 sessions in the scanner (2 actors x 2 conditions). 
Both Live sessions were completed sequentially, and both Recorded sessions were 
completed sequentially, with condition and actor order counterbalanced across 
participants. Within each session, participants were instructed to look at the actor, 
monitor their gaze, and press a button to indicate when the actor changed their gaze 
position. Each session consisted of 36 gaze trials, with a third of trials devoted to each 
gaze condition (Figure 3.1.3). The presentation order of the 36 trials was randomized for 
each subject. Each trial lasted approximately 10 seconds. Trial durations were randomly 
assigned and were drawn from a flat distribution on the interval between 8 and 12 
seconds. Because the live actor could not be temporarily removed from the field of view, 
no interstimulus interval was used (Figure 3.1.4).  
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Figure 3.1.3. Gaze Trial Conditions. The actor’s eyes were closed in a third of trials, 
directed forward in a third of trials, and averted (half left; half right) in a third of trials.  
 
Closed' Direct'gaze
Averted'gaze
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Figure 3.1.4. Session Design. Each of the four sessions completed by the participants (2 
actors x 2 conditions, Live and Video) consisted of 36 trials continuous trials of between 
8 and 12 seconds. 
Data Acquisition 
Imaging data were collected in a 3.0 Tesla Siemens TIM Trio scanner using a 32-
channel head coil. Gradient echo, T2*-weighted EPI images with BOLD contrast were 
used to collect functional imaging data. Slices were acquired in an oblique 30-degree 
axial to coronal tilt orientation relative to the main magnetic field to minimize signal 
dropout in ventral frontal regions. The imaging parameters were as follows: TR=3000ms; 
TE=30ms; flip angle=90°; FOV=200x200 mm2. EPI voxels were 2.5 mm isotropic in-
plane, with 54 2.5mm slices being acquired per volume. While in the scanner, 
participants completed four sessions of the gaze-monitoring task, with 150 volumes 
acquired per session.  For use in geometric correction of the 4 EPI volumes, a minimum 
of two B0 fieldmaps with the same geometry as the EPI data were collected for each 
..."(36$trials)
~10$sec
t
~10$sec
~10$sec
~10$sec
~10$sec
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participant, with additional fieldmaps being collected either when a subject moved or 
as time permitted.  Additionally, one to two high-resolution, whole-brain T1-weighted 
structural images (TR=1500ms; TE=2.9ms; flip angle=10°; 1 mm isotropic voxel 
resolution) was collected for each participant.  
Eye Tracking  
To ensure task compliance, participants’ eye movements were tracked throughout 
the experiment. A small video camera was fixed to the head coil, and recorded pupil 
movements were analyzed off-line. Prior to the first session, participants completed a 
nine-point calibration routine (cf. Figure 3.1.5), which was repeated both after subject 
movement and prior to subsequent sessions as time permitted.   
Analysis 
fMRI  Pre-Processing. All fMRI analyses were conducted with FEAT, part of 
FSL (Jenkinson, Beckmann, Behrens, Woolrich, & Smith, 2012). Pre-processing 
included standard motion correction and dvars motion scrubbing (Power, Barnes, Snyder, 
Schlaggar, & Petersen, 2012); fieldmap unwarping of EPI data; slice timing correction; 
ICA cleanup using MELODIC and an in-house script that removed likely physiological 
artifacts based on power spectrum (Kelly et al., 2010) as well as removed any temporal 
fluctuations in the expected region of a Nyquist ghost artifact; MNI registration; 6mm 
spatial smoothing and co-registration of  EPI images to T1-weighted structural scans. 
When two T1 anatomical scans were collected for a participant, they were averaged prior 
to co-registration. In group-level analyses, individual subjects’ T1 anatomical scans were 
co-registered to an MNI template brain, to which all subjects’ EPI data was co-registered 
to permit anatomical localization of functional activations at the group level. 
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fMRI Analysis. Statistical models for each session were based on standard 
univariate analyses that explored contrasting activation in response to the various gaze 
conditions. Higher-level analyses were carried out with FLAME in FSL. In all models, 
sessions across actors within a participant were combined using a fixed effects model 
before being passed to a mixed effects group analysis model. We ran several models; our 
hierarchy of models was as follows: 
Two broad classes of models were tested. (1) To test main effects of group x 
condition, a finite impulse response (FIR) plus a temporal lag of 5 seconds was modeled 
after each shift in the actor’s gaze. (2) For comparisons of gaze conditions, boxcar 
functions for each gaze epoch (Direct/Closed/Averted) were used. In both classes of 
models, a standard double-gamma plus temporal derivative hemodynamic response 
function was convolved with each event-related impulse or boxcar function. 
For both classes of models, main effects (across both groups and conditions), 
effects between groups, between condition, and the interaction of group and condition 
were tested. In the first class of models (FIR), these comparisons were made across all 
gaze shifts. 
In the boxcar class of models, these comparisons were made for all possible 
contrasts of gaze condition (although only individual Direct/Averted/Closed and 
Direct>Averted & Closed and Direct>Averted gaze contrasts were investigated). 
Finally, all models were tested in the full sample of participants (n=14 in each 
group), as well as a subset of participants (n=10 in each group) who self-reported feeling 
a sense of interaction in the Live condition.   
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Region of Interest (ROI) Analysis. Group (ASD, NT) x Condition (Live, 
Video) comparisons of individuals’ responses to each gaze condition (Direct, Closed, 
Averted) as well as contrasts of Direct>Averted gaze (isolating Joint gaze) were 
performed in independently-defined ROIs related to the so-called Mirror Neuron System, 
Theory of Mind network, face-processing regions, and regions related to engagement and 
control (cf. Table 3.1. 2).  
Eye Tracking Data. Eye tracking video files were analyzed offline with MR 
Gaze software (Tyszka, 2015) (Figure 3.1.5). Heatmaps of the fixation locations across 
all sessions for each group were spatially correlated to ensure that both groups similarly 
complied with instructions to monitor the actors’ gaze.  
 
Figure 3.1.5. Eye Tracking. MR Gaze software (Tyszka, 2015) identified the 
participant’s pupil (a) to identify (x,y) fixation coordinates. These coordinates from 
eyetracking during the functional scans were calibrated with against coordinates 
generated during a pre-session nine-point calibration routine (b). In the sample calibration 
grid (b), fixation point number seven would become (0,0) in calibrated (x,y) coordinates. 
Panel (c) shows a heatmap of sample fixation points from one subject in this calibrated 
space. 
Results 
a. b. c.
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Quality Assurance  
To both check the general quality of our data and to ensure that group differences 
were not reducible to experimental confounds, the following three quality assurances 
were performed.  
Motion. A concern in neuroimaging research involving ASD participants is that 
group level differences (especially in functional connectivity analyses) maybe 
artifactually driven by group motion differences (Deen & Pelphrey, 2012). While the 
effects of motion are less of a concern for our analyses, we took steps to mitigate its 
effects. First, we checked for group differences in motion. While there were no group 
differences in the average change in rotational motion across each session (p=0.15), there 
was a group difference in the average change in translational displacement over each 
session (p=0.022) (Figure 3.1.6). We corrected for this group differences in displacement 
by using dvars to introduce a motion scrubbing variable (an approach recommended by 
(Power et al., 2012)) to the nusiance regressor files incorporated in our FEAT model.  
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Figure 3.1.6. Group Differences in Motion.  Group differences in individual 
members’ mean change in translational displacement (left) and in rotational motion 
(right) across sessions showed that while the NT and ASD groups had similar amounts of 
rotational motion (measured in millidegrees), the ASD group had more change in 
translational displacement (measured in mm).  
Behavior and Eye Tracking. Due to a technical error, reliable button press data 
was not collected. The purpose of the button press was to provide participants with a 
simple attentional monitoring task. The experimenters can anecdotally confirm that they 
observed all participants making button presses throughout each session and that 
participants seemed to perform at ceiling (i.e., they could and did detect changes in the 
actors’ gaze position). Additionally, based on visual inspection of the eye tracking 
videos, all participants were awake and alert throughout the duration of the experiment.  
In a post-task questionnaire, participants were asked to indicate whether they felt 
differently in one condition than the other. Ten of fourteen participants in each group 
spontaneously reported feelings of interaction (i.e., that the felt the presence of the actor) 
in the Live but not the Video condition. In some subsequent analyses, this subset of 
participants who seemed particularly sensitive to the condition manipulation (“Felt 
Interaction or FI Subset”) was analyzed separately.  
In preliminary analysis of eyetracking data from seven participants in each group 
(Figure 3.1.7), participants from both groups similarly complied with the task to monitor 
the actors’ eye region throughout the duration of the task (spatial correlation between two 
groups heatmaps: r=0.94).  
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Figure 3.1.7. Group Eye Tracking Heatmaps. Preliminary eye tracking analysis (n=7 
participants per group) of gaze data from (a) NT and (b) ASD individuals shows that both 
groups tended to fixate a small area throughout the duration of the task. For illustrative 
purposes those heatmaps for NT (c) and ASD (d) subjects are overlaid on a frame from 
the Video condition. In both, the focus of fixation was in a parafovial region that included 
the eyes.  
Pre-processing check: “Button-press” response. To check that our 
preprocessing routine affected both groups similarly, we ran a model designed to detect 
motor cortex activation following the participants’ presumed button-press activity. A 
finite-response function was modeled for each change in the actor’s gaze position, plus a 
lag of 5 seconds. In both groups, right-handed participants (n=13 in each group) showed 
robust left motor cortex activity following time points when they should have pressed a 
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button, supporting both (1) our pre-processing routine and (2) the validity of the 
assumption that both groups completed the task similarly.  
Whole Brain Analyses 
Main effects. Before analyzing group (NT, ASD) x condition (Live, Video) 
differences in response to specific gaze conditions (e.g., Direct versus Averted gaze), we 
first looked at the main effects of group and condition. This analysis focused on the 
response to any gaze change regardless of gaze type, and, as in the “button-press” 
analysis described above, modeled a finite impulse response 5 seconds after each gaze 
shift made by either the Live or Video actor. Unless otherwise stated, all analyses in this 
section report whole-brain thresholding of z>1.96 (corresponding to p<0.05) and cluster-
level thresholding at p=0.05 (indicating a 5% chance that a cluster of that size would be 
formed by chance). 
The main effect of condition across participant groups showed greater activation 
in visual and gaze processing regions (fusiform, occipital cortex, and temporal cortex) in 
the Video than Live condition (Figure 3.1.8). Meanwhile, no voxels survived the Live 
greater than Video comparison, hypothetically due to greater heterogeneity of response 
across the two participant groups in the Live condition, which future analyses will 
investigate.   
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Figure 3.1.8. Main Effect of Video>Live Condition. Across all participants (N=28) and 
gaze types (Direct, Closed, Averted), the main effect of Video compared to Live gaze 
after each gaze shift (FIR at time of shift plus 5 seconds). Whole-brain thresholding of 
z>1.96, with cluster-level thresholding at p=0.05. 
 The main effect of group across conditions showed activation in the right 
inferior frontal gyrus, extending into the insula in the NT group (Figure 3.1.9). 
Meanwhile, ASD participants had more activation in a small region of the medial 
prefrontal cortex, as well as a large area in the posterior cerebellum. 
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Figure 3.1.9. Main Effect of Group after Gaze Shift. Across gaze types (Direct, 
Closed, Averted), the main effect of group (left: ASD>NT, right: NT>ASD) after each 
gaze shift (FIR at time of shift plus 5 seconds). Whole-brain thresholding of z>1.96, with 
cluster-level thresholding at p=0.05. N=14 in each group. 
Looking at the interaction of group and condition, in the Live condition, no voxels 
survived the NT greater than ASD contrast. However, there was greater medial PFC 
activation in the ASD than NT group in the Live condition in a nearly identical region to 
that shown in Figure 3.1.9. In the Video condition, voxels in the right IFG, and temporal 
lobe regions survived the NT>ASD contrast, while a posterior region of the cerebellar 
survived the ASD>NT contrast.  
Effects of gaze condition. After investigating main effects of group and 
condition, a boxcar-design analysis was used to assess responses to specific gaze 
conditions. The average response to each gaze condition (Closed, Averted, and Direct) 
across subjects and conditions elicited strong visual cortex activity, with Direct and 
Averted gaze also activating temporal and frontal regions (Figure 3.1.10).  
 
Figure 3.1.10. Average Response to Closed, Averted, and Direct Gaze. Across all 
participants (N=28) and conditions (Live, Closed), the main effect of each gaze type (left 
to right: Closed, Averted, Direct), modeled in a blocked design covering the duration of 
Closed DirectAverted
Z
0
7
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each gaze trial. Whole-brain thresholding of z>1.96, with cluster-level thresholding at 
p=0.05. 
 Direct gaze was a special condition in our experiment – when the actor 
looked directly ahead, they formed joint gaze with the participant. Focusing on isolating 
the effects of Direct gaze, the contrast of Direct greater than Averted and Closed gaze 
(Figure 3.1.11) shows robust activation in a region of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), 
pars triangularis extending into the pars opercularis (Broca’s area) and the anterior insula; 
the superior temporal sulcus; and the inferior parietal lobule; medially, the supplementary 
motor area, extending into the anterior cingulate was also activated. Subcortically, the 
right thalamus was activated in areas known to have structural connectivity with the 
prefrontal and temporal cortices (Figure 3.1.12). 
 
Figure 3.1.11. Main Effect of Specific Direct Gaze. Across all participants (N=28) and 
conditions (Live, Closed), the main effect of Direct greater than Closed and Averted 
Direct>Closed & Averted
Z
0
6
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gaze, modeled in a blocked design covering the duration of each gaze trial. Whole-
brain thresholding of z>1.96, with cluster-level thresholding at p=0.05. 
 
Figure 3.1.12. Thalamic Activation to Specific Direct Gaze. (a) Subcortical activation in 
the right thalamus from the same Direct>Averted and Closed contrast described in Figure 
3.1.13. Thalamic activation overlapped with portions of the thalamus (b) described by the 
Oxford Thalamic Connectivity Probability atlas as being structurally connected with pre-
frontal (yellow) and temporal (pink) cortices.  
 A contrast of Direct>Averted gaze in the Live condition in the subset of 
participants who were most sensitive to the experimental manipulation (FI participants) 
qualitatively indicates that many of the regions specific to Direct gaze in the main effect 
contrast (Figure 3.1.11) were modulated by group (NT>ASD) in the Live condition 
(Figure 3.1.13). 
a.
b.
x=8.
x=8.
y=-18.
y=-18. z=12.
z=12.
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Figure 3.1.13. Qualitative Comparison of (1) NT vs. ASD Response to Direct Gaze in 
Live Condition and (2) Main Effect of Direct Gaze. Comparisons of the main effect of 
Direct gaze (inset, copied from Figure 3.1.11) to group contrast of NT >ASD responses 
to Direct > Averted gaze in the Live condition (whole-brain thresholding of z>1.65, with 
cluster-level thresholding at p=0.05) show that the main effect of Direct gaze was largely 
driven by the group contrast of Joint gaze, i.e., Direct>Averted gaze in the Live condition  
Activity in the three gaze conditions (Direct, Closed, Averted), as well as a direct 
comparison of Direct versus Averted gaze (i.e., Joint versus non-Joint gaze) are explored 
in detail in the proceeding region of interest (ROI) analyses. 
Group by Condition Analysis of Independently Defined ROIs 
0
4
Z
Live: NT> ASD, Direct>Averted
N=10 per group (FI subset)
D>C&A
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 Four groups of independently defined Regions of Interest (ROIs) were 
identified. Relevant to social cognition, (1) putative Mirror Neuron System (MNS) 
regions (inferior frontal gyrus and inferior parietal lobule) and (2) theory of mind (TOM) 
regions (dorsal medial prefrontal cortex, ventral medial prefrontal cortex, anterior 
superior temporal sulcus, and temporoparietal junction) were investigated. Relevant to (3) 
face processing, the fusiform face area and amygdala (whose involvement we also 
expected for reasons beyond face processing) were investigated. And, (4) relevant to 
cognitive control and task engagement, a region of the anterior cingulate cortex involved 
in the Stroop task as well as the precuneus, a default mode network hub (Utevsky et al., 
2014) and also a theory of mind region (Spunt & Adolphs, 2014), was investigated. A list 
of the ROIs investigated is detailed in Table 3.1.2. 
 
Table 3.1.2. Regions of Interest (ROIs) Tested. ROIs were roughly grouped by four 
categories. Their names used throughout the paper, anatomical description, how they 
were defined (either through clusters from Neurosynth (Yarkoni et al., 2011) reverse 
inference masks or anatomical labels), and voxel size5 are described.  
Group Name ROI How Defined Voxels 
MNS rIFG Right inferior frontal gyrus, pars 
triangularis and some IFG pars 
opercularis; extending into anterior 
insula & frontal operculum 
Neurosynth “Social” 392 
rIPL Right inferior parietal lobule Juelich Atlas 3084 
TOM dmPFC Dorsal medial prefrontal cortex Neurosynth “TOM” 1537 
vmPFC Ventral medial prefrontal cortex Neurosynth “TOM” 252 
rTPJ Right temporoparietal junction Neurosynth “TOM” 1048 
raSTS Right anterior superior temporal 
sulcus 
Neurosynth “TOM” 555 
                                                
5 Future analyses will include analysis of larger ROIs, for example TOM ROIs directly from published papers, as well as some 
subject-specific ROIs from other tasks in the Adolphs lab that feature an overlapping subject pool.  
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Face lFFA Left fusiform face area Neurosynth “Face” 3182 
rFFA Right fusiform face area Neurosynth “Face” 2693 
lAmy Left amygdala  Neurosynth “Face” 691 
rAmy Right amygdala Harvard-Oxford Atlas 2083 
Control/ 
Engagement 
Precuneus Precuneus Neurosynth “TOM” 868 
ACC Anterior cingulate cortex Neurosynth “Stroop” 91 
 
Putative Mirror Neuron System Regions. Two ROIs associated with the so-
called Mirror Neuron System were explored. The first was the right Inferior Parietal 
Lobule (rIPL), defined anatomically by the Juelich atlas. The second was a “social” 
cluster in the right Inferior Frontal Gyrus (rIFG), identified by the meta-analysis tool 
Neurosynth (Yarkoni et al., 2011). In the rIFG, in the Live condition only, the pattern of 
the response to Direct gaze was distinct from the other gaze conditions in the NT group, 
but not the ASD group (Figure 3.1.14a). The same pattern was observed in the rIPL 
(Figure 3.1.14b). Comparisons of Direct and Averted gaze allowed us to directly compare 
responses to Joint and Non-Joint gaze (especially in the Live condition). In the FI subset 
of participants who self-reported being sensitive to our condition manipulation (n=10 of 
14 per group, orange bars in Figure 3.1.14), in the rIFG and rIPL, the contrast of Direct to 
Averted gaze was amplified in the Live compared to Recorded condition, but only in 
controls (rIFG: t(9)=2.16, p=0.059; rIPL: t(9)=2.63, p=0.028) (Figure 3.1.14c,d).   
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Figure 3.1.14. ROI Analysis in pMNS Regions. (Top) Main effect of Direct>Averted 
and Closed gaze and (bottom) contrast of Direct>Averted gaze in the Live condition 
(Joint vs. Non-Joint gaze). Analyses conducted in the rIFG (left) and rIPL (right).  
Potentially, group differences in neural response to a Live person could be used as 
a robust neural marker of ASD diagnosis. In a preliminary analysis, individual responses 
to Joint gaze (Direct>Averted gaze in the Live condition) in just two regions (our rIFG and 
rIPL ROIs) mostly separated our FI subset of participants into individuals with autism and 
matched controls (Figure 3.1.15).  
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Figure 3.1.15. Mirror Region Activation to Joint Gaze Separates NT and ASD 
Participants. Among the FI subgroup of participants, individuals’ responses to 
Direct>Averted Live gaze in the rIPL and rIFG mostly separated into two groups 
according to autism diagnosis. Red dots: NT; blue dots: ASD.  
Putative TOM Regions. Activity in the dmPFC, vmPFC, and rTPJ all exhibited 
patterns of deactivation across gaze conditions in the Live relative to Video condition. In 
rTPJ (Figure 3.1.16d), this is true for both NT (F(1,13)=3.97, p=0.0497) and ASD 
(F(1,13)=13.3, p=0.0005) participants, but only true for controls in dmPFC (F(1,13)=5.5, 
p=0.022) (Figure 3.1.16a) and vmPFC (F(1,13)=20.7 p<0.000) (Figure 3.1.16b). A 
positive response to Direct, Averted, and Closed gaze was observed in the raSTS for 
Controls in both the Live and Video conditions, with no difference observed between 
those two conditions. Unlike controls, ASD subjects did not have a positive response in 
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the raSTS to Video gaze; as a group, their response to Live gaze was highly variable 
and any visual trend for it to be higher than in the Video condition was statistically 
insignificant (F(1,13)=1.98 p=0.16) (Figure 3.1.16c). There was no significant condition 
modulation of specific processing of Direct (relative to Averted) gaze in these TOM 
ROIs. 
 
Figure 3.1.16. ROI Analysis in TOM Regions, Main Effect of Condition. Main effect of 
Direct>Averted and Closed gaze in the (a) dmPFC, (b) vmPFC, (c) raSTS, and (d) rTPJ.  
Face-Responsive Regions: In the left FFA, there was decreased activity in the 
Live relative to Video condition in each gaze condition for both groups (NT: 
F(1,13)=5.69, p=0.0195; ASD: F(1,13)=14.45, p=0.0003) (Figure 3.1.17a). This was also 
true in the right FFA for controls (F(1,13)=9.19, p=0.003), but the pattern did not hold 
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for the ASD group (Figure 3.1.17b). In the right FFA, ASD subjects (but not NT 
subjects) tended to respond differently in the Video and Live conditions to Direct relative 
to Averted gaze (t(13)=2.09, p=0.057, Figure 3.1.17d).  
 
 
Figure 3.1.17. ROI Analysis in FFA. (Top) Main effect of Direct>Averted and Closed 
gaze and (bottom) contrast of Direct>Averted gaze in the Live condition (Joint vs. Non-
Joint gaze). Analyses conducted in the left FFA (left) and right FFA (right).  
 In the amygdala, ASD subjects differed more from controls in the Video 
than Live condition. While initially counterintuitive, this result was driven by the 
unsurprising finding that ASD subjects had a greater amygdala response to potentially 
more arousing Direct>Averted gaze in the Live than Video condition.  
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Specifically, in the left amygdala there was no difference between the two 
groups in the Live condition, but the groups were different in the Video condition 
(F(1,27)=17.43, p=0.0001) (Figure 3.1.18a). Across gaze types, there was a trend in NT 
subjects for decreased responses in the Live relative to Video condition (F(1,13)=3.37, 
p=0.070). In ASD participants, the visual trend for the opposite effect (increased negative 
response in the Video condition) was insignificant.   
In the right amygdala, as in the left amygdala, there was a difference between the 
groups in the Video (F(1,27)=7.89, p=0.0063) but not the Live condition (Figure 
3.1.18b). There was no effect of condition within group. 
In the amygdala, only the ASD group showed a difference in response to 
Direct>Averted gaze as a function of experimental condition. In both the left and right 
amygdala, they showed an increase in response to Direct relative to Averted gaze in the 
Live condition (lAMY: t(13)=2.11, p=0.055; rAMY: t(13)=2.25, p=0.042) (Figure 
3.1.18c,d). 
  
143 
 
 
Figure 3.1.18. ROI Analysis in Amygdala. Main effect of Direct>Averted and Closed 
gaze and (bottom) contrast of Direct>Averted gaze in the Live condition (Joint vs. Non-
Joint gaze). Analyses conducted in the left amygdala (left) and right amygdala (right).  
Control/Engagement. In addition to social and face processing, we were 
interested in differences in cognitive control and engagement in the two conditions.  Our 
initial investigation of these processes focused on two ROIs: (2) precuneus voxels 
extracted from a Neurosynth “TOM” mask (note the precuneus is implicated both in 
TOM and default mode networks) and (2) an ACC region defined by the Neurosynth 
“stroop” reverse inference map. 
 In the precuneus ROI, both groups actually responded similarly within 
each condition. Both groups had a strong decrease in activity when presented with Live 
compared to Video gaze for all three gaze types (NT: F(1,13)=15.32, p=0.0002; ASD: 
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F(1,13)=5.54, p=0.021) (Figure 3.1.19a). In the NT group, the effect was especially 
pronounced for direct and averted gaze, while in the ASD group, the effect was most 
pronounced for direct gaze specifically, resulting in trend towards a conditional effect on 
Direct>Averted activation being observed in ASD participants who reported being 
sensitive to the experimental condition manipulation (Trend: t(9)=-1.77, p=0.11) (Figure 
3.1.19c). 
 
Figure 3.1.19. ROI Analysis in Precuneus and ACC Regions. Main effect of 
Direct>Averted and Closed gaze and (bottom) contrast of Direct>Averted gaze in the 
Live condition (Joint vs. Non-Joint gaze). Analyses conducted in the precuneus (left) and 
ACC (right).  
 Meanwhile, in the ACC region associated with the Stroop task and 
cognitive control, there was an interaction between gaze type and experimental condition. 
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In the Live condition, sustained Direct gaze elicited more ACC activity in both groups 
than either Averted or Closed gaze (Figure 3.1.23b). This contrast between Direct and 
Averted gaze in the Live condition was stronger in controls (NT: t(13)=2.23, p=0.044; 
ASD: (t(13)=1.82, p=0.092), especially the subset who reported feeling a sense of 
interaction in the Live condition (t(9)=4.86, p=0.0008) (Figure 3.1.19d). In the Video 
condition, controls actually had elevated activity in the ACC ROI for both the Direct and 
Averted relative to Closed conditions, while no gaze type elicited positive ACC 
activation in Video condition for ASD individuals (Figure 3.1.19b).  
Preliminary Analysis of Individual Differences in Response to Joint Gaze 
It is important to note that these correlational analyses involve a small sample size 
and are therefore preliminary. 
Inspired by the finding in children that autisms symptom severity was inversely 
correlated with activity in the IFG during an emotional expression imitation and 
observation task (Dapretto et al., 2006), we tested whether activity in response to Joint gaze 
(i.e., Direct>Averted gaze in the Live condition) in our social IFG region was also related 
to autism severity. While ADOS scores were designed for classification rather than a 
severity metric, the ADOS Calibrated Severity Score (CSS) is appropriate for use as a 
severity metric (Hus, Gotham, and Lord, 2015). While ideal, this metric was only 
available for 12 of our 14 ASD participants (for whom we had copies of their original 
ADOS score sheets). Therefore, we decided to use a different measure, the ADOS Social 
Interaction Module 4 algorithm scores (ADOS-SI), as a metric of severity. This was 
justified because those 12 individuals’ available CSS social-affective sub-scores (CSS-
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SA) correlated highly with those same individual’s ADOS Social Interaction Module 
4 algorithm scores (n=12, r=0.88, 95% Confidence Interval (C.I.) [0.62, 0.97], 
p=0.0001). This high correlation made sense as the CSS was designed to remove 
confounds like behavioral problems that were not prevalent in our high-functioning adult 
population. In all 14 ASD participants, that ADOS Social Interaction score was weakly 
inversely correlated with rIFG responses (n=14, r=-0.50, 95% C.I. [-0.81, 0.04], p=0.07) 
to Joint gaze. The inverse correlation relationship was stronger in the FI subset of ASD 
participants who were sensitive to our condition manipulation (n=10, r=-0.70, 95% C.I. 
[-0.92, -0.12], p=0.02).  
While responses in the right IFG ROI, associated with the putative Mirror Neuron 
System, were inversely correlated with autism severity, responses in the perceptual right 
FFA to Live Joint gaze were positively correlated with ADOS severity (n=14, r=0.62, 
95% C.I. [0.13, 0.87], p=0.02), in line with the decrease in activity seen in this region in 
the Live condition in controls (cf. Figure 3.1.17b).  
In both individuals with autism and controls, performance on the Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes task (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001) was 
related to responses to Joint gaze in various regions.  
In the ASD group, scores on the Eyes task were weakly inversely correlated with 
activity in the rTPJ (which in controls saw decreased activity in the Live condition, cf. 
Figure 3.1.16d) (n=14, r=-0.51, 95% C.I. [-0.82, 0.03], p=0.06).  
The two groups tended to have opposite relationships between right amygdala 
responses to Joint gaze and performance on the Eyes task (NT: n=14, r=0.66, 95% C.I. 
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[0.08, 0.92], p=0.03); ASD: n=14, r=-0.50, 95% C.I. [-0.82, 0.04], p=0.066), with 
stronger correlations seen in the FI subgroups (NT: n=14, r=0.88; ASD: n=14, r=-0.55).  
Engagement with the Live condition modulated responses to Joint gaze in the 
ACC: ACC responses to Joint gaze was positively correlated with Felt-Interaction (FI) 
categorization from our post-task questionnaire in the NT group (n=14, r=0.72, 95% C.I. 
[0.29, 0.90], p=0.004) but possibly weakly inversely related with FI categorization in the 
ASD group (n=14, r=-0.44, 95% C.I. [-0.79, 0.12], p=0.12). 
Discussion 
Summary of Findings 
Relevant to our first aim to address three hypotheses concerning group differences 
in response to Live and Video gaze, we (1) showed neural sensitivity to the Live versus 
Video presence of another person; we (2) showed that this sensitivity was especially 
prominent with respect to Direct, joint gaze (i.e., Direct>Averted; Direct>Averted and 
Closed gaze); and (3) we showed that the Live condition differently affected individuals 
with autism (ASD) relative to matched controls (NT). In contrasts of Live and Recorded 
Direct (joint) versus Averted (non-joint) gaze, controls had more activity in various 
regions, including the inferior frontal gyrus, dorsal medial prefrontal cortex, anterior 
cingulate, precuneus, anterior insula, and fusiform gyrus. These regions showed 
considerable overlap with those involved in a “face-to-face” social interaction mediated 
by a Live video feed (Redcay et al., 2010). In contrast to the controls, we saw no whole-
brain difference in response to direct Live versus Recorded gaze in the group of 
individuals with autism.   
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Notably, direct gaze elicits activity not only in regions associated with direct 
gaze (Calder et al., 2002) , but also in the putative Mirror Neuron System. Functional 
(Dapretto et al., 2006) and structural (Hadjikhani, Joseph, Snyder, & Tager-Flusberg, 
2006) differences in the so-called Mirror Neuron System have been associated with 
autism. Importantly, these “mirroring” regions are best associated with processing 
emotional social cues, pointing to impaired top-down social modulation in autism, as in 
Hamilton and colleague’s STORM (“social top-down response modulation” model) 
(Hamilton, 2013). Interestingly, processing in face and TOM regions tended to decreased 
in the Live condition; one potential hypothesis, which remains to be tested using 
functional connectivity and mediation analyses is that the Live condition, i.e., the 
presence of another person, elicits a switch in social processing from theory-based 
mentalizing about others to a more simulation-based understanding of others; potentially, 
such a “switch” could be mediated by the precuneus, a DMN hub (Utevsky et al., 2014) 
often implicated in TOM networks. Direct gaze elicited greater activity in the thalamus, 
which has been shown to mediate attention and arousal (Portas et al., 1998); to that end, 
we are especially interested in how future analysis of autonomic arousal (see below) 
interacts with this region. Finally, in the Live condition, Direct gaze elicited ACC 
activity, a region implicated in cognitive control – a process our participants may well 
have needed to maintain sustained direct gaze with another person! 
Relevant to our second aim to preliminarily relate differences in the neural 
response to Joint Live gaze to individual differences, we found that activity in certain 
putative Mirror Neuron System and Theory of Mind regions as well as the ACC related 
to autism severity, as well as two social skills measures: the Empathizing Quotient and 
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the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task. A third, potent individual difference related to 
neural activity across both groups was the degree to which individuals were sensitive to 
the experimental manipulation, i.e., whether or not they reported feeling interaction with 
or the presence of the actor during the Live condition. Looking within this subgroup of 
individuals (n=20), the neural response to Joint gaze in just two ROIs, the rIFG and rIPL, 
both putative Mirror Neuron System regions, was sufficient to separate 19 of the 20 FI 
participants into two clusters that corresponded with their ASD diagnosis. 
Experimentally, the emotional engagement observed in this subset of subjects may have 
been necessary to engender truly interactive, second-person social cognition (Schilbach et 
al., 2013).  
Caveats and Shortcomings 
While we are confident that a majority of our participants were sensitive to our 
manipulation of social presence (i.e., the Live condition did in fact feel subjectively 
different form he Video condition), one shortcoming to point out is that we do not 
definitely know (1) whether all participants were sensitive to our social modulation (2) 
and whether there was heterogeneity in the degree to which participants felt they were 
being watched (based on our FI categorization of participants, we are fairly confident that 
at least 71% of our participants felt that they were watching a live person, but we are not 
sure whether they felt the actor could see them). Some individuals did spontaneously self-
report this, but we do not know whether they all felt bi-directional observation, which 
would be required for true joint gaze (an experience that would distinguish this study 
from others such as the work by Redcay and colleagues (2013; 2010)). In future work, it 
will be important to more carefully interview participants to be able to divide them into 
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subgroups based on their social experience within the experiment. Potentially, we 
could also modify the experimental set up to better facilitate social engagement during 
the Live condition.  
An important caveat for all our findings is that they are exploratory: within a 
small sample of participants, we employed a fairly open-ended design that permitted 
different levels of personal engagement with the task.  
Future Directions 
Future directions fall under two categories: (1) further analyses to be carried out 
within the current data set and (2) future studies and extensions.  
Further Analyses. One area of future analysis is to better explore individual 
differences. For instance, while this analysis focused on ROI’s defined completely 
independently from this study, looking at subject-specific ROIs (inspired by (Fedorenko, 
Hsieh, Nieto-Castañón, Whitfield-Gabrieli, & Kanwisher, 2010)) may allow us to see 
similarities or differences obscured in our ROI analyses that assumed all participants’ 
functional localization was anatomically defined. In a subject-specific analysis, it would be 
possible to take externally-defined ROIs (as we did here, but perhaps in broader regions 
defined by a handful of highly-relevant studies — e.g., (Dapretto et al., 2006; Pitskel et al., 
2011; Redcay et al., 2013; Redcay et al., 2010; Spunt & Adolphs, 2014) instead of the 
meta-analysis tool we used — and then explore volumes around each individual subject’s 
peak activation in those externally-defined regions. In addition to defining ROIs 
differently, it is important to rigorously test whether outliers exist in either participant 
group to determine whether those individuals may be driving any observed group effects 
(Byrge, Dubois, Tyszka, Adolphs, & Kennedy, 2015). Future ROI analyses will also 
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investigate response time courses as well as potential functional connectivity 
differences between groups and conditions. We can look more at individual differences that 
correspond with ROI response once ROI analyses are refined.   
A future aim would be to train a classifier to predict groups based on activity in a 
subset of regions. We already started to achieve this in the Felt Interaction subset of 
participants, but would want better predictive power across the full set of participants. In 
this analysis, we may find subtypes within each group.  
Another exciting possibility is to extract a pupil dilation response (PDR) from our 
eye tracking data as a measure of autonomic response, which could be analyzed as a 
function of condition and also added to our fMRI model.  
Finally, we were surprised by the variability of response found in the amygdala. In 
group registration masks, drop out did not seem problematic in this region, but future 
analyses can look for drop out and field distortion in more detail, also looking for potential 
physiological artifacts, such as from the middle cerebral artery. Future scanning sequences 
could be tailored to target specific regions, such as the amygdala.  
Future Extensions. In a novel study using real, live people as stimuli in the 
scanning room, we demonstrated that the social presence of another person modulates the 
neural response to gaze in a broad number of brain regions associated with social, face 
and gaze processing and cognitive attention/control. The pattern of response between 
individuals with autism and controls was more different in the Live than Video condition, 
suggesting the importance of using truly social stimuli in both research and therapy 
targeted at ASD.  Future work in this area of interactive social neuroscience should (1) 
examine processing of interaction in developmental and non-human populations (Banaji 
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& Gelman, 2013) as well as (2) develop more spontaneous, bi-directionally 
interactive paradigms. It is exciting to imagine what this future work will reveal about the 
social brain.  
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CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Building on a large literature and theoretical framework, we provide empirical 
evidence that ecologically valid methods need to be incorporated into the study of 
social brain function. In this thesis, three themes of ecological validity were proposed: 
(1) the addition of contextual cues — perceptual or implied — to make an experimental 
manipulation or stimulus convincingly naturalistic; (2) a special contextual 
manipulation of inducing an interactive experience — this can be achieved through 
face-to-face interactions or through convincing subject-contingent stimuli; and (3) a 
theme that runs in parallel to the first two: believability — subjects must believe in the 
experimental manipulation.  
Contextual Cues and Interaction Influence Social Cognition 
In the first two chapters, we showed that (1) contextual cues and (2) face-to-face 
interaction do matter for social cognition. Further, we showed that particular brain 
structures mediate assessment of contextual cues.  
Specifically, in the second chapter, “The Amygdala and Social Threat”, we showed 
that the amygdala mediates basic approach-avoidance behavior. Lesions to this structure 
promote an enhanced default approach bias, operationalized as the difference in trust/threat 
judgments to low-information, occluded faces relative to unaltered facial images. The 
contextual factor of ambiguity was one of many that was then used in the formation of a 
hierarchical decision tree that successfully predicted a replication group of participants’ 
specific responses to a set of threating scenarios (about 60% success versus about 12% 
chance performance). The tree comprised a hierarchical model of threat assessment, in 
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which responses were first divided according to two broad factors: perceived degree of 
dangerousness and threat category (psychological versus physical threat) to guide basic 
approach-avoidance behavior. Subsequently, sequential processing of various factors along 
nodes in the decision tree elicited specific defensive responses. Hypothetically, specific 
brain structures, including the amygdala, perform neural computations associated with each 
of those nodes present; future work can test this behavioral model neuroscientifically.  
In the third chapter, “Face-to-Face Social Cognition”, we utilized a novel approach 
in neuroimaging research to test the response of specific brain structures to the live 
presence of another person. This experimental manipulation showed that face, gaze, and 
social regions of our brains respond differently to another person’s gaze in the presence of 
that other person instead of in the presence of a representation, i.e., video, of that person. 
Specifically, live interaction promoted increased activity to Direct relative to Averted gaze 
in putative Mirror Neuron System regions relative to a video condition. Meanwhile 
responses to all gaze conditions (Direct, Closed, and Averted) actually decreased in the live 
relative to video condition in Theory of Mind regions, where Direct gaze was not distinct 
from Averted gaze. Together these patterns preliminarily suggesting that different 
experimental paradigms may modulate the interaction of these two broad-scale social 
neural networks. Further, modulation of the neural response to direct gaze by the presence 
of another person was impaired in individuals with autism — a disorder with core 
impairments in social interaction — relative to controls. In preliminary analyses, it was 
largely possible to separate the groups by autism diagnosis as a function of individuals’ 
neural response in two putative Mirror Neuron System regions of interest. This separation 
was not possible in the video condition, suggesting that research using interactive 
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paradigms may be necessary to gain insight into autism and other psychiatric conditions 
featuring social impairments. 
Future Directions in Real-World Social Neuroscience 
While this thesis has yielded several observations in support of the importance of 
ecological validity in social neuroscience research, the most exciting outcome of this thesis 
is the potential for future findings in “real-world” social cognition. Direct extensions of this 
thesis can be broken down into near-term directions directly related to the projects of this 
thesis, as well as future directions for further in the future.  
Near-Term Directions. These can be broken down by specific sections of the 
thesis: 
Extending and further validating our discovery of a default approach-related bias in 
bilateral amygdala lesion patients, we would like to test for an approach bias across many 
classes of stimuli. 
Our threat scenario paradigm relied on self-report to imagined scenarios. While the 
scenario paradigm has been used by others in psychology, it is desirable to improve realism 
by immersing a participant in an experience rather than relying on the participant’s 
imagination. We would like to start to achieve this using virtual reality. Additionally, we 
would like to examine the import of individual differences, including those related to 
approach-avoidance behavior, such as anxiety and amygdala lesions. Further, we would 
like to corroborate explicit ratings with implicit, affective response measures.  
An obvious near-term goal for our Face-to-Face fMRI experiment would be to 
establish the statistical reliability of the patterns found by replicating the study in a second 
group or by increasing our sample size. Future analyses in the experiment include further 
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region of interest analyses, including defining ROIs from other studies, as well as 
idiosyncratically in subjects. Using these ROIs, we would like to look at individual 
differences in connectivity between regions as well as the time course of response to gaze 
conditions, to further characterize individual and group differences, and test whether group 
differences are driven by outliers or whether different sub-groups exist. Finally, we would 
like to extract a measure of autonomic response from the pupil in our eyetracking data, to 
potentially add condition-dependent fluctuations in autonomic processing to our model.  
Further Future Directions. Further future directions center around (1) improved 
ecological validity in measuring individual responses, focusing on implicit and affective 
response, and (2) continuing to probe social neuroscience in interaction.  
There is evidence that humans bodily react to affective stimuli, such as freezing to 
emotional stimuli (Roelofs et al., 2010). Measuring these implicit measures as well as any 
affective cues (autonomic response as well as changes in facial expression) will provide 
insight into individual differences as well as potential embodied processing in social 
cognition. Such embodied processing may be relevant in interactive paradigms, including 
ours in which the anterior insula (extending from the MSN inferior frontal gyrus region) 
was more strongly activated in the live than video condition.  
 In interaction, it will be important to study more dynamic, truly contingent actions. 
This has been done in EEG research relating coherence in interacting individuals’ brain 
activity measured at the scalp with bodily synchrony (Liao, Acar, Makeig, & Deak, 2015; 
Yun, Watanabe, & Shimojo, 2012). Body synchrony, including functions such as pupil 
mimicry (Kret, Tomonaga, & Matsuzawa, 2014), is an interesting area of research enabled 
by interactive techniques. Finally, to better understand the role of interaction in social 
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cognition, we should test whether human infants and other species (Banaji & Gelman, 
2013) and sensitive to the contingent, social presence of another being.   
Future. Social neuroscience is a young, rapidly growing field. By incorporating 
ecologically valid methods, especially interactive paradigms, the field is poised to 
exponentially increase our understanding of how our brains facilitate navigation of our 
incredible social environment.   
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